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Across the United States, at least 1,600 local governments in 40 states have enacted stormwater 
fees since the mid-1960s.  Many of these local governments enacted stormwater fees to finance 
costly infrastructure upgrades required by increasingly stringent federal and state regulation of 
stormwater systems and combined sewer overflows.  The sustained spread of stormwater fees 
across the United States over the past five decades reflects a significant shift of fiscal 
responsibility for operating, maintaining, and improving key public infrastructure systems to the 
local level.  This dissertation investigates the emergence, diffusion, and form of stormwater fees 
enacted by local governments in the United States over the past 50 years.  Structured by several 
theoretical frameworks and utilizing a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, this 
research identifies key vertical and horizontal intergovernmental dynamics influencing the 
enactment of stormwater fees by local governments across the country.  While underscoring the 
strong influence that federal and state regulation of municipal stormwater systems has played in 
popularizing stormwater fees among local governments in the United States, my research also 
highlights the crucial role that state-level statutory law, case law, and administrative approaches 
have had on expanding or contracting the options local governments have for implementing 
stormwater fees individually within their own jurisdictions and collectively across metropolitan 
regions.  My case studies of stormwater fee form suggest that the challenges to broadly scoped 
collective action characterizing stormwater management and finance in highly fragmented 
metropolitan regions may present transaction cost barriers too high to be surmounted without 
coercive intervention from a higher level of government, but that collective action of more 
limited scope can be achieved in relatively self-organized manner.  This research also 
demonstrates the enduring and important role that consulting firms and professional industry 
associations have played in influencing stormwater fee enactment by local governments across 
the United States over the past half-century. 
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PREFACE 
Most of the figures in this dissertation use color to represent certain information.  As such, 
viewing figures in black and white or greyscale will wash out some key information. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STORMWATER FEES 
1.1.1 What is a stormwater fee? 
A stormwater fee is a fee assessed by a governmental entity – typically a municipality, county, or 
special regional district in the United States – used to fund the operation, maintenance, and/or 
capital improvement of stormwater infrastructure.  Although various jurisdictions levy a variety 
of fees related to stormwater, this dissertation – similar to Matichich et al. (2013) – focuses on 
recurring (e.g., monthly, quarterly, annual) fees assessed against parcels of real property based 
on some estimate of the demands those parcels impose on a stormwater drainage system.  These 
recurring, parcel-based fees are distinct from one-time stormwater “impact” or “development” 
fees levied against new developments (e.g., Nelson 1995), although both recurring and one-time 
stormwater fees can use similar methodologies to calculate rates.  Recurring fees specifically 
designed to estimate the amount of stormwater runoff from parcels of real property also contrast 
with millage rates used to finance stormwater-related expenditures primarily in that property 
values do not bear any necessary or direct relation to the amount of stormwater runoff flowing 
from each parcel of real property.  Just as drinking water utilities charge user fees for drinking 
water collection, treatment, and distribution services, recurring, parcel-based stormwater fees – 
2 
often implemented as part of a stormwater utility1 – serve as user fees for stormwater 
conveyance, treatment, and/or other services.  Unless otherwise specified, any subsequent use of 
the term “stormwater fee” in this dissertation refers to this type of recurring, parcel-based 
stormwater fee.2   
The basis and formulae for calculating stormwater fees varies among jurisdictions, but 
the most common constructions calculate a fee based on the areal extent of impervious surfaces 
on a parcel of real property within the relevant jurisdiction.  The areal extent of impervious 
surfaces serves to estimate the amount of runoff generated from a parcel of real property as rain 
falls or as snow and ice melts, which – in turn and in theory – approximates demands placed on 
stormwater infrastructure and services.  Some jurisdictions vary or tier stormwater fee rates by 
customer class (e.g., residential, commercial, industrial).  Certain jurisdictions also exempt 
various properties (e.g., undeveloped land, roads, public parks, cemeteries) from stormwater 
fees.  Revenues generated by stormwater fees usually fund the operation, maintenance, and/or 
capital improvement of stormwater systems, although revenue use also varies among 
jurisdictions and can include financing activities such as flood mitigation, water quality 
protection, and administration of associated regulatory programs.  In some jurisdictions, 
stormwater fees are also combined with rebates, grants, customer assistance programs, credit 
programs, and – in at least one instance – a credit trading program (District of Columbia 
Department of Energy & Environment, 2018). 
                                                 
1 The term “stormwater utility” is often used to refer to one of three distinct concepts:  (1) in an 
administrative or organizational sense, referring to an organization governing stormwater services and infrastructure 
in a certain jurisdiction; (2) in a programmatic sense, referring to a program of stormwater services and 
infrastructure provided by a governing organization; or (3) in a narrower sense, referring only to a stormwater fee.  
In the organizational sense, the term “stormwater authority” is also used in place of “stormwater utility” in some 
states (e.g., Pennsylvania).  Even in the narrow sense, the term “stormwater utility” is sometimes used to distinguish 
different types of stormwater fee rate structures.  For instance, Kea, Dymond, and Campbell (2016) distinguish 
between “stormwater fees” charging customers a flat rate (e.g., $2 per month) and “stormwater utilities” charging 
customers a variable rate (e.g., based on the amount of impervious surface on each parcel of real property).  For 
purposes of this dissertation, I do not make this same distinction.  Rather, I refer to both flat and variable rate 
approaches as “stormwater fees.”  Furthermore, throughout this dissertation, I use the term “stormwater utility” in 
the organizational or programmatic sense, opting to use the term “stormwater fee” for the narrower sense. 
 
2 Names for these recurring, parcel-based stormwater fees vary by locality.  Some examples include:  
drainage fee (Austin, Texas); storm drainage management fee (Dallas, Texas); storm drainage service charge 
(Union, Ohio); municipal drainage utility system charge (Galveston, Texas); storm water user fee (Wadsworth, 
Ohio); storm water utility charge (Washburn, Wisconsin); stormwater management utility fee (Anderson, South 
Carolina); and stormwater utility / EPA fee (Bucyrus, Ohio). 
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1.1.2 Why stormwater fees? 
To understand why hundreds of local governments across the United States – as well as local 
governments in France (Le Nouveau, Deroubaix, Diou, & Tardivo, 2013), Germany (Bertram et 
al., 2017; Keeley, 2007), South Africa (Fisher-Jeffes & Armitage, 2013), Canada (Campbell, 
Dymond, Key, & Dritschel, 2017; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2016), as well as 
Australia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Poland (Tasca, Assunção, & Finotti, 2017) – have enacted 
stormwater fees over the last 50 years, we need to consider:  (1) what activities constitute 
stormwater services; (2) why stormwater services generally fall under the purview of local 
governments; and (3) what alternative institutional arrangements local governments have used – 
and might use – to finance provision and production of stormwater services. 
The stormwater services expected and demanded by citizens – and increasingly required 
by regulatory agencies – in the United States and elsewhere have evolved to include not only 
drainage systems (e.g., ditches, swales, pipes) to keep roads passable, and detention ponds to 
mitigate downstream channel erosion and flooding, but also watershed management technologies 
and strategies designed to protect the quality of receiving waters (Debo & Reese, 2003; 
Matichich et al., 2013).  Furthermore, in the roughly 800 communities across the United States 
that have combined sewer systems (United States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of 
Water, 2004) where stormwater and sanitary sewage flow together in one shared set of pipes, 
stormwater infrastructure and services directly interconnect with sanitary sewer services and 
infrastructure.  Even in communities with nominally separate sewer systems for sanitary sewage 
and stormwater, the separation between stormwater and sanitary sewer systems is not entirely 
complete due to various sources of inflow and infiltration, such as illicit roof drain connections 
and cracked sanitary sewer pipes (Bhaskar, Welty, Maxwell, & Miller, 2015). 
Stormwater services (e.g., flood prevention, drainage of real property, protection of water 
quality) exhibit two key characteristics of public services:  economically or physically infeasible 
exclusion; and the potential for joint – albeit congestible (Buchanan, 1965; Craig, 1987; 
Hochman, 1982) – use (V. Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977).  Accordingly, stormwater management is 
typically a public responsibility, at least in the United States (Poertner, 1981).  However, 
activities on privately owned parcels of real property (e.g., expanding an impervious driveway, 
installing a stormwater cistern) directly affect public stormwater systems.  Garner et al. (1994, p. 
4 
7) argue that stormwater fees involve a fundamental “redefinition of the way in which people 
think about runoff and stormwater management” from a conception of stormwater management 
“as a government service needed to solve a public problem” to a view that stormwater services 
are provided by the government primarily to manage runoff from privately owned real property. 
Debo and Reese (2003, p. 118) note that “municipal stormwater programs have been 
funded using a number of mechanisms... including property taxes, sales taxes, state revolving 
funds, road funding, user fees, bonding, and surcharges on other utility fees” with property-tax 
funding being the most common.  Debo and Reese (2003, p. 118-122) – among many others, 
including Bachhuber (2013), Brisman (2002), Garner et al. (1994), Honchell (1986), and Pigott 
(1993) – observe four primary advantages of stormwater fees as financing mechanisms for 
providing and producing municipal stormwater programs compared with other financing 
mechanisms:  (1) stability, by virtue of being a dedicated, service-specific user fee3 rather than a 
tax-derived revenue that has to compete in the budgetary process with other general government 
obligations such as schools and police protection;4 (2) adequacy, with sufficient revenue 
generated while staying below citizen-customer5 willingness to pay; (3) flexibility, both in how 
revenues are generated and towards what ends they are expended; and (4) perceived equity, with 
costs borne proportionally by users on the basis of the demands they place on stormwater service 
systems.  Compared with other mechanisms for financing stormwater services, stormwater fees 
also have several disadvantages, including:  higher design, implementation, and administration 
costs; and potential customer opposition (Keeley, 2007). 
The economic appeal of stormwater fees – in terms of efficiency and equity – can be 
illustrated by briefly considering how stormwater services are currently financed in some locales.  
Many communities across the United States currently finance stormwater and sewer services 
with charges based on potable water use, as measured by metered water inflow to residences, 
commercial establishments, industrial facilities, and institutional buildings.  While this financing 
mechanism adequately accounts for demands placed on sewer and stormwater conveyance 
                                                 
3 Many local ordinances – and some state laws – require that any revenues generated by stormwater fees be 
expended only for costs related to the operation, maintenance, administration, or capital improvement of stormwater 
infrastructure. 
 
4 The stability and dedicated nature of stormwater fee revenues can also expand and enhance opportunities 
for local governments to finance stormwater-related capital projects through bonded borrowing. 
 
5 I use the term “citizen-customer” in the tradition and spirit of Thomas (2013) and others. 
5 
networks – which, as noted previously, are combined systems in some parts of the United States 
– by water flowing down sink, shower, and washing-machine drains, fees based on potable water 
use fail to capture demands placed on conveyance systems by stormwater, which can account for 
a preponderance of total demand in combined systems during and after wet weather events (3 
Rivers Wet Weather, 2018).  Thus, in many parts of the United States, stormwater service 
demands are essentially unpriced, and a strong economic efficiency and equity argument can be 
made for implementing stormwater fees to amend the current water-meter-based financing 
system.  More specifically, if a local government finances investments in stormwater 
infrastructure systems solely with revenues derived from metered-water fees, a compelling 
argument can be made that properties with relatively high metered water use but relatively small 
stormwater demands (e.g., small residential parcels) bear an undue fiscal burden for these 
investments compared with properties with little or no metered water use but large stormwater 
demands (e.g., parking lots, shopping malls, big-box retail establishments).  By putting a price on 
stormwater service demand through a stormwater fee – which opponents sometimes disparage, 
oppose, and legally challenge, as a “rain tax” – a local government can not only generate revenue 
needed to operate, maintain, and improve critical infrastructure, but can also incentivize citizen-
customers to implement stormwater abatement practices on private property, especially by 
combining a stormwater fee with a concerted credit program.  In other words, by aligning service 
fees with service demand, and by incentivizing decentralized stormwater management, 
stormwater fees can play a crucial role in the efficient and equitable allocation of stormwater and 
sewer services within and among hydrologically interconnected jurisdictions. 
From an economic perspective, by pricing a previously unpriced economic externality, 
stormwater fees are a form of Pigouvian price instrument (Parikh, Taylor, Hoagland, Thurston, 
& Shuster, 2005; Thurston, 2006).  Compared with quantity instruments (e.g., cap-and-trade 
approaches) and command-and-control regulations, price instruments like stormwater fees offer 
certain advantages and disadvantages for abating stormwater pollution (Parikh et al., 2005; 
Thurston, 2006). 
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1.2 STORMWATER REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Two federal programs account for most of the increasing regulatory pressure on owners of 
stormwater infrastructure systems in recent decades:  (1) regulation of municipal separate storm 
sewer systems (MS4s); and (2) regulation of combined sewer overflows (CSOs).  Both of these 
regulatory programs were established as part of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (also known as the Clean Water 
Act),6 which prohibits any discharge of pollutants through “point sources” to any “water of the 
United States” that does not comply with the terms of an NPDES permit.  While state regulatory 
agencies assume primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of NPDES 
permits – including permits for MS4s and CSOs – in many states, the responsibility for enforcing 
and administering NPDES permits ultimately lies with the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA). 
1.2.1 MS4 regulations 
As defined by USEPA (2018) an MS4 is, “a conveyance or system of conveyances that is:  
owned by a state, city, town, village, or other public entity that discharges to waters of the U.S.; 
designed or used to collect or convey stormwater (e.g., storm drains, pipes, ditches); not a 
combined sewer; and not part of a sewage treatment plant, or publicly owned treatment works.”  
Federal regulation of MS4s was authorized by amendments to the federal Clean Water Act made 
by the Water Quality Act of 1987, reflecting an increased regulatory focus on pollution 
associated with “nonpoint sources” generally (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
1990; United States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Water, 1985, 1992b) and 
stormwater specifically (United States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Water, 
1983, 1992a). 
                                                 
6 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was originally enacted in 1948, but was completely rewritten by 
amendments enacted in 1972.  The NPDES program was established by the 1972 amendments. 
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The first phase of MS4 regulation by USEPA – known as Phase I MS4 regulations – were 
promulgated in December 1990,7 and required any MS4 in an incorporated place or county with 
a population over 100,000 people to obtain an NPDES permit.  Based on the population of the 
incorporated place or county, the Phase I MS4 regulations classified regulated MS4s as either 
“medium” (100,000 to 249,999 people) or “large” (more than 250,000 people).  In some states, 
the responsible state agency regulated some MS4s in places with populations less than 100,000 
under the Phase I regulations.  For example, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
regulated MS4s in many smaller towns and villages under the Phase I regulations, usually if the 
smaller communities were in the same county as or were in close geographic proximity to a 
medium or large MS4.  According to USEPA (2018), approximately 855 MS4s are regulated 
under the Phase I MS4 regulations.  The Phase I MS4 regulations also applied to certain 
construction and industrial activities (United States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of 
Water, 2005b). 
The Phase II MS4 regulations – finalized by USEPA in December 19998 – required any 
MS4 in an urbanized area,9,10 as well as any other MS4 designated by an NPDES permitting 
authority that was not regulated under the Phase I MS4 regulations, to obtain an NPDES 
permit.11  In addition to being located in an urbanized area, the Phase II MS4 regulations 
included two additional ways that MS4s could be regulated:  (1) serving a population of at least 
                                                 
7 Although the Phase I MS4 regulations were finalized in December 1990, the first permit application 
deadline was 18 November 1991 for large MS4s and 18 May 1992 for medium MS4s (Franzetti, 2005). 
 
8 Although the Phase II MS4 regulations were finalized in December 1999, the deadline for local 
governments to obtain permit coverage was 10 March 2003 (United States Environmental Protection Agency - 
Office of Water, 2000). 
 
9 The United States Census Bureau designates “urbanized areas” as Census-recognized communities of 
50,000 people or more.  Since the Census Bureau updates the urbanized area designations after each decennial 
national census, the population of MS4s regulated under the Phase II MS4 regulations expands over time.  However, 
the number of newly regulated Phase II MS4s following the 2010 census was very small compared with the number 
of MS4s regulated based on the 2000 census. 
 
10  Although the Phase II MS4 regulations technically only require permits for those areas delineated as 
urbanized areas by the Census Bureau, the permitted area for most regulated MS4s is the entire local jurisdiction, 
including non-urbanized areas (Galavotti et al., 2012).  In fact, 14 states require the entire local jurisdiction be 
included under Phase II MS4 regulations if any portion of the jurisdiction is delineated as an urbanized area 
(Galavotti et al., 2012). 
 
11 Although most MS4s are regulated under either the Phase I or Phase II MS4 regulations, some relatively 
small number of MS4s are regulated under both Phase I and Phase II MS4 regulations (Galavotti et al., 2012). 
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10,000 with a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile; or (2) contributing 
substantially to the pollutant loadings of a physically interconnected, regulated MS4 (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Water, 2012).  The “small” MS4s regulated 
under the Phase II regulations include a variety of “non-traditional” (i.e., non-municipal) MS4s, 
such as MS4s owned by universities, hospitals, prisons, federal military installations, as well as 
state and local departments of transportation.  According to USEPA (2018), roughly 6,700 MS4s 
are regulated under the Phase II MS4 regulations.  The Phase II MS4 regulations provided some 
flexibility in permitting, specifically regarding permit waivers and phasing-in of permits (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Water, 2005b, 2012).  The Phase II MS4 
regulations also applied to certain construction activities (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency - Office of Water, 2005b). 
The MS4 regulations require a permit holder to develop a stormwater management plan 
comprising six elements, known as “minimum control measures”:  (1) public education and 
outreach; (2) public participation/involvement; (3) illicit discharge detection and elimination; (4) 
construction site runoff; (5) post-construction runoff control; and (6) pollution prevention / good 
housekeeping (United States Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Water, 2005a). 
Local governments required to obtain NPDES permit coverage under the Phase I and 
Phase II MS4 regulations are located in every state (Figure 1.1).  The federal Clean Water Act 
limits the term of NPDES permits – including MS4 permits – to five years, meaning that most 
Phase I MS4s are currently in their sixth permit cycle, while most Phase II MS4s are currently in 
their third or fourth permit cycle (Galavotti et al., 2012). 
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Figure 1.1.  Map of regulated MS4s in the contiguous United States. 
[Map image from www.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater-discharges-municipal-sources.]
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1.2.2 CSO regulations 
In 1994, USEPA finalized its CSO Control Policy (United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 1994),12 which defines combined sewer systems (CSSs) and CSOs as follows: 
 
“A combined sewer system (CSS) is a wastewater collection system owned by a State or 
municipality... which conveys sanitary wastewaters (domestic, commercial, and industrial 
wastewaters) and storm water through a single-pipe system to a Publicly Owned 
Treatment Works (POTW) Treatment Plant...  A CSO is the discharge from a CSS at a 
point prior to the POTW Treatment Plant.” 
 
 
The CSO Control Policy set the stage for USEPA and state permitting authorities to begin 
regulating CSOs through NPDES permits.  In many places across the United States, enforcement 
of the CSO Control Policy has largely taken the form of consent decrees or consent agreements 
between USEPA, state and/or local regulatory agencies, and CSO permittees.  While the terms of 
these consent decrees, orders, and agreements vary, the CSO Control Policy generally aims to 
bring CSO permittees into compliance with the Clean Water Act by abating CSOs. 
The estimated 830 combined sewer systems in the United States (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Water, 2004) are mostly concentrated in states in 
the northeastern quadrant of the country, especially Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, New 
York, Michigan, West Virginia, Maine, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Vermont (Figure 1.2).  
The infrastructure upgrades required by enforcement of the CSO Control Policy are significant.  
For instance, in the Pittsburgh region, current estimates place the cost of bringing existing CSOs 
in compliance with the CSO Control Policy between $2 billion and $4 billion over the next 15 to 
20 years (Allegheny County Sanitary Authority, 2012).  Similar multi-billion-dollar investments 
are being mandated and made in many other metropolitan regions across the United States 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2018a). 
                                                 
12 The CSO Control Policy codified and elaborated the CSO Control Strategy finalized by USEPA in 1989 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1989). 
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Figure 1.2.  Map of CSO permittees in the contiguous United States. 
 [CSO permittee data from www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=004909c6679a4289b629a1c26278224c. 
Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research consists of three primary branches:  emergence, diffusion13, and form.  These three 
branches of inquiry focus on the following research questions: 
 
emergence:  Why, how, and under what conditions was the first stormwater fee in 
the United States enacted? 
 
diffusion:  How, why, and under what conditions did stormwater fees spread 
among local governments across the United States during the last 50 years? 
 
form:  Why have most stormwater fees in the United States been independently 
enacted by individual local governments rather than collectively by groups of 
local governments (e.g., all or some of the subcounty governments in a county or 
special-purpose district)? 
 
In other words, this dissertation inquires why certain local governments in the United 
States enacted stormwater fees in certain places, at certain times, and in certain forms.  Specific 
hypotheses associated with each of these broad research questions are presented in subsequent 
chapters. 
                                                 
13 Throughout this dissertation – especially in Chapter 3 – I use the term “diffusion” in the tradition of 
social and political scientists studying the diffusion of ideas or innovations (e.g., Rogers 2003) and policies (e.g., 
Berry and Berry 2014).  Whereas physical and natural scientists use the term diffusion to describe the movement of 
particles within physical, chemical, or biological systems according to certain physiochemical principles, political 
and social scientists use the term to describe the movement of ideas, innovations, or policies within social or 
political systems according to sociopolitical principles.  I discuss theories of policy diffusion in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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1.4 MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The primary motivation of this research is to better understand the birth, growth, and institutional 
structure of stormwater fees in the United States, phenomena that – to date – have been 
minimally examined with rigorous, systematic research.  As such, this research can be 
considered primarily “phenomenon-driven” research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  In addition 
to contributing to theoretical developments in an array of interrelated domains, this dissertation 
also advances the praxis of local and regional governance, particularly as pertains to stormwater 
and sewer management, especially in metropolitan regions within the American federalist system 
of government.  With respect to theory, the main challenge for this research was not in 
discovering or building appropriate theoretical frameworks, but rather in selecting from among 
an abundance of relevant frameworks.  This theoretical richness was particularly pronounced in 
framing my inquiry into stormwater fee forms, with many potentially applicable frameworks that 
focus on various aspects of institutional collective action and the governance of metropolitan 
regions.  Given this theoretical cornucopia, my research does not seek to build or discover new 
theory so much as to test, compare, and refine the scope and parameters of existing frameworks. 
1.4.1 Theoretical motivations and contributions 
Theoretically, this research is motivated by and contributes to the development of several 
theoretical frameworks:  collective learning; multiple streams; policy innovation and diffusion; 
and institutional collective action.  Specific motivations and contributions of this dissertation 
with respect to these primary theoretical frameworks are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 More generally, this research is theoretically framed in the extensive literature on 
intergovernmental relations, particularly in federalist systems like the United States, and 
particularly with respect to environmental regulation.  As noted previously, federal legislation – 
often filtered through state agencies – has predominately driven regulation of local and regional 
stormwater systems in the United States.  As such, regulation of stormwater systems in the 
United States can be seen as a continuation and extension of the “rise of mandates” era in 
American federalism, with the federal government asserting more direct control over domestic 
affairs once largely the purview of state and/or local governments (Derthick, 2008).  The 
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increased federal regulatory focus on stormwater and combined sewer systems over the past 
three decades has also occurred during a period when public spending on water and wastewater 
infrastructure by state and local governments increasingly outpaced federal spending (Musick & 
Petz, 2015).  Moreover, the federal regulatory focus on stormwater and combined sewer systems 
also followed the wave of “tax revolt” that began in the late 1970s, when many states imposed 
strong limitations on the taxing and spending powers of local governments (Bennett & 
Dilorenzo, 1982; Lowery & Sigelman, 1981). 
While regulation of stormwater systems in the United States has been mandated primarily 
by federal legislation, the processes leading to relevant federal regulations have often involved 
substantial negotiations with states, local governments, and other stakeholders.  For instance, the 
Phase 2 MS4 regulations arose out of a decade-long negotiated rulemaking process involving 
intense negotiations between USEPA and members of an advisory committee including 
representatives of local governments, industry groups, and other stakeholders (Ryan, 2011).  
Recognizing the wide variation in local circumstances, the final Phase 2 MS4 regulations 
specified only a set of minimum measures (i.e., the six minimum control measures), leaving 
regulated entities substantial flexibility in designing and implementing stormwater management 
programs (Aguilar & Dymond, 2016; Galavotti et al., 2012; Ryan, 2011). 
Along with the “vertical” dimension involving relations among federal, state, regional, 
and local levels of government, the regulation of stormwater systems in the United States also 
involves “horizontal” relationships among local governments, often within metropolitan or other 
geographic regions.  Like many problems of inter-municipal governance, the physical forces 
governing stormwater and sewer flows disregard jurisdictional borders, creating significant 
interdependences and potential externalities among neighboring local governments.  As such, the 
problem of managing interdependent stormwater and sewer systems involving multiple local 
governments represents one of many contentious and consequential challenges in inter-
municipal, regional, and metropolitan governance.  In an increasingly interconnected and 
globalized world, metropolitan regions have emerged as an important “unit of political process 
and economic competition” (D. Y. Miller & Lee, 2011).  However, in the absence of general-
purpose regional metropolitan governments, the highly decentralized, federalist system of 
American government presents many challenges to – and opportunities for – coordinated, 
cooperative, collaborative, and – failing all else – coerced collective action among quasi-
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sovereign metropolitan municipalities (D. Y. Miller, 2002; D. Y. Miller & Cox, III, 2014).  
These horizontal, inter-municipal aspects of intergovernmental relations are particularly pertinent 
to my inquiries into stormwater fee form. 
1.4.2 Practical motivations and contributions 
Across the United States, especially in many metropolitan regions, heated debates rage about the 
most efficient and equitable means to meet the interrelated and expensive regulatory 
requirements to abate water pollution from CSOs and MS4s.  Hundreds of municipalities across 
the country have decided that stormwater fees are a crucial component of overall, integrated 
stormwater and sewer management strategies because – as noted above – these fees not only 
provide vital revenues, but also more accurately price service demand, and can incentivize 
distributed investment in “green” infrastructure projects that attenuate stormwater runoff by 
retaining rainfall where it falls and meltwater where it melts.  Proponents maintain that such 
distributed, “green” strategies represent more efficient and equitable approaches than exclusively 
building larger pipes and treatment plants in the systems’ downstream reaches, a strategy which 
may place disproportionate financial burden on lowland municipalities.  By providing a 
comprehensive, rigorous evaluation of the evolution of stormwater fees among local 
governments in the United States, this research aims to help citizens, engineers, and elected 
officials better understand, debate, and design stormwater fees in their own jurisdictions. 
1.4.3 Existing stormwater fee literature 
A large body of publications over the past four decades have surveyed, documented, and 
analyzed various aspects of stormwater fees in the United States.  Some of the earliest 
publications detail the histories, characteristics, and benefits of stormwater fees and stormwater 
utilities implemented by specific local governments (Cyre, 1982, 1990; Diessner, 1990; Ferrari, 
1987; Garner, 1990; Honchell, 1986; Lynard, Finnemore, Loop, & Finn, 1980; Poertner, 1981; 
Stitt, 1986; H. Wilson, 1990).  From such case studies, and from principles and theories of public 
finance, these and other early publications (Cyre, 1983; Hardten, Benson, & Thomson, 1990; 
Mussman & Greig, 1991; Priede, 1990a, 1990b) discern sets of best practices, principles, and 
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strategies for local governments interested in establishing a stormwater fee or stormwater utility.  
At least one early study prospectively assessed the feasibility and potential impact of stormwater 
fees for a particular set of local governments (Lindsey, 1990a).  Building on the implementation 
principles, practices, and strategies emerging from the early literature, some publications 
following  the promulgation of the Phase 2 MS4 regulations in December 1999 focused 
specifically on assessing the potential of stormwater fees to help local governments meet the 
anticipated costs associated with the Phase 2 MS4 permit requirements (Brisman, 2002; 
Treadway & Reese, 2000).  Since the earliest case studies, researchers and practitioners have 
continued to document and analyze specific cases of local governments enacting, implementing, 
and defending stormwater fees and utilities (Anantapadmanabhan, 2016; Atherton & Kutz, 1995; 
A. T. Brown, 2001; Chandler, 2012, 2015; Charles River Watershed Association, 2007; 
Diessner, 1993; N. E. Gray, 1995; Grimes & Schumacher, 1992; Hargett, 1992; Hoskins, 2006; 
B. D. Keller, 1999; Lindsey, Rubleske, & Rummel, 1996; Niermeyer, 1993; Null, 1995; Preston, 
2008; Spray & Hoag, 2004; Veal & Mullins, 2003; Ward, Kabalin, & Sawatzky, 2003; Zolezi, 
2009). 
As stormwater fees and stormwater utilities became more prevalent across the United 
States, publications began to present comparisons among larger numbers of cases, continuing to 
document emerging trends and recommend implementation practices, principles, and strategies 
(American Public Works Association, 1991; Busco & Lindsey, 2001; Damico & Curtis, 2003; 
Finck & Tam, 2012; Forester Media, 2015a, 2015b; Grigg, 2013; Kaspersen, 2000; Lindsey, 
1988; Matichich et al., 2013; Metropolitan Area Planning Council, 2010; New England 
Environmental Finance Center, 2005; Reese, 2007a; Sharples, 2007; B. R. Smith, 2007; van der 
Tak, Bishton, Taylor, & Matichich, 2012; B. P. Walker, 2001; Woolson, 2004).  Some 
publications have focused solely on generalized practices, principles, and strategies for 
implementing stormwater utilities and fees with little to no mention of specific cases 
(Berthiaume, Quiroz, & Ivey, 2015; Duncan, 2001; Pigott, 1993). 
In analyzing the legal, administrative, and political issues facing local governments 
interested in implementing stormwater fees and utilities, some literature also focuses on or 
incorporate insights from court cases challenging various aspects of stormwater utilities and fees 
implemented by several local governments (Cyre, 1987; Garner et al., 1994; McCarter, 2014; 
Schoettle & Richardson, 1993; Zielke, 1990), including cases compiled and analyzed by a 
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national organization representing stormwater and wastewater agencies (National Association of 
Clean Water Agencies, 2014, 2016).  Building on earlier works, some publications also 
examined issues relevant to the enactment of stormwater fees and utilities by local governments 
in specific states, such as state statutes and case law (Anantapadmanabhan, 2016; Bowen, 2013; 
Chiaruttini, 2014; Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, 2013; Cooperwasser, 2012; Glass, 
2014; Horstmann & Bakare, 2017; Hoskins, 2006; Keehner & Trivedi, 2013; Lienhart et al., 
2013; Marsello, 2011; Maryland Department of the Environment, 2008; Palmer, 1993; 
PennFuture, 2017; Sauer, 2011; J. Smith, 2006; L. Wilson & Lindsey, 1995).  Some works have 
specifically focused on the feasibility of multi-municipal stormwater fees in specific areas 
(Rybarczyk, 2012).  One study even assessed the feasibility of a statewide stormwater utility in 
Vermont (Ali, Sandoval, & Schorr, 2013). 
Other  publications have focused on specific aspects of stormwater fees and stormwater 
utilities, such as:  credit programs, credit trading programs, and other stormwater retrofit 
financing programs (S. Brown & Sanneman, 2017; Doll & Lindsey, 1999; Doll, Scodari, & 
Lindsey, 1998; Dougherty, Hammer, & Valderrama, 2016; Ellard, 2010; Kertesz, Green, & 
Shuster, 2014; Reese, 1996, 2007b; Sands, 2012; Szalay, 2011; Twigg, 2014; Valderrama et al., 
2013; Valderrama, Levine, Yeh, & Bloomgarden, 2012); the impact of different fee structures 
(Fedorchak, Dymond, & Campbell, 2017); multi-jurisdictional approaches (Taylor, Thomas, 
Baughman, Taylor, & Abercrombie, 2007); assessment of stormwater fees on federal property 
(Kaspersen, 2011); public outreach (American Rivers, 2016; Beierle, Chinn, & Williams, 2013; 
Chandler, 2012, 2015; Henderson & Eckl, 2012; A. Vicari, 2015); and public perception 
(OpinionWorks, 2015). 
As stormwater fees and utilities became more widespread across the United States, a 
number of formal and semi-formal surveys (Benson, 1993, 2002; B. D. Keller, 2002; Lindsey, 
1990b) – and even meta-surveys (Lindsey & Doll, 1998) – emerged documenting and analyzing 
various characteristics of stormwater fees and utilities.14  While many of the earliest surveys are 
not readily accessible today, several surveys of stormwater utilities and fees have been and 
continue to be regularly administered at national (Campbell et al., 2017; Kumar, White, Jha, & 
                                                 
14 At least one survey of stormwater fees and utilities was conducted and reported as part of a survey of 
drinking water and sanitary wastewater fees (Raftelis Environmental Consulting Group, 1998). 
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Merritt, 2016),15 regional (Southeast Stormwater Association, 2015), and statewide (Florida 
Stormwater Association, 2016) scales.  The results of at least two state-specific stormwater fee 
surveys are available through interactive web applications (Harkins & Berahzer, 2017; Hughes & 
Kirk, 2018). 
In addition to the literature published by researchers and practitioners, USEPA has also 
directly published (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1997, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) 
or financed (Burchmore, Cyre, Harrison, Reese, & Tucker, 2006; LaDuca & Kosco, 2014) 
several guidance documents intended to provide information to help local governments assess, 
implement, and improve financing mechanisms for stormwater management programs. 
Although much of the literature on stormwater fees has focused on the United States, 
some publications examine stormwater fees in other countries including France (Le Nouveau et 
al., 2013), Germany (Bertram et al., 2017; Keeley, 2007), South Africa (Fisher-Jeffes & 
Armitage, 2013), Canada (Campbell et al., 2017; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 
2016), as well as Australia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Poland (Tasca et al., 2017). 
While the existing rich body of literature on stormwater fees is full of individual case 
studies as well as many cross-case comparisons and syntheses, very little existing literature – 
excepting Kea, Dymond, and Campbell (2016) – systematically or rigorously analyzes the 
political, demographic, geographic, and other factors driving the diffusion and form of 
stormwater fees in the United States. 
My research advances the existing literature on stormwater fees in the United States in 
four key ways.  First, the emergence branch of this dissertation presents a novel case study of 
what appears to be the first stormwater fee in the United States, a case that is largely overlooked, 
dismissed, or mischaracterized in the existing literature.  This case study identifies several 
important issues and themes that continue to characterize stormwater fee debates and 
deliberations today.  Second, building on Kea, Dymond, and Campbell (2016) and on Campbell 
et al. (2017), the diffusion branch of this research significantly advances the data and analyses on 
the patterns of stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United States.  Third, by 
contributing structured analyses of factors facilitating or inhibiting the formation and endurance 
of multi-jurisdictional stormwater fees, the form branch of this dissertation substantially extends 
the relatively limited subset of existing research into multi-jurisdictional stormwater fees. 
                                                 
15 In addition to the United States, Campbell et al. (2017) also survey stormwater utilities in Canada. 
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The fourth way this research advances the existing literature on stormwater fees is by 
analyzing stormwater fee phenomena through the lens of various established and emerging 
theoretical frameworks of public policy processes.  Although stormwater fees are undoubtedly 
public policies, this dissertation appears to be the first research to use theoretical frameworks of 
the policy process to frame inquiries into stormwater fee phenomena.  By structuring inquiries 
according to policy theoretic frameworks, this dissertation represents a first step towards 
organizing, executing, and interpreting stormwater fee research in more structured, consistent, 
and comparable ways.  This theoretically framed inquiry is crucial for discerning key causal 
mechanisms and contextual factors shaping stormwater fee policy outcomes across states, 
regions, and localities.  The existing literature is full of principles, strategies, best practices, and 
learned lessons inductively generalized from numerous case studies and cross-case comparisons.  
However, local elected officials, engineers, and citizens may benefit little – and may even 
potentially be misled – by recommendations or lessons inductively derived from the experiences 
other communities if those recommendations or experiences are not framed in a way that allows 
structured analyses of which contextual factors shaping stormwater fee outcomes vary between 
the relevant communities.  This research aims to provide practitioners of local and regional 
governance across the United States – and potentially in other countries – with theoretically 
structured sets of insights they can use to better understand, deliberate, and design stormwater 
fees in their own communities.  These insights should prove particularly useful in the many 
states where stormwater fees are not yet well or widely established (e.g., Pennsylvania, Maine, 
Missouri, Delaware, the Dakotas), especially those states currently without any documented 
stormwater fees (i.e., Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, Wyoming).  However, since stormwater fees are living institutions 
undergoing constant reevaluation, redesign, repeal, and resurrection, this research may also 
prove useful for communities in states where stormwater fees are long-established and already 
widespread (e.g., Florida, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, Texas, Ohio). 
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1.5 METHODOLOGY 
To investigate my research questions, I applied a medley of methods from along the quantitative-
qualitative spectrum.  I applied different modes of inquiry, methods of data collection, and 
analytical techniques along each of the three branches of inquiry outlined above.  By using a 
variety of methods and conceptual frameworks, this dissertation aims to provide rich, robust 
analyses of stormwater fee emergence, diffusion, and forms in the United States.  Further details 
about the methods used to investigate each of the three branches of this research are provided in 
the respective chapters. 
1.5.1 Qualitative case studies:  emergence and form 
To investigate stormwater fee emergence and form, I conducted largely qualitative case studies.  
While the emergence case study was necessarily historical, I considered a mixture of historical 
and contemporary evidence in the case studies of stormwater fee form.  In all the case studies, I 
extracted and collected evidence from archival records and documentation.  In the case studies of 
stormwater fee form, I amended the documentary and archival sources of evidence with a set of 
in-person, semi-structured interviews, the details of which I discuss further in Chapter 4. 
Since my motivation was to assess the applicability of existing theoretical frameworks 
rather than to build new theory, I used primarily descriptive and deductive rather than inductive 
analytical strategies to analyze the evidence generated in the case studies.  More specifically, I 
assessed the fit of each selected theoretical framework by comparing posited concepts and causal 
mechanisms with the empirically observed evidence in each case.  In this respect, my case study 
analyses employed deductive, theory-testing process tracing within each case (Beach & 
Pedersen, 2013).  In the form case studies where I had multiple cases, I also compared evidence 
and synthesized findings across the cases using explanatory typological analysis (Elman, 2005) 
based on selection of “diverse” (Gerring & Seawright, 2007) or “polar” (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) cases.  Whereas I compared across multiple cases using a single 
theoretical framework in inquiring into stormwater fee form, I compared the perspectives and fit 
of two distinct theoretical frameworks in a single case in inquiring into stormwater fee 
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emergence.  I discuss my approach to case selection for the emergence and form case studies in 
greater detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, respectively. 
1.5.2 Quantitative analyses:  diffusion 
To investigate stormwater fee diffusion, I conducted a predominately quantitative analysis of a 
cross-sectional dataset characterizing the approximately 39,000 legally recognized, general-
purpose local governments in the United States.  I used a variety of statistical, graphical, and 
mapping techniques to explore and explain patterns of stormwater fee diffusion in the dataset.  
The data and analytical techniques I used to inquire into stormwater fee diffusion are discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
1.5.3 Epistemology and ontology 
Although a detailed discussion of the philosophical perspectives and personal worldview 
undergirding this research is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I take a brief moment here to 
address some key epistemological and ontological considerations, following the advice of 
Creswell (2014, p. 6) to “make explicit the larger philosophical ideas.” 
I adopt and apply a generally pragmatic perspective in this research, “focusing attention 
on the research problem... and then using pluralistic approaches to derive knowledge about the 
problem” (Creswell 2014, p. 11).  This pragmatism, however, leans more towards a post-
positivistic perspective in some parts (i.e., in the more quantitative diffusion inquiries) and more 
towards interpretive or constructivist positions in other parts (i.e., in the more qualitative 
emergence and form inquiries).  In inquiring into stormwater fee diffusion, I rely on numerical 
and categorical data that I take to accurately represent, or at least estimate, some 
intersubjectively understood characteristics or concepts associated with some intersubjectively 
understood entities.  For example, in the diffusion inquiries, I analyze quantitative relationships 
between stormwater fee enactment by local governments in the United States and certain 
demographic variables regularly quantized by an agency of the federal government.  In 
conducting these analyses, I neither investigate the subjective meanings nor critically question 
the historical evolution of the concepts purported to be measured or estimated by these variables.  
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Relying primarily on words rather than numbers as representations of theorized concepts, the 
emergence and form branches of this research more centrally and explicitly focus on perception, 
interpretation, construction, and communication of individual and intersubjective realities.  Still, 
in these more qualitative case studies, I largely presume that the words people use reflect some 
intersubjectively understood concepts without critically questioning the values or contradictions 
underlying the concepts.  For example, in the emergence case study, several local officials 
express the importance of expanding storm sewers in the city to facilitate future “development.”  
In this research, I generally accept that “development” has or had some intersubjectively 
understood meaning without critically questioning the historical construction of the concept of 
“development” or exploring how the meaning of “development” varied among individuals in the 
case study beyond what those individuals expressed through their documented words. 
This pragmatic, flexible, and eclectic philosophical perspective is well suited to my 
mixed-methods mode of inquiry, and to the diverse, but interrelated array of phenomena and 
processes on which this research focuses. 
1.5.4 Validity and reliability 
A thorough review of the extensive literature on research validity and reliability (e.g., Creswell 
and Miller 2000; Cypress 2017; Denzin 1978; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Morse et al. 2002) is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.16  However, the importance of these issues to all research 
endeavors merits at least brief discussion here.  Adopting the largely post-positivist perspective 
described above, I relied on several procedures and techniques to ensure the validity and 
reliability of this research. 
Since the dataset used to inquire into stormwater fee diffusion was constructed primarily 
by compiling and extending several other datasets, the validity of my research into stormwater 
fee diffusion rests largely on the validity of the constituent datasets.  The reliability of my 
research into stormwater fee diffusion mainly rests on my use of standardized statistical 
techniques to analyze publicly available data.  Anyone with the time and a mind to do so can 
recreate the dataset and analyses used in my inquiries into stormwater fee diffusion. 
                                                 
16 Although I focus here on validity and reliability, I recognize that these terms are somewhat controversial, 
especially as applied to qualitative research where some researchers prefer terms like rigor or trustworthiness. 
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The procedural validity of the more qualitative parts of this research rely mainly on 
conceptual triangulation among data sources, theories, and methods (Creswell & Miller, 2000; 
Denzin, 1978).  As the sole investigator, it was not possible for me to triangulate with other 
investigators (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Denzin, 1978) during the course of this research.  
However, review of this research by my committee members and others has served as an 
additional validity check.  The validity of this research can be further examined post hoc through 
member checks by participants17 as well as auditing of my documentation by other researchers 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  The reliability of my case studies into 
stormwater fee emergence and form rests on three main pillars:  (1) the publicly accessible 
nature of most of the evidence; (2) use of established theoretical frameworks; and (3) use of 
fairly standard coding techniques.  Although the interviews I conducted in inquiring into 
stormwater fee forms are not replicable in any exact sense, I aimed to ensure the reliability of 
these sources of evidence by interviewing public officials using a semi-structured format and by 
providing a copy of the script I used in conducting the interviews (see Appendix C). 
                                                 
17 Some people I interviewed already confirmed the validity of the form case studies. 
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2.0  EMERGENCE 
Stormwater fees started somewhere.  This chapter investigates why, how, and under what 
conditions the first stormwater fee in the United States emerged.18 
2.1 THEORY 
In investigating the emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United States, I apply, compare, 
and contrast two theoretical frameworks:  the multiple streams approach – or framework – 
(Kingdon, 1984, 1995; Zahariadis, 2014) and the collective learning framework (Gerlak & 
Heikkila, 2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  These two frameworks are most appropriate to apply 
to the emergence branch of this research due to the focus of these frameworks on processes of 
policy production, creation, selection, innovation, emergence, and implementation. 
2.1.1 Multiple streams 
With roots in the “garbage can model” of organizational choice (M. D. Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1972), the multiple streams approach envisions public policies emerging from a turbulent, 
ambiguous decision-making system in which policy entrepreneurs create or take advantage of 
opportune moments (i.e., policy windows) to merge together the three streams posited to 
comprise a policy system:  problems, policies, and politics (Kingdon, 1984, 1995; Zahariadis, 
2014).  The multiple streams approach takes as its unit of analysis either an entire policy system 
                                                 
18 My claim that this case study examines the first stormwater fee enacted in the United States is based on 
review of the existing stormwater fee literature.  If a stormwater fee was enacted in the United States earlier than the 
case studied here, I did not find it documented in the existing stormwater fee literature. 
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or a particular decision within a policy system.  Here, I apply the multiple streams framework to 
analyze the particular decision of a local American government to invent and enact the 
stormwater fee policy.  The motivating question behind the multiple streams approach, as 
originally expressed by Kingdon (1984, p. 1) is “what makes an idea’s time come?”  The focus 
on the multiple streams approach on explaining the ripening of ideas makes this framework 
particularly well suited to frame my analyses of stormwater fee emergence. 
Although other theoretical frameworks could be defensibly applied to my inquiry of 
stormwater fee emergence, the multiple streams approach is an especially suitable theoretical 
framework to apply to this branch of my research because management and financing of 
jurisdictionally and physically complex stormwater and sewer systems – especially in 
institutionally fragmented metropolitan regions – often exhibit many of the policy system 
characteristics on which the multiple streams approach focuses.  By focusing on the process of 
political manipulation, the multiple streams approach flourishes in situations where problem 
definition and solution identification arise from dynamic, highly ambiguous, and inherently 
political processes of competitive, contentious meaning-making and information interpretation 
that no one person controls entirely, and within which end goals of various participants may not 
be completely clear or well defined (Zahariadis, 2014).  In the multiple streams approach, the 
process of political manipulation is characterized by actors using labels and symbols to 
strategically alter meaning and emphasize certain problem or solution dimension over others 
(Zahariadis, 2014).  The multiple streams approach posits a policy process wherein certain actors 
(i.e., policy entrepreneurs) with clear, typically self-interested goals manipulate policy-makers so 
that the policy-makers consider certain problem definitions and policy solutions (i.e., the 
definitions and solutions that serve the interests of the policy entrepreneur) over others.  
However, the multiple streams approach also posits that the acceptability of a policy solution is 
ultimately decided not by policy entrepreneurs, but by policy-makers acting in political and 
institutional contexts (Zahariadis, 2014).  I also consider the multiple streams approach to be an 
appropriate framework with which to analyze stormwater fee emergence because – in many 
respects – adoption of a stormwater fee represents a significant alteration of a normative 
structure in a community (i.e., beliefs about the appropriate relationship between private property 
and public services), just the sort of a situation posited by Rommetveit (1976) to be prime 
candidates for garbage-can decision-making (Zahariadis, 2014). 
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As reflected in my hypotheses regarding stormwater fee emergence – presented below – I 
focus on a few particular aspects within the multiple streams framework to help explain the 
emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United States.  Within the problem stream, I focus 
on how local indicators of stormwater impacts as well as focusing events (Birkland, 1997) 
combined to open a policy window within which the first stormwater fee in the United States 
emerged.  In the politics stream, I explore how the national mood regarding environmental 
protection – as reflected in the spate of federal environmental protection legislation enacted in 
the early and mid-1970s – influenced the emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United 
States.  With respect to policy entrepreneurs, I primarily explore which individuals and 
organizations played the role of policy entrepreneurs in the invention, consideration, and 
enactment of the first stormwater fee.  I specifically focus on the access policy entrepreneurs had 
to local decision-makers, the resources available to those policy entrepreneurs, and the strategies 
those policy entrepreneurs used to define the problem and sell the solution to policy-makers, 
taking into account the various elements posited to comprise the “primeval soup” (Kingdon, 
1984, 1995) of competing ideas in the policy stream (i.e., value acceptability, technical 
feasibility, resource adequacy, network integration). 
By applying the multiple streams approach in a novel case study of a stormwater fee 
policy enacted by a local government, I intend to contribute to the community of what Zahariadis 
(2014,  p. 44) terms “second-generation” multiple streams scholars demonstrating the “versatility 
and breadth of the framework” by applying it to different levels of government (i.e., sub-
nationally and internationally) and to new policies. 
2.1.2 Collective learning 
The collective learning framework integrates insights from organizational theory, network 
analysis, and public policy research in seeking to explain how learning products (e.g., new 
policies) emerge from learning processes, and how various features of collective settings (i.e., 
institutional structure, social dynamics, and technological / functional domains) – along with 
exogenous sociopolitical, physical, and economic shocks – influence individual and collective 
learning processes (Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  It is this focus of the 
collective learning framework on the processes by which new policies emerge that makes it an 
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appropriate choice for inquiring into the emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United 
States. 
The collective learning framework considers collective learning processes to occur as 
knowledge, information, and experience pass – although not necessarily in a linear or intentional 
fashion – through three phases:  acquisition, translation, and dissemination (Gerlak & Heikkila, 
2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  Within each of these learning phases, the collective learning 
framework posits a number of mechanisms, most of which can operate at the individual or 
collective level, such as:  informational search and deliberative dialogue in the acquisition phase; 
analysis and heuristic processing in the translation phase; and transference and collective 
routines in the dissemination phase (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  The collective learning 
framework also posits two types of learning products, each identified in earlier collective 
learning literature:  cognitive changes, such as new or altered ideas, beliefs, or values; and 
changes in collective behaviors or actions, such as new or altered routines, programs, plans, 
strategies, rules, or policies (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) posit that 
cognitive learning products necessarily precede – although do not always lead to – behavioral 
learning products. 
The collective learning framework also posits that an array of contextual factors can 
influence collective learning processes and products.  The collective learning framework 
categorizes three broad “internal” characteristics of a collective context – structure, social 
dynamics, and the technological / functional domain – all of which are likely to be influenced by 
prevailing rules and norms (Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  The collective 
learning framework also posits an array of “external” or exogenous factors outside the control of 
the actors in the collective” (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013).  Exogenous factors – such as the 
political, social, and economic climate – can influence collective learning processes and 
products, often in highly context-dependent ways. 
As a relatively new framework, my policy emergence research contributes to the 
development of the collective learning framework simply by examining how particular factors 
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shape collective learning processes in a novel19 case study.  My emergence case study also 
contributes to the development of the collective learning framework by applying the framework 
alongside the multiple streams framework, which provides points of contrast and comparison 
between the two frameworks. 
2.1.3 Multiple streams and collective learning:  complements and contrasts 
The collective learning framework offers an apposite contrasting – and, in some respects, 
complementary – perspective to the multiple streams framework.  For one, the information 
translation mechanisms posited in the collective learning framework (e.g., heuristic processing, 
mental framing) provide useful explanations of how exactly policy-makers and policy 
entrepreneurs interpret ambiguous information in the multiple streams framework.  Similarly, the 
information dissemination mechanisms in the collective learning framework (e.g., storytelling) 
also help explain how policy entrepreneurs strategically manipulate policy-makers in the 
multiple streams framework.  Moreover, both the multiple streams framework and the collective 
learning framework recognize the central role of values and beliefs in policy processes, and both 
highlight the importance of institutional structures. 
Despite these and other complementary points of connection between the multiple 
streams framework and the collective learning framework, there are also enough distinctions 
between the two frameworks to allow for contrasting interpretations and points of emphasis of 
how and why new policies emerge.  In fact, Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) explicitly distinguish 
learning processes from the action of policy entrepreneurs as two distinct paths by which policy 
change may occur.  Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) suggest that more research is needed to better 
understand how learning processes interact with other influences (e.g., policy entrepreneurs) on 
policy processes.  By applying both the multiple streams framework and the collective learning 
                                                 
19 Some existing literature discusses a stormwater fee enacted by the local government in my emergence 
case study.  However, as discussed below, the literature I reviewed identifies the stormwater fee enacted by this 
local government as having been enacted years later than the stormwater fee on which my case study focuses.  As 
such, my emergence case study is novel not in the sense that it is the first research to identify and analyze a 
stormwater fee enacted by this particular local government, but in the sense that it does appear to be the first 
research to inquire into a stormwater fee enacted by this local government years before the stormwater fee identified 
in the existing literature. 
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framework to my inquiry into the emergence of stormwater fees in the United States, this 
research is well positioned to assess the conceptual interconnections and gaps between the two. 
2.1.4 Hypotheses on stormwater fee emergence 
Informed by the multiple streams and the collective learning frameworks, as well as previous 
publications on stormwater fees in the United States, my inquiry into the emergence of the first 
stormwater fee in the United States aims to test the following hypotheses. 
 
multiple streams 
 
emergence hypothesis 1: 
The first stormwater fee enacted in the United States was motivated in part by 
local public officials anticipating increased compliance costs flowing from the 
focusing event of the 1972 amendments to the federal Clean Water Act, an event 
which also reflected a shifting balance of interests towards environmental 
protection nationally, but also and especially locally. 
 
emergence hypothesis 2: 
Indicators of local stormwater impacts (e.g., water quality deterioration, flood 
damage) brought to the attention of local decision-makers drove – in part – the 
consideration and eventual enactment of the first stormwater fee in the United 
States, activating interest and attention by indicating a violation of certain values 
(e.g., environmental stewardship, socioeconomic equity) or beliefs. 
 
emergence hypothesis 3: 
A policy entrepreneur or entrepreneurs with sufficient access, resources, and 
strategies played a key role in the enactment of the first stormwater fee in the 
United States by using the aforementioned indicators, focusing event, and shift in 
national and local mood to create a policy window from which the first fee 
emerged. 
 
collective learning 
 
emergence hypothesis 4: 
The enactment of the 1972 amendments to the federal Clean Water Act spurred 
the community that enacted the first stormwater fee in the United States to 
engage in search and deliberative dialogue to acquire information as to how they 
were going to meet anticipated compliance costs. 
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2.2 METHODS 
To investigate the emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United States, I conducted an 
historical case study of the stormwater fee enacted in Billings, Montana in 1964.  The case study 
method dovetails well with the theoretical frameworks I selected for the emergence branch of 
this research, particularly because the multiple streams approach emphasizes the strong context 
dependence of policy decisions and because the collective learning framework suggests that 
process-based research strategies are best suited for inquiring and understanding how learning 
products emerge from learning processes. 
2.2.1 Case selection 
According to previously published work (Campbell et al., 2017; Cyre, 1982; Diessner, 1990, 
1993; Lindsey, 1990b; Poertner, 1981), the earliest stormwater fees in the United States were 
implemented between 1968 and 1974, primarily by city governments in the Pacific Northwest 
and Mountain West, including:  Bellevue, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Boulder, Colorado; 
and Billings, Montana.20  Although I designed this research and formulated hypotheses about 
stormwater fee emergence based on indications in previous work that the first stormwater fees in 
the United States were enacted in the late-1960s to mid-1970s, my initial research revealed that 
the stormwater fee in Billings, Montana was first implemented in 1964.21  While stormwater fees 
first enacted in the late-1960s and throughout the 1970s may represent cases of policy emergence 
or invention (Berry & Berry, 2014) independent of the Billings stormwater fee enacted in 1964, 
this research focuses on the Billings case as apparently the first instance of stormwater fee 
enactment in the United States. 
                                                 
20 While disagreeing on the year in which some of the earliest stormwater fees were first enacted, these 
previously published works agree – or at least do not contradict the other works – that the year of first 
implementation was prior to 1980 for these four cities. 
 
21 The existing literate may largely overlook the Billings case as the first stormwater fee in the United 
States because the stormwater fee enacted in Billings in 1964 was not implemented as part of a “stormwater utility.”  
As noted by Burchmore et al. (2006), the existing literature on the earliest stormwater fees in the United States 
largely focuses on stormwater fees implemented as part of a stormwater utility, such as in Bellevue, Portland, and 
Boulder.  The stormwater fee enacted in Billings in 1964 was implemented not as part of a stormwater utility but as 
a mechanism to finance a citywide bond issuance for a storm sewer expansion project. 
31 
2.2.2 Sources of evidence 
The primary sources of evidence for this case study were newspaper articles.  I reviewed 
microfilms of three newspapers operating in the Billings area in the mid-1960s:  the Billings 
Gazette, the Billings Times, and the Laurel Outlook.22  Having obtained evidence that the 
Billings city council enacted a stormwater fee in July 1964, I focused my review of the 
newspaper articles on the timeframe between April and November 1964, a few months before 
and after enactment of the stormwater fee.  I browsed microfilms from the three newspapers 
looking for articles, advertisements, editorials, public notices, and any other items potentially 
related to stormwater issues in the city.  I supplemented the newspaper records with evidence 
obtained through personal communication with several people in Billings.  Another key piece of 
evidence was a legal opinion written by a justice on the Supreme Court of Montana in a court 
case about the stormwater fee enacted in Billings in 1964.  In Appendix A, I present images of 
each piece of evidence cited in the main text, with key passages highlighted.23 
2.2.3 Evidence coding 
I coded sources of evidence using a coding framework comprised of key concepts identified in 
the multiple streams framework (Figure A.1) and the collective learning framework (Figure 
A.2).24
                                                 
22 Microfilms borrowed through inter-library loan from the Montana Historical Society. 
 
23 For ease of navigation, the parenthetical citations of evidence in the main text are hyperlinked to the 
relevant images in Appendix A, and the evidence images in Appendix A are hyperlinked back to the section of this 
chapter in which each piece of evidence is first cited. 
 
24 Coding performed using NVivo 11 software. 
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2.3 RESULTS 
2.3.1 A fee is born 
On the evening of Monday 27 July 1964, members of the city council in Billings, Montana voted 
9-1 to approve Ordinance 3082 (Billings City Council, 1964), which established the first 
recurring, parcel-based stormwater fee in the United States (Blythe, 1964f).  The stormwater fee 
enacted in Billings in 1964 was a tiered structure based on the total square footage of parcels of 
residential and commercial real property in the city (Blythe, 1964f; “Council Sets Rates, Charges 
and Rentals to Pay for $4 Million Dollar Storm Sewer,” 1964). 
The Billings city council enacted the stormwater fee to finance a $4,000,000, 20-year 
bond issue to expand and improve storm sewers in the city (Blythe, 1964f; “Notice of Special 
Election: City of Billings, Montana,” 1964).  Billings voters narrowly approved the storm sewer 
bond issuance – 6,827 votes (51.2%) in favor versus 6,512 votes (48.8%) against25 – as part of a 
primary election on Tuesday 02 June 1964 (“Bond Issues Appear to Make Clean Sweep,” 1964).  
As a revenue bond issue, the storm sewer bond issue required only a simple majority of votes for 
approval (Blythe, 1964c).  In addition to candidates for the federal and state legislatures, 
governor, state supreme court, and a variety of other elected offices, two other bond issues – a 
$380,000, 20-year city bond issue for construction of a new fire station in western Billings26 and 
a $500,000, 20-year county bond issue for construction and furnishing of a new nursing home – 
were on the same ballot as the city storm sewer bond issue.  Although voters approved all three 
bond issues, the vote on the storm sewer bond issue was much closer – a roughly 2.4% margin – 
                                                 
25 According to decennial census records, the population of Billings aged 18 years or older was 32,715 in 
1960 and 39,843 in 1970.  With 13,339 total votes cast, this means roughly 33% to 40% of the city’s voting-age 
population cast votes on the storm sewer bond issue.  However, the number of voters registered for the 1964 primary 
election in Yellowstone County was 33,322 (“Primary Ballots Could Be 203,000,” 1964).  With the population of 
Billings accounting for roughly 66% of the county population in 1960 and 70% in 1970, the number of registered 
voters in the city casting votes in the storm sewer bond issue can be estimated at closer to 56% to 60%. 
 
26 The fire station city bond issue was to finance relocation of two existing fire stations – the south side and 
Pioneer Park stations – to a newly constructed station in the West End subdivision as well as purchase of some 
additional firefighting equipment and construction of a firemen’s training tower (“For a Better Billings,” 1964). 
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than the nursing home and fire station issues, which were each approved by more than 35% 
margins (“Bond Issues Appear to Make Clean Sweep,” 1964). 
The 1964 storm sewer bond issuance in Billings focused on a sizable area of western and 
southwestern Billings (Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3), parts of which had been recently 
annexed into the city, and much of which was prone to flooding.  Prior to the storm sewer 
expansions, drainage in the western parts of the city primarily relied on a series of irrigation and 
drainage ditches.  The storm sewer expansions associated with the bond issuance would roughly 
double the city’s then-existing storm sewer conveyance capacity (Blythe, 1964b). 
Much of the technical work designing the proposed storm sewer expansion (Figure 2.1, 
Figure 2.2) was done by Morrison-Maierle Co., a local engineering firm contracted by the city.  
While available evidence does not directly indicate who came up with the idea for a stormwater 
fee to finance the storm sewer bond issue, some evidence suggests that Morrison-Maierle – 
which signed a contract with the city for the storm sewer expansion project in 1961 – may have 
not only originated the idea of a stormwater fee and introduced it to the city council as part of the 
“vast amount of research” the firm put into designing the project (Blythe, 1964c), but was also – 
along with two other engineering firms with offices in Billings – involved in planning “the 
promotion and public relations for acquiring the necessary financing” for the project (“Hearing 
Set in Airport Manager Dismissal Case,” 1964).  Other evidence, discussed below, indicates that 
the city considered five alternative methods of assessing fees to finance the storm sewer bond 
issue, but the available evidence does not clearly indicate who proposed these alternative 
financing mechanisms or if the city evaluated these alternatives independently or in consultation 
with Morrison-Maierle. 
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Figure 2.1.  Storm sewer expansion plans (schedules II-VII) 
produced by Morrison-Maierle for the City of Billings in the mid-1960s. 
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Figure 2.2.  Storm sewer expansion plans (schedules VIII-XIII) 
produced by Morrison-Maierle for the City of Billings in the mid-1960s. 
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Figure 2.3.  Mid-1960s storm sewer planned expansions in Billings, Montana 
shown relative to the current road networks and city boundaries in the Billings region.  [Storm sewer plans digitized from original schedules. 
Road and jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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2.3.2 Advocates 
Supporters of the storm sewer bond issue recognized that sewers – as underground infrastructure, 
largely out of sight of the public – may be a harder sell to voters than for more visible initiatives 
such as a fire station or nursing home.  However – in addition to framing the project as crucial to 
the long-term development of the city – supporters of the storm sewer bond issue maintained that 
the storm sewer expansion would save all city taxpayers money in the long run by preventing 
significant maintenance and repair costs for flooded and washed out streets, since road 
maintenance was managed on a city-wide basis. 
Supporters of the storm sewer bond issue included some prominent civic organizations in 
the city.  In advance of the storm sewer bond issue vote, the community planning committee of 
the Billings Chamber of Commerce released a statement supporting the project (“Absentee 
Voters Cast Bond Ballots,” 1964).  Organized support for the storm sewer bond issue also 
included the posting of a relief map illustrating the need for expanded storm sewers placed in 
west end shopping centers, pamphlets enclosed in water bills mailed out before the vote, and 
letters of support mailed to approximately 50 local civic organizations by the Greater Billings 
Association (“Absentee Voters Cast Bond Ballots,” 1964).  The Greater Billings Association also 
took out a full-page ad supporting the storm sewer and two other bond issues, which ran in the 
Billings Gazette on 26 May and 01 June 1964 (Greater Billings Association, 1964).  The League 
of Women Voters of Billings also published more impartial, factual information about the three 
bond issues in the May 1964 issue of Campaign Facts (League of Women Voters of Billings, 
1964). 
Local newspaper coverage – especially in the Billings Gazette – leading up to the 02 June 
1964 vote was generally very supportive of the storm sewer bond issue.  In addition to two 
articles by reporter Sam Blythe, the Gazette ran unattributed editorials and other articles 
explicitly supporting the bond issue (Blythe, 1964b, 1964c, “For a Better Billings,” 1964, 
“Mayor Sees Major Need for Sewers,” 1964, “Vote ‘Yes’ on the Bond Issues,” 1964).  After the 
vote, the president of the Billings Chamber of Commerce publicly thanked the Gazette for “its 
outstanding efforts in its educational work” on the bond issues (“Bond Issue Votes Please 
Officials,” 1964). 
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2.3.3 Opposition 
Opposition to the storm sewer bond issue seems to have been centered around Billings residents 
in the proposed project area who felt they did not need and would not benefit from storm sewers 
(“Absentee Voters Cast Bond Ballots,” 1964) and residents in areas already served by storm 
sewers who felt that they would be paying to improve other people’s property with little or no 
tangible benefit to their own property (Blythe, 1964b).  Regarding the latter group, the lone 
councilmember to vote against the stormwater fee ordinance summarized the opposition 
succinctly:  “The rich people of the fourth ward are helping to pay for sewers for the poor people 
of northwest Billings” (Blythe, 1964f).  Supporters of the storm sewer bond issue, however, 
emphasized the interconnected nature of the city’s storm drainage system and that the expanded 
drainage infrastructure would alleviate overloading of existing drainage facilities (Blythe, 1964b, 
1964c; Greater Billings Association, 1964).  Some of the opposition to the storm sewer bond 
issue also apparently arose from concerns and confusion related to charges associated with the 
city’s sewage treatment plant (Blythe, 1964c, 1964d). 
2.3.4 When it rains 
In addition to positive coverage in the Billings Gazette, and support from the mayor and other 
key city officials, the weather also may have played a role in voters approving the storm sewer 
bond issue.  After a particularly dry winter, a series of spring rainstorms caused substantial 
flooding in parts of the city – particularly the west end (“Rain Sends Creek Over Banks,” 1964) – 
which the city engineer believed would help approval of the storm sewer bond issue (“Storm 
Leaves Road, Bridge Crews Busy,” 1964).  For April 1964, the United States Weather Bureau 
recorded 4.11 inches of precipitation in Billings, well above the historical average for April of 
1.31 inches (“City’s Rainfall 3 Times Normal,” 1964, “Torrential Rains Hit Billings,” 1964).  On 
Thursday 28 May 1964 – just days before the vote on the storm sewer bond issue – a collapsed 
irrigation ditch washed out a 100-foot section of street in the western part of the city, which the 
city street superintendent and a school district consultant said acutely illustrated the need for 
storm sewers in the area (Proctor, 1964).  Wet weather and flooding – particularly in the western 
and southern parts of the city – continued leading up to the storm sewer bond issue vote, with 
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another storm dumping over 1.5 inches of rain Friday 29 May 1964 (Blythe, 1964e; “Southeast 
Billings Slough,” 1964, “Torrential Rains Hit Billings,” 1964). 
2.3.5 Who benefits?  Who pays? 
Around the same time as citizens of Billings were debating and voting on the storm sewer 
expansion project and associated bond issue, the recently annexed area in southwest Billings was 
also the subject of public debate with respect to provision of sanitary sewerage.  In early May 
1964, Mayor Willard Fraser voted against the creation of two new sanitary sewer special 
improvement districts to serve the area, breaking a 5-5 tie vote by the city council (Blythe, 
1964a).  The members of city council voting against the sanitary sewer special improvement 
districts were primarily concerned that the city would become fiscally responsible for the costs of 
the proposed districts if the annexation of the area in question were found to be illegal in a then-
unresolved lawsuit (Blythe, 1964a).  Other members of city council argued that residents of the 
newly annexed area were now officially part of the city and that many of these residents 
supported annexation specifically so they could receive sanitary sewer services from the city 
(Blythe, 1964a).  In mid-May 1964, after the city declined to create a special improvement 
district for sanitary sewers in the recently annexed area, commissioners for Yellowstone County 
passed a resolution of intent to create a metropolitan special improvement district to provide 
sewers for the area (“Commissioners Approve MSID,” 1964). 
In the mid-1960s, special improvement districts and other special districts were very 
common institutions for financing the provision of an array of services in and around Billings, 
including:  garbage collection; construction of curbs, gutters, and sidewalks; installing and 
maintaining fire hydrants; weed cutting and removal; street light maintenance; and street 
sprinkling (i.e., dust suppression).  As such, a special improvement district for storm sewers 
represented a conceivable alternative to a city-wide bond issue for financing storm sewer 
expansions in the western parts of the city in 1964.  In fact, Jack Mueller – then the surveyor for 
Yellowstone County – filed a suit against the city in 1962 alleging that an interceptor sanitary 
sewer trunk line in the city’s west end was illegally financed through a special improvement 
district, and that the sanitary trunk lines should have been financed through city-wide bonds 
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(“Sanitary Sewer Suit Still On,” 1964).27  The choice between a city-wide bond issue versus a 
special improvement district largely boils down to a choice about how widely distributed the 
costs of a project should be.  As noted previously, some people opposed the storm sewer bond 
issue precisely because they felt that the costs of the project should be borne only by those who 
would directly benefit from the project, a position which implicates a special improvement 
district.  Meanwhile, supporters of the storm sewer bond issue contended that the city-wide bond 
issue was an appropriate financing mechanism because the entire city would benefit from the 
project.  The city apparently had considered a special improvement district for the storm sewer 
expansion project, but abandoned the idea after the lawsuit was filed contesting the legality of 
the annexation of the area that was the focus of the project (“Mayor Sees Major Need for 
Sewers,” 1964).  Supporters of the city-wide bond issue repeatedly argued that the benefits of the 
storm sewer expansion project would extend beyond the immediate project area, including the 
city engineer’s reported assertion that, “All of the city will benefit from construction of Billings 
proposed storm sewer system even if some areas are not in the immediate construction zone” 
(Blythe, 1964c). 
Arguments about the distribution of costs and benefits of the storm sewer expansion 
project featured prominently in a crucial legal challenge of the Billings stormwater fee.  After the 
stormwater fee became effective in Billings in September 1964, reports circulated that the 
Yellowstone County Taxpayers’ Association planned to protest the city’s stormwater fee 
(“Group May Protest Charges for $4 Million Bond Issue,” 1964).  The county taxpayer 
association, joined by some individual property owners in the city, did in fact challenge the 
Billings stormwater fee in a lawsuit that was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of 
Montana (City of Billings v. Nore, 417 P.2d 458, 1966).28  The city’s stormwater fee was upheld 
in the initial case tried in the District Court of Yellowstone County29 as well as in the case before 
the state supreme court, but a brief examination of some of the legal arguments and reasoning in 
                                                 
27 As of late May 1964, Mueller’s suit remained unresolved and reviewed evidence did not indicate the 
outcome of this suit. 
 
28 My discussion of the county taxpayer association’s legal opposition to the Billings stormwater fee is 
based on the opinion written by Justice Wesley Castles in the case before the Supreme Court of Montana.  This 
opinion is available at http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/1966/11038-0.html. 
 
29 In the legal challenge of the Billings stormwater fee, the District Court of Yellowstone County entered 
two judgments – one on 15 March 1965 and one on 26 October 1965 – that were combined on appeal to the state 
Supreme Court. 
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this dispute illustrates some salient points.  One of the crucial objections raised by the parties 
opposing the Billings stormwater fee was that, despite a uniform fee structure across the city, the 
proposed storm sewer expansion project would disproportionately benefit residents living in the 
immediate project area.30  In assessing this and other objections to the Billings stormwater fee, 
the Supreme Court relied largely on testimony given in the county district court trial by Ed 
Waldo, the general manager of the city’s water department.  Waldo testified that the city 
considered five possible methods of setting rates to finance the storm sewer bond issuance, 
namely a charge for each property based on:  (1) the number of water connections; (2) the 
amount of water consumption; (3) the assessed land valuation; (4) area alone; and (5) a 
combination of area and use class.  In explaining why the city decided on the combination of 
area and use class, Waldo connected the decision to considerations of equity, proportionality of 
fees and usage, impervious surfaces, and runoff: 
 
“We were charged with... determining an equitable means of arriving at a charge and as 
this involved the construction of a storm sewer system we wanted to apportion our cost or 
the charge... in proportion to the utilization of that facility by the property that was going 
to be served.  To do this we differentiated between commercial and residential property.  
On the average in Billings here the commercial property is more impervious than 
residential property... and the runoff from the commercial property generally speaking 
would be greater than the runoff from residential property...  The other factors of course 
would be the actual area of the property itself, and by using a combination of these we 
felt that we were arriving at the most equitable means of paying for the storm sewer 
system.” 
 
Ed Waldo 
City of Billings 
Water Department Manager 
as quoted in City of Billings v. Nore, 417 P.2d 458 (1966) 
 
                                                 
30 The parties opposing the Billings stormwater fee raised numerous other objections, most of which the 
court dismissed as ill-founded in fairly short order.  The other key issue seriously considered by the court centered 
on whether the ordinance enacting the fee was a legislative act subject to ballot initiative, or an administrative act 
not subject to initiative.  This issue was central to the case because the dispute over the stormwater fee formally 
began on 14 December 1964 when citizens filed petitions with the city clerk demanding a vote to either uphold or 
repeal the ordinance enacting the stormwater fee.  In response to the petitions, the city contended that the ordinance 
was not a legislative act, but an administrative act.  The city’s position was that the ordinance establishing the 
stormwater fee passed by a vote of city council 27 July 1964 was an administrative act to finance the bond 
proposition which the necessary majority of city voters had approved 02 June 1964.  Based on the provisions in the 
bond proposition, the ordinance establishing the stormwater fee, and relevant sections of state statutes, the court 
agreed with the city’s position on the “merely administrative” – as opposed to legislative – nature of the stormwater 
fee ordinance.  Moreover, based on state statute, the court found that the city council “had the duty to impose the 
rates following the affirmative bond issue vote” (City of Billings v. Nore, 417 P.2d 458, 1966). 
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The proportionality of the stormwater fee to the estimated runoff and utilization of storm 
sewer service was crucial to the court’s reasoning in upholding the fee: 
 
“The charges are imposed and determined according to the nature and area of the real 
property which will be served by the storm sewer system, in other words, for the use of 
the facilities.” 
 
City of Billings v. Nore, 417 P.2d 458 (1966) 
 
In addition to Waldo’s testimony, the court found ample evidence in the record that the 
storm sewer expansion project would benefit residents living outside the immediate project area: 
 
“The record shows the following reasons for the proposed improvements:  the present 
storm sewer system has been overloaded causing surcharging of water back into homes 
and business properties; excess water is collecting in the streets and other places causing 
excessive maintenance expenses and danger to the health and welfare of city residents; 
and the present sanitary sewer system is receiving excessive infiltration of water which 
would be stopped by a proper storm sewer system. Furthermore, if the proposed 
improvements are made, the cost of street repairs necessitated by the poor drainage will 
be minimized, the construction of permanent-type pavements will be encouraged, the 
flow of vehicular traffic will be protected and improved, safety and health standards will 
be enhanced, and unsightly and unsanitary conditions will be removed. 
 
When we examine the foregoing reasons, it becomes apparent at once that not only are 
residents within the proposed sewer extension system to be benefited by its adoption, but 
also residents living within the present storm sewer system will be benefitted.” 
 
City of Billings v. Nore, 417 P.2d 458 (1966) 
 
In assessing the claim about unequal benefits, the court also cited a pertinent section of 
state statute, which refers to indirect as well as direct services and benefits: 
 
"Any city... may when authorized so to do by a majority vote of the qualified electors 
voting on the question... construct... and/or extend a storm and/or sanitary sewerage 
system... and may operate and maintain such facilities for public use...  such municipality 
shall have authority, by ordinance duly adopted by the governing body to charge just and 
equitable rates, charges or rentals for the services and benefits directly or indirectly 
furnished thereby.” 
 
Revised Codes of Montana 
Section 11-2217, as quoted in 
City of Billings v. Nore, 417 P.2d 458 (1966) 
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2.4 DISCUSSION 
The case study of the stormwater fee enacted in Billings, Montana in 1964 illustrates that a few 
key issues central to the emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United States continue to 
permeate contemporary discussions and debates about stormwater fees.  First, as evinced in 
Chapter 4, the arguments about the distribution of costs and benefits associated with the Billings 
stormwater fee continue to be a prominent theme in debates about stormwater fees in the United 
States more than 50 years later.  This theme has also been recognized throughout the existing 
literature on stormwater fees.  For example, Cyre (1986) observed that, “a utility approach to 
stormwater management and financing may create controversy in your community.  It will alter 
‘who pays’ for stormwater services and facilities, with financial impacts sufficient to provoke 
political and legal challenges.”  A second key aspect of the Billings case study is the crucial role 
that state statutes and a decision from the state supreme court played in the Billings stormwater 
fee withstanding a legal challenge.  The continuing importance of state-specific statutory law and 
case law on the diffusion and form of stormwater fees in the United States will be prominently 
evinced and discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively.  Thirdly, the Billings case also 
suggests the key role that private consulting firms can play in enactment of a stormwater fee.  
While the available evidence does not definitively identify with whom the stormwater fee idea 
originated, the evidence does strongly suggest that Morrison-Maierle played a key role in the 
enactment of the stormwater fee in Billings in 1964.  The importance of private consulting firms 
in the enactment of stormwater fees in the United States is a theme that remerges in both 
subsequent chapters, and that is strongly indicated in the existing stormwater fee literature, as 
discussed towards the end of Chapter 3. 
2.4.1 Comparing frameworks 
Available evidence on the enactment of the stormwater fee in Billings, Montana in 1964 reflects 
many concepts identified in the multiple streams framework and collective learning framework 
(Table 2.1, Figure A.31). 
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Table 2.1.  Coding summary for the emergence case study. 
Numbers indicate how many times each concept was coded by source and timing. 
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COLLECTIVE LEARNING 
            Learning Processes 
                acquisition 
                    deliberative dialogue 4 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 
            search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        dissemination 
                    collective routines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
            transference 7 0 0 4 2 1 0 0 
        translation 
                    analysis 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
            heuristic processing 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
    Learning Products 
                behavior changes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        cognitive changes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Contextual Factors 
                institutional structure 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
        social dynamics 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
        technological / functional domain 4 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 
    Exogenous Factors 10 0 4 0 5 1 0 0 
    Prevailing Rules and Norms 14 0 1 7 4 1 0 1 
MULTIPLE STREAMS 
            Problem Stream 
                focusing events 11 0 4 0 5 2 0 0 
        indicators 10 0 2 3 5 0 0 0 
    Politics Stream 
                balance of interests 13 1 1 7 3 1 0 2 
    Policy Stream 
                technical feasibility 4 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 
        value acceptability 15 0 1 6 4 3 0 1 
    Policy Entrepreneurs 
                access 3 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 
        resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The most frequently expressed concepts in the available evidence were related to what 
the collective learning framework terms “prevailing rules and norms” or what the multiple 
streams framework terms “value acceptability” (Table 2.1, Figure A.31).  The strong 
concurrence of these related concepts across the two frameworks reflects the central role of 
values and beliefs in policy processes posited by both frameworks.  These related concepts were 
expressed most frequently by advocates of the storm sewer bond issue – especially in the weeks 
leading up to the vote (Table 2.1) – who typically framed the issue in terms of community values 
and norms including moral obligation and economic progress.  The other most frequently 
expressed concept was the “balance of interests” posited by the multiple streams framework 
(Table 2.1, Figure A.31).  This concept was central to the issue of who benefits and who pays in 
the debate over the storm sewer bond issue. 
Another prominent set of interrelated concepts in the available evidence manifested in the 
weather.  The unusually wet weather in the days, weeks, and months leading up to the vote 
represents a key “exogenous factor” through the lens of the collective learning framework, or a 
series of “focusing events” through the lens of the multiple streams framework (Table 2.1, Figure 
A.31).  In the multiple streams framework, these focusing events acutely emphasized conditions 
that many actors in the policy system cited as indicators of the need for the storm sewer 
expansion project, including flooding and damage to roadways (Table 2.1, Figure A.31). 
Overall, the multiple streams framework provided a better fit for this case, or at least for 
the evidence presently available for this case.  More than 50 years after the case occurred, many 
of the learning processes on which the collective learning framework focuses are not readily 
apparent in the available evidence.  For instance, while the available evidence strongly suggests 
that Morrison-Maierle played an important role in the emergence of the stormwater fee, this 
evidence does not provide many details about how the firm acquired, disseminated, and 
translated information regarding the fee within the Billings community.  Such details would be 
more readily obtained through direct observation or targeted interviews with firsthand 
participants in a more recent or contemporary case.  That said, the conversations and debates 
presented in the archival newspaper articles – and even the newspaper articles themselves – can 
be seen through the lens of the collective learning framework as deliberative dialogue that served 
to disseminate and translate information within the Billings community related to the learning 
product of the stormwater fee policy. 
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Whereas much of the available evidence in the emergence case study falls outside the 
primary foci of the collective learning framework, key concepts from most of the main 
components of the multiple streams framework – the problem, politics, and policy streams – can 
be found in fair abundance throughout the available evidence.  As noted for the collective 
learning framework, the available evidence does not provide much detail regarding the role of a 
key policy entrepreneur I identified in this case, Morrison-Maierle.  This lack of evidence about 
how the actions of an apparently important policy entrepreneur influenced the stormwater fee 
policy output is reflected in the infrequent coding of the key concepts related to policy 
entrepreneurs (Table 2.1).  However, the relative dearth of concepts related to policy 
entrepreneurs coded in the evidence reflects my choice to focus on Morrison-Maierle as the key 
policy entrepreneur.  Insofar as they politically manipulated the inherent ambiguity around the 
storm sewer bond issue, many other actors identified in the available evidence can arguably be 
seen as policy entrepreneurs.  In this respect, several key city officials (e.g., Mayor Willard 
Fraser, City Engineer Charles Linquin, Water Department Manager Ed Waldo, aldermen Joe 
Leone and Duane Smith)31 and other actors in the city (e.g., the Billings Chamber of Commerce, 
the Greater Billings Association) also acted as crucial policy entrepreneurs.  In this case, even 
the Billings Gazette and its reporters such as Sam Blythe can be characterized as policy 
entrepreneurs who had access not only to key decision-makers but also to the eyes and minds of 
thousands of citizens.  In fact, most of the evidence in this case study came from the Billings 
Gazette, which had a decidedly positive take on the storm sewer bond issue.  Coverage of the 
issue in the Billings Times was more impartial but much less extensive. 
2.4.2 Hypotheses on stormwater fee emergence 
The available evidence is consistent with some aspects of my hypotheses about stormwater fee 
emergence in the United States. 
 
 
                                                 
31 I chose not to code city officials and staff as policy entrepreneurs because the multiple streams 
framework defines policy entrepreneurs as actors with access to policy-makers rather than the policy-makers 
themselves. 
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emergence hypothesis 1: 
The first stormwater fee enacted in the United States was motivated in part by 
local public officials anticipating increased compliance costs flowing from the 
focusing event of the 1972 amendments to the federal Clean Water Act, an event 
which also reflected a shifting balance of interests towards environmental 
protection nationally, but also and especially locally. 
 
With regard to my first emergence hypothesis, the enactment of a stormwater fee in 
Billings in 1964 is clearly inconsistent with the notion that amendments to the federal Clean 
Water Act eight years later were a salient focusing event.  In fact, the available evidence shows 
no indication that any national-level factors – including federal legislation and shifts in national 
interests regarding environmental protection – influenced the enactment of a stormwater fee in 
Billings in 1964.  Rather, the available evidence indicates predominately local motivations 
behind the enactment of the stormwater fee in Billings in 1964, specifically, reducing flooding in 
the western parts of the city.  Available evidence also strongly suggests that the unusually wet 
weather events in the days, weeks, and months leading up to the 02 June 1964 vote on the storm 
sewer bond focused the flooding issues in the minds of voters and decision-makers in Billings. 
 
emergence hypothesis 2: 
Indicators of local stormwater impacts (e.g., water quality deterioration, flood 
damage) brought to the attention of local decision-makers drove – in part – the 
consideration and eventual enactment of the first stormwater fee in the United 
States, activating interest and attention by indicating a violation of certain values 
(e.g., environmental stewardship, socioeconomic equity) or beliefs. 
 
The available evidence is very much consistent with my second emergence hypothesis.  
While indicators of water quality impacts appear largely absent from the documented discussions 
about the stormwater fee enacted in Billings in 1964, indicators of flooding abound.  The 
awareness of flooding in parts of the city appear to have activated interest and attention of local 
decision-makers by indicating violation of a few key values or beliefs:  preventing damage to 
existing and future streets; flood relief, including reducing health and safety hazards associated 
with stagnant water, as well as preventing damage to private property due to overloading of 
existing storm sewers); and facilitating future growth, development, and progress for the city.  
While most of the values expressed in the documented discussion of the storm sewer bond issue 
in Billings in 1964 were of a fairly practical and fiscal variety, a few officials framed the issue in 
moral terms.  For example, Mayor Willard Fraser issued a statement that argued the three bond 
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issues up for consideration by voters in the 02 June 1964 election were an “obligation of a 
responsible citizenry and a duty the people of Billings have no mind to shirk” (Blythe, 1964e).  
Duane Smith – the alderman from the city’s fifth ward at the time – made a similarly moral 
argument regarding sanitary sewers:  “We have a moral obligation to these people to provide 
them with sewers” (Blythe, 1964a).  As noted above, much of the debate around the storm sewer 
project also concerned distributional values, particularly about how widespread the benefits and 
the costs of the project would and should be. 
 
emergence hypothesis 3: 
A policy entrepreneur or entrepreneurs with sufficient access, resources, and 
strategies played a key role in the enactment of the first stormwater fee in the 
United States by using the aforementioned indicators, focusing event, and shift in 
national and local mood to create a policy window from which the first fee 
emerged. 
 
While my research found limited evidence regarding who initially came up with the idea 
for a stormwater fee in Billings in the early to mid-1960s, available evidence suggests Morrison-
Maierle – the engineering firm contracted with the city to design the storm sewer expansion 
project – as a likely candidate.  The available evidence indicates that Morrison-Maierle clearly 
had sufficient resources and access to key decision-makers – principally, the city council 
members who ultimately voted on the ordinance enacting the stormwater fee – to create and/or 
exploit the policy window in which the stormwater fee emerged.  As noted above, other actors in 
the 1964 Billings policy system can also be viewed as policy entrepreneurs, including all those 
who made arguments for and against the storm sewer expansion project and the associated 
financing arrangements by emphasizing certain aspects of the project and associated financing 
alternatives over others. 
 
emergence hypothesis 4: 
The enactment of the 1972 amendments to the federal Clean Water Act spurred 
the community that enacted the first stormwater fee in the United States to 
engage in search and deliberative dialogue to acquire information as to how they 
were going to meet anticipated compliance costs. 
 
As with my first hypothesis, the notion that amendments to the federal Clean Water Act 
in 1972 influenced the emergence of the first stormwater fee in the United States is clearly 
inconsistent with the evidence documenting enactment of a stormwater fee in Billings in 1964.  
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Although meeting regulatory compliance costs does not appear to have been a relevant factor in 
the enactment of a stormwater fee in Billings in 1964, available evidence does document a fairly 
robust deliberative dialogue in the city around the need for the storm sewer expansion project as 
well as alternative financing arrangements for the project. 
2.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research into why, how, and under what conditions the stormwater fee policy emerged in 
the United States might investigate if any of the other earliest stormwater fees in the country 
(e.g., Boulder, Portland, Bellevue) were actually cases of policy emergence or invention that 
occurred independently of the stormwater fee enacted in Billings in 1964 or if – following the 
distinctions identified by Berry and Berry (2014) – those early fees were cases of policy 
emulation, innovation, or diffusion.  Other potential cases for stormwater fee emergence might 
include cases of large geographic “jumps” in stormwater fee enactment across the country.  
Given that many of the earliest stormwater fees in the United States were enacted in western 
states, future research into stormwater fee emergence may benefit by investigating the 
relationship between stormwater fee enactment and pre-existing drainage and/or irrigation 
institutions (i.e., drainage districts, irrigation districts) common in western states.   
Within the case of the stormwater fee enacted in Billings in 1964, future research could 
build on my case study by finding additional evidence.  More detailed evidence on the 
interactions between key actors in inventing, promoting, and opposing the stormwater fee policy 
would facilitate more robust application of the collective learning framework, particularly with 
respect to posited collective learning processes.  Additional evidence along these lines would 
also facilitate refined and expanded application of the multiple streams framework, particularly 
with respect to the roles of key policy entrepreneurs and improved focus on posited mechanisms 
within the policy window, including problem politics, coupling logic, decision styles, and 
institutional context (Zahariadis, 2014).  By better clarifying between collective learning 
processes and the actions of policy entrepreneurs, additional evidence for this case could also 
help clarify points of contrast and connection between the collective learning framework and the 
multiple streams framework. 
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3.0  DIFFUSION 
Since apparently emerging in Billings, Montana in 1964, stormwater fees have been enacted by 
at least 1,600 local governments across the United States.  This chapter investigates how, why, 
and under what conditions stormwater fees diffused among local governments in the United 
States over the past half-century. 
3.1 THEORY 
In the diffusion branch of this research, I rely mainly on the family of theories and models of 
policy innovation and diffusion (Berry & Berry, 2014) as well as the diffusion of innovation 
literature more generally (e.g., Rogers 2003).  Berry and Berry (2014) distinguish policy 
innovation (i.e., when a government enacts a policy new to that government) from policy 
invention (i.e., when a government enacts a policy new to all governments – at least all 
governments in a relevant population of governments).  Accordingly, the emergence branch of 
this research inquires into policy invention, while the diffusion branch inquires into policy 
innovation. 
3.1.1 Policy innovation and diffusion 
Building on the work of J. L. Walker (1969) and many others, Berry and Berry (1990) propose 
two types of explanations for policy innovation:  diffusion (i.e., emulation of previous adoptions 
by other governments) and internal determinants (i.e., political, economic, and social 
characteristics of the innovating jurisdiction).  Rogers (2003, p. 5) defines diffusion as “the 
process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
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members of a social system.”  Likewise, Berry and Berry (2014, p. 310) offer that “we can say 
policy diffusion occurs if the probability of adoption of a policy by one governmental 
jurisdiction is influenced by the policy choices of other governments in the system.” 
Scholars have identified an array of mechanisms of policy diffusion.  Currently, there 
seems to be general consensus around at least three policy diffusion mechanisms:  learning, 
competition, and coercion (Berry & Berry, 2014; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013; Shipan & 
Volden, 2008, 2012).  Other widely discussed mechanisms of policy diffusion include imitation 
or emulation (Berry & Berry, 2014; Shipan & Volden, 2008, 2012) and socialization or 
normative pressure (Berry & Berry, 2014; Graham et al., 2013).  As a policy diffusion 
mechanism, learning occurs when policy-makers in one jurisdiction obtain information about the 
efficacy or other merits of a particular policy from another jurisdiction that previously enacted 
the policy (Berry & Berry, 2014).  Imitation differs from learning in that policy-makers imitating 
a policy enacted in another jurisdiction do not focus on the effects or characteristics of the 
policy, but simply copy the actions of other policy-makers perceived to be leaders (Shipan & 
Volden, 2008, 2012).  Berry and Berry (2014) suggest at least two distinct types of competitive 
diffusion mechanisms:  location-choice competition, where one government adopts a policy in an 
attempt to influence whether individuals choose to obtain some good or service within or outside 
of that government’s jurisdiction; and spillover-induced competition, where adoption of a policy 
by one government creates an externality that changes another government’s expected net benefit 
from adopting the same policy.  Coercive diffusion, which can occur horizontally among 
jurisdictions at the same level of government or vertically among hierarchically nested 
jurisdictions, typically involves a more powerful government incentivizing or – in the extreme – 
forcing a less powerful government to adopt a policy (Berry & Berry, 2014). 
Diffusion theory posits that the diffusion of a particular policy may be driven by more 
than one mechanism and that the mechanism(s) underlying the diffusion of a particular policy 
may vary over time as well as with the characteristics of adopting governments (Berry & Berry, 
2014).  Furthermore, Rogers (2003) posits that the perceived attributes of any innovation – 
including policies – influence its diffusion, particularly its rate of diffusion.  Rogers (2003) 
identifies five perceived innovation attributes that influence its diffusion:  relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability.  Moreover, Makse and Volden (2011) 
found that the innovation attributes posited by Rogers (2003) influenced which learning 
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mechanisms are relevant to the diffusion of particular policies and how those mechanisms 
geospatially pattern the diffusion of those policies. 
Berry and Berry (2014) propose a general form for models of government innovation that 
incorporates both internal determinants as well as diffusive effects.  In explaining the probability 
that any jurisdiction will adopt a policy of interest at any time, Berry and Berry (2014) 
recommend including variables measuring diffusion effects from other, external governments on 
that jurisdiction as well as three broad sets of variables measuring internal determinants of policy 
innovation:  motivation of public officials; obstacles to innovation as well as resources for 
overcoming those obstacles; and the presence or effects other germane polices.  Furthermore, 
Berry and Berry (2014) recommend that policy diffusion researchers design inquiries and specify 
models to allow the investigators to distinguish – where feasible – between different diffusive 
mechanisms.  Berry and Berry (2014) suggest that such mechanism-discriminating studies, 
which account for both internal determinants and diffusive effects on policy innovation – like 
Shipan and Volden (2008) and many other studies published during the past decade – represent a 
vanguard third-generation of policy diffusion research. 
In their review and synthesis of policy diffusion research across three subfields of 
political science – American politics, comparative politics, and international relations – Graham, 
Shipan, and Volden (2013) propose a set of central concepts and a common language for policy 
diffusion research with the goal of facilitating theoretical generalization as well as easing 
communication across subfields and studies.  In their “who-what-when-where-why” framework, 
Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013) propose three sets of actors who affect policy diffusion:  
internal actors within the government considering an innovation; external actors in governments 
from which policies may diffuse; and go-betweens who act across governments.  To explore 
crucial questions of when and where policy diffusion occurs, Graham, Shipan, and Volden 
(2013) suggest focusing on characteristics and interactions of the internal, external, and go-
between actors in a policy system and how those characteristics and interactions change over 
time. 
My mixed-methods research design allows for robust and contextualized insights into the 
who, what, when, where, and why of stormwater fee diffusion in the United States.  More 
specifically, my diffusion dataset provides a rich set of observations from which to analyze how 
patterns of stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United States changed over 
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time and across physical and political geographies.  Further, combining analyses of this large 
diffusion dataset with detailed case studies of stormwater fee emergence and form facilitates 
more finely resolved analysis of the mechanisms driving stormwater fee diffusion and how 
various contextual factors influence this diffusion.  This research also aims to contribute to the 
development of the policy innovation and diffusion literature by continuing the strong empirical 
tradition of analyzing policy innovation and diffusion horizontally among governments in the 
United States federalist system (e.g., Arsneault 2000; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Boushey 
2010; Gray 1973; Savage 1985a, 1985b; Shipan and Volden 2008), and particularly the subset of 
that literature analyzing vertical influences across levels of government (e.g., Allen, Pettus, and 
Haider-Markel 2004; Karch 2007; Krause 2011; Welch and Thompson 1980).  Moreover, my 
research into stormwater fee diffusion extends the fairly limited set of existing research 
investigating policy diffusion among local governments (e.g., Krause 2011). 
3.1.2 Hypotheses on stormwater fee diffusion 
Informed by theories and models of policy innovation and diffusion, my inquiry into the 
diffusion of stormwater fees among local governments in the United States aims to test the 
following hypotheses. 
 
diffusion hypothesis 1: 
Stormwater fees were more likely to be enacted by local governments:  (a) located in 
states with clear, unambiguous state legislation empowering local governments to enact 
stormwater fees; (b) that were regulated under the Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 regulations; 
(c) with CSO permits; (d) with relatively high proportions of developed land use; and (e) 
with relatively homogenous polities. 
 
diffusion hypothesis 2: 
Significant acceleration in stormwater fee enactment across the country followed 
announcement of the Phase I and Phase II MS4 regulations by USEPA in larger and 
smaller MS4 communities, respectively. 
 
diffusion hypothesis 3: 
Large, rich cities were the first local governments to enact stormwater fees in each state. 
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3.2 DATA 
This section outlines the data I used to analyze stormwater fee diffusion.  Further details on the 
diffusion dataset are provided in Appendix B. 
3.2.1 Foundation 
In constructing a dataset to serve as the basis for my analyses of stormwater fee diffusion among 
local governments in the United States, I merged three national GIS shapefiles from the United 
States Census Bureau:  counties, county subdivisions, and places.  From this merged shapefile, I 
extracted records for legally valid local32 governments in the lower 48 states,33 then pruned out 
redundant records that resulted from several city-county consolidations.  The final dataset 
included 38,744 records:  19,352 places; 16,369 county subdivisions; 3,022 counties;34 and 
Washington, D.C.  To be clear, in this cross-sectional dataset, the units of observation and 
analysis are legally recognized, general-purpose county and subcounty governments in the 
contiguous United States.  While every state except Connecticut and Rhode Island has counties, 
legally recognized Census places are located mostly in western and southern states, while legally 
recognized county subdivisions are more prevalent in the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Great 
Plains regions of the country (Figure 3.1). 
 
 
                                                 
32 Unless otherwise specified, I use the term “local government” to refer to general-purpose county and 
subcounty governments throughout this chapter. 
 
33 I focus only on the contiguous 48 states because existing surveys and studies of stormwater fees in the 
United States (Campbell et al., 2017; Lindsey, 1990b; Poertner, 1981) document no stormwater fees in either Alaska 
or Hawaii, and because existing surveys indicate there are eight other states (i.e., Connecticut, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Wyoming) with no stormwater  fees, so 
excluding Hawaii and Alaska will not result in dropping all fee-free states from the diffusion inquiry. 
 
34 Here, I include parish governments as county governments.  Parishes exist only in Louisiana, but are 
functionally and geospatially very similar to county governments in other states.  The Census Bureau shapefiles also 
include parishes in with counties. 
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Figure 3.1.  Map of general-purpose local governments in the contiguous United States. 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.]
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3.2.2 Attributes 
While the Census shapefiles contained many attribute fields for each record (e.g., local 
government names), I added demographic, housing stock, and income attributes for each record 
by joining data tables from the 2010 Census and the 2016 American Community Survey.  I 
further attributed each record in the diffusion dataset with attributes derived from my own 
calculations (e.g., land area, border complexity35), some of which made use of other national 
datasets (e.g., land uses, urbanized areas).  Finally, I joined in attributes from the 2017 Western 
Kentucky Stormwater Utility Survey (Campbell et al., 2017) as well as a data table on regulated 
MS4s personally provided by USEPA36 and a publicly available data table on permitted CSOs.37  
Further details on the attributes comprising my diffusion dataset are presented in Appendix B. 
3.2.3 Limitations 
Like any dataset, my diffusion dataset has limitations and imperfections.  First, by including all 
legally recognized, general-purpose county and subcounty governments in the universe of 
entities that could possibly enact a stormwater fee, my diffusion dataset likely includes some 
local governments that do not have the authority to actually enact a stormwater fee.  As noted by 
Cohen (2007), while most incorporated places have a set of elected or appointed officials legally 
empowered to levy taxes, raise revenues, and provide local public services such as drinking 
water, sewers, sanitation, and fire and police protection, laws governing the formation and 
                                                 
35 I calculated a border complexity metric for each local government by taking a ratio between the 
perimeter of the jurisdiction and the circumference of a circle encompassing an equivalent area.  This morphological 
metric is commonly used in ecological sciences (e.g., shape complexity in landscape ecology, shoreline 
development in limnology).  I posit two ways in which this metric may be relevant to stormwater fee diffusion.  
First, local governments directly adjacent to natural waterways (e.g., non-channelized rivers, streams, creeks) tend to 
have more complex borders.  In the absence of better data, the border complexity metric may serve to measure the 
landscape position of each local government relative to bodies of water.  Second, local governments in 
jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan regions often have complex borders.  As such, the border complexity 
metric may serve as a measure of the “metropolitan-ness” of each local government.  The border complexity metric 
is further discussed in Appendix B. 
 
36 MS4 data from Holly Galavotti, Office of Wastewater Management, USEPA 
 
37 CSO permit data from www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=004909c6679a4289b629a1c26278224c 
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function of local governments in the United States vary widely from state to state.  As such, the 
fact that certain types of local governments in certain states have enacted no stormwater fees to 
date38 may reflect the fact that laws in these states prevent these types of local governments from 
enacting stormwater fees.  If state law precludes certain forms of local government from 
assessing stormwater fees in certain states, a tenable argument can be made that these entities 
should not be included in the universe of potential stormwater fee enactors.  Cognizant of this 
issue, I chose to err on the side of overinclusion in my diffusion dataset for two main reasons.  
First, as the first researcher – to my knowledge – to link an existing database of stormwater fees 
to the universe of local governments in the United States, I felt it would be easier for future 
researchers to whittle out any irrelevant records from an overinclusive database rather than 
attempt to add in unduly omitted records from an underinclusive database.  Second, in some 
states, local governments that were previously not legally empowered to assess stormwater fees 
have more recently been granted such authority.39  As state laws change, it may prove more 
efficient to add a field to my diffusion dataset indicating if state law authorizes each local 
government to assess a stormwater fee rather than adding or deleting records.  Investigating the 
status of state laws in authorizing various types of local governments to assess stormwater fees is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but represents a potentially fruitful path of future research. 
The second main limitation of my diffusion dataset – largely the product of fusing 
together several existing datasets – is that it is only as complete, accurate, and current as the 
constituent datasets.  While there are known omissions, inaccuracies, and ambiguities in some of 
the datasets used to create my diffusion dataset, each constituent dataset represents the best 
readily available information of its kind.  For example, while there are some known omissions 
and inaccuracies in Campbell et al. (2017), this survey is the only nationwide data available on 
local government stormwater fee enactment in the United States.  Similarly, while the data from 
USEPA on regulated MS4s contains some ambiguous records and came with disclaimers about 
                                                 
38 For example, Campbell et al. (2017) record zero stormwater fees enacted by townships in Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska.  Furthermore, all of these states 
except the Dakotas are among the set of states where some municipal and township governments overlap (United 
States Census Bureau, 2013). 
 
39 In 2016, Pennsylvania passed a series of laws explicitly authorizing certain types of local governments 
(i.e., boroughs and townships) to enact stormwater fees.  Prior to passage of these laws – as discussed further below 
– the legal authority of these forms of local government in Pennsylvania to independently assess stormwater fees 
was unclear.  The state passed a law in 2013 explicitly empowering municipal authorities – legally distinct entities 
from the municipalities themselves – to assess fees for stormwater management. 
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its completeness, this is the only nationwide data available on regulated MS4s.  Moreover, for 
general purpose local governments, certain data are only available at certain points in time.  For 
example, population data was readily available for each local government nationwide only from 
the 2010 Census.  As discussed below, future research building on my diffusion dataset would 
benefit from incorporating more temporally varying data. 
3.2.4 Strengths 
Despite these limitations, my diffusion dataset significantly advances the study of stormwater 
fees in the United States in several key ways.  First, by using polygons to represent each local 
government’s geographic jurisdiction – as opposed to the point representation used by Campbell 
et al. (2017) and others – my dataset allows for new kinds of analyses that incorporate explicitly 
areal characteristics of local governments (e.g., geographic size, land use composition).  Second, 
by incorporating other sets of key variables – particularly variables related to MS4 regulation 
status – my dataset allows more explicit analyses of the factors animating stormwater fee 
diffusion in the United States.  Third, by looking at the whole population of legally recognized, 
general-purpose county and subcounty local governments in the United States rather than just 
those local governments that have enacted stormwater fees, my dataset allows for more robust 
analyses of why stormwater fees have been enacted in certain places (i.e., positive cases) but not 
others (i.e., negative cases).  Finally, by bringing together a set of regularly updated national 
datasets in a fairly straightforward manner, my dataset demonstrates the feasibility of creating a 
living national dataset on stormwater fee diffusion.  With stormwater fee ordinances being newly 
enacted, revised, and repealed by local governments across the country on a regular and ongoing 
basis, a centralized, georeferenced, regularly updated, national dataset would represent a 
substantial step forward in the study of stormwater fees in the United States. 
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3.3 METHODS 
To analyze patterns of stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United States, I 
primarily utilized exploratory visualizations (i.e., graphs, maps) and tabulations, along with 
regression modeling.  For these analyses, I was interested in explaining variation in three types 
of dependent variables:  (1) a binary variable indicating whether or not a local government has 
enacted a stormwater fee; (2) variables indicating when each local government enacted a 
stormwater fee;40 and (3) variables indicating in what order local governments enacted a 
stormwater fee in each state.  I analyzed other variables in the dataset (e.g., population, land use, 
MS4 regulation status) for potential explanatory relationships with the various dependent 
variables. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Special-district stormwater fees 
While the vast majority of the 1,637 stormwater fees recorded by Campbell et al. (2017)41 
represent fees enacted by individual, general-purpose local governments, ten records represent 
stormwater fees enacted by special-purpose governments, each involving multiple general-
purpose local governments (Figure 3.2, Table 3.1).  Most of these stormwater fees enacted by 
special-purpose governments involve only a handful of general-purpose local governments, but 
three involve substantially more:  Sanitation District 1 of Northern Kentucky (32) just across the 
Ohio River from Cincinnati; the Northeastern Ohio Regional Sewer District (57) in the greater 
                                                 
40 For some analyses, I left the “when” dependent variable at the year level as recorded by Campbell et al. 
(2017).  For other analyses, I aggregated enactment years into groups (e.g., five-year periods, decades). 
 
41 Although recorded by Campbell et al. (2017), I exclude Silver Spring, Maryland from my analyses 
because Silver Spring is an unincorporated Census-Designated Place, not a legally recognized local government 
jurisdiction.  I also exclude the “Fitchburg (rural)” record recorded by Campbell et al. (2017).  This record reflects 
the fact that the City of Fitchburg in Dane County, Wisconsin implemented a stormwater fee with different rates for 
the urban and rural parts of the city.  I consider the “Fitchburg (rural)” and the “Fitchburg (city)” records recorded 
by Campbell et al. (2017) to represent different property classifications within the same stormwater fee rate structure 
rather than two distinct stormwater fees. 
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Cleveland area; and the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District (381) in eastern Ohio 
(Figure 3.2, Table 3.1).42  Further details on stormwater fees enacted by special-purpose 
governments are provided in Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
42 Each special-district stormwater fee was considered a single entity for some preliminary exploratory 
analyses (i.e., Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4), but the individual general-purpose local governments implicated in each 
special-district stormwater fee were analyzed subsequently (i.e., Table 3.2 and after). 
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Figure 3.2.  Map of local governments with stormwater fees in the contiguous United States. 
 [Stormwater fee data source is Campbell et al. (2017).  Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
Animated version available at http://youtu.be/N9NfsNs6akQ.
62 
Table 3.1.  Special-district stormwater fees 
recorded in the 2017 Western Kentucky University Stormwater Utility Survey (Campbell et al., 2017). 
special-purpose district name state # of general-purpose local governments 
Southeast Metro Stormwater Authority CO 3 
Douglasville-Douglas County Water and Sewer Authority GA 2 
Sanitation District 1 of Northern Kentucky KY 32 
Long Creek Watershed Management District ME 3 
South Washington Watershed District MN 3 
Vadnais Lake Area Water Management Organization MN 4 
Columbia-Boone County MO 2 
Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District OH 381 
Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District OH 57 
Garners Creek Storm Water Utility WI 2 
 
3.4.2 Exploratory analyses 
The states with the greatest number of local governments that have enacted stormwater fees 
include Minnesota (197), Florida (183), Wisconsin (126), Washington (117), Texas (109), Iowa 
(106), Ohio (106), Indiana (80), North Carolina (75), Georgia (59), and Oregon (52) (Figure 3.3).  
Out of the 1,637 stormwater fees in the United States, Campbell et al. (2017) record the year of 
fee enactment for 1,218, roughly 74%.  Although Campbell et al. (2017) record enactment years 
for over 70% of stormwater fees in most states, the percentage of stormwater fees with 
enactment years recorded is fairly low in some states, such as Iowa (41%), Indiana (49%), and 
North Carolina (51%) (Figure 3.3). 
63 
 
Figure 3.3.  Scatterplot of total number of stormwater fees vs. percent with enactment year by state. 
[Data source is Campbell et al. (2017).]
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3.4.2.1 Year of enactment 
The number of newly enacted stormwater fees in the United States exhibited two notable spikes:  
in the early 1990s, particularly from 1991 to 1993; and again in the mid-2000s, especially from 
2001 to 2007 (Figure 3.4).  Prior to 1980, Campbell et al. (2017) record only six stormwater fees 
in five U.S. states, with the pace of new stormwater fee enactment ramping up substantially after 
1985 (Figure 3.4).  Prior to 1990, the states where the most new stormwater fees were enacted 
include Washington (20), Minnesota (15), Florida (15), Colorado (6), and Ohio (6) (Table B.2). 
Between 1990 and 1999 stormwater fees expanded into 13 new states while the most new 
stormwater fees were enacted in states where stormwater fees were already fairly widely 
established, namely Florida (81), Washington (49), Minnesota (42), and Ohio (14) (Table B.2).  
However, during the 1990s, a substantial number of new stormwater fees were also enacted in 
states with relatively few existing stormwater fees – such as California (25) and Oregon (15) – or 
with no previously existing stormwater fees – such as Texas (14) and Wisconsin (14) (Table 
B.2).  
The number of new stormwater fees enacted in the United States really exploded between 
2000 and 2009, with numerous new fees enacted in states where stormwater fees were already 
well established – such as Wisconsin (81), Minnesota (76), Ohio (57), Florida (56), Texas (44), 
Washington (29), Colorado (19), California (11), and Oregon (11) (Table B.2).  During the 
2000s, a substantial number of new stormwater fees were also enacted by local governments in 
states with relatively few existing fees, such as Georgia (27), Indiana (25), Iowa (24), North 
Carolina (22), South Carolina (19), Kansas (14), and Tennessee (14) (Table B.2). 
From 2010 to 2017, the most new stormwater fees were enacted in Texas (24), Iowa (16), 
Virginia (15), Ohio (14), Wisconsin (14), Georgia (13), Illinois (12), Maryland (12), Florida 
(10), Indiana (10), North Carolina (10), and Pennsylvania (10) (Table B.2).  
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Figure 3.4.  Chart of stormwater fee enactment by year. 
Primary y-axis shows number of new stormwater fees enacted and number of states in which stormwater fees were enacted each year, plus cumulative number 
states in which stormwater fees were enacted through each year.  Secondary y-axis shows cumulative number of stormwater fees enacted through each year.
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3.4.2.2 Local government type 
The pattern of stormwater fee diffusion among various types of local governments in the United 
States reflects the fact that certain local government forms only exist in certain states (Table 3.2).  
For instance, while all 48 of the coterminous states contain cities,43 38 contain towns, 19 contain 
villages, and 12 contain townships, certain types of general-purpose, subcounty local 
governments are only found in a few states:  boroughs in Connecticut, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania; charter townships in Michigan; and plantations in Maine (Table 3.2).  Similarly, 
Pennsylvania is the only state with local government forms referred to officially as 
municipalities (Table 3.2).  Except for Connecticut and Rhode Island, all of the coterminous 48 
states contain county or parish governments.  Referred to by a variety of names including 
“unified government”, “consolidated government”, “metropolitan government”, or “urban 
county government”, seven states contain at least one local government formed as result of the 
merging of a city government and a county government (Table 3.2). 
Most of the lower 48 states are home to three or four types of legally recognized, general-
purpose local governments, most commonly villages, towns, cities, and counties (Table 3.2).  
However, four states are each home to only two legally recognized, general-purpose local 
government forms:  cities and counties in Iowa, Idaho, and Nevada; and towns and cities in 
Rhode Island (Table 3.2).  Six states have five forms of local governments, while New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania have the greatest diversity of local government forms, with six and seven types 
of local governments, respectively (Table 3.2). 
The 1,637 stormwater fees recorded by Campbell et al. (2017) have been enacted by or 
involve44 all or parts of 2,116 local governments in 40 states and Washington, D.C., with the vast 
majority of those local governments being subcounty governments:  cities (1,376); townships 
                                                 
43 Census data listed Ranson, West Virginia as a corporation, but the state now officially recognizes Ranson 
as a city, so Ranson is treated here as a city. 
 
44 I use verbiage like “enacted by” throughout this section to reflect the fact that the great majority of the 
stormwater fees recorded by Campbell et al. (2017) were in fact enacted by individual general-purpose local 
governments.  However – as previously discussed – some general-purpose local governments did not independently 
enact stormwater fees, but are “subject to” or “implicated in” stormwater fees enacted by special-purpose 
governments. 
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(268); villages (214); towns (134); and boroughs (5) (Table 3.2).45  Stormwater fees have also 
been enacted by many county governments (111)46 as well as a handful of consolidated city-
county governments (Table 3.2), such as the City of Augusta / Richmond County in Georgia, and 
the City of Lexington / Fayette County in Kentucky.  While only about 2% of towns and 
townships across the lower 48 states have enacted stormwater fees, 50% of city-county 
governments and nearly 14% of cities have enacted stormwater fees (Table 3.2).  However, the 
proportion of local government forms that have enacted stormwater fees varies substantially 
state-to-state (Table 3.2).  For instance, over 50% of cities in Florida and in Ohio have enacted a 
stormwater fee, contrasted with less than 1% of cities in Arkansas, Idaho, and Missouri (Table 
3.2). 
While each of the 40 states home to at least one stormwater fee has at least one city that 
has enacted a stormwater fee, all of the stormwater fees enacted by townships are located in three 
states:  Ohio (261),47 Pennsylvania (4), and Minnesota (3) (Table 3.2).  Similarly, stormwater 
fees have been enacted by villages in only five states:  Ohio (145), Wisconsin (46), Illinois (13), 
Florida (8), and North Carolina (2) (Table 3.2).  Of the three states with boroughs, only boroughs 
in Pennsylvania have enacted stormwater fees (Table 3.2).  Almost half of the 40 states home to 
at least one stormwater fee have at least one stormwater fee enacted by a county (19) or a town 
(18) (Table 3.2). 
 
                                                 
45 In these analyses, Washington, D.C. is treated as a city within its own state. 
 
46 While some stormwater fees enacted by county governments apply to all areas in the county, many 
county stormwater fees only apply to certain areas within the county.  For example, the stormwater fee assessed by 
the Clayton County Storm Water Utility in northwestern Georgia applies to unincorporated areas of the county as 
well as all six cities in the county.  In contrast, the stormwater fee assessed by the Columbia County Stormwater 
Utility in eastern Georgia only applies to the more intensively developed unincorporated areas in the eastern part of 
the county near the City of Augusta.  The jurisdictional nuances of stormwater fees enacted by county governments 
are further discussed in Appendix B. 
 
47 All the townships subject to a stormwater fee in Ohio are part of a special-district stormwater fee, most in 
the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District (253) or the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (7). 
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Table 3.2.  Number of local governments and stormwater fees by local government type in each state. 
state 
borough village town township charter township municipality plantation city city-county county parish SUM COUNT 
tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees 
tot
al 
fee
s 
# # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % 
AL 
      
292 0 0 
            
169 3 1.8 
   
67 1 1.5 
   
528 4 0.8 3 2 
AR 
      
190 0 0 
            
312 1 0.3 
   
75 0 0 
   
577 1 0.2 3 1 
AZ 
      
46 1 2.2 
            
45 5 11.1 
   
15 0 0 
   
106 6 5.7 3 2 
CA 
      
21 0 0 
            
461 53 11.5 
   
57 3 5.3 
   
539 56 10.4 3 2 
CO 
      
196 7 3.6 
            
75 28 37.3 
   
62 4 6.5 
   
333 39 11.7 3 3 
CT 10 0 0 
   
149 0 0 
            
19 0 0 
         
178 0 0 3 0 
DC 
                     
1 1 100.0 
         
1 1 100.0 1 1 
DE 
   
3 0 0 44 0 0 
            
10 2 20.0 
   
3 0 0 
   
60 2 3.3 4 1 
FL 
   
19 8 42.1 124 16 12.9 
            
267 140 52.4 
   
67 19 28.4 
   
477 183 38.4 4 4 
GA 
      
105 1 1.0 
            
425 46 10.8 6 2 33.3 153 11 7.2 
   
689 60 8.7 4 4 
IA 
                     
946 106 11.2 
   
99 0 0 
   
1045 106 10.1 2 1 
ID 
                     
200 4 2.0 
   
44 0 0 
   
244 4 1.6 2 1 
IL 
   
982 13 1.3 16 1 6.3 1431 0 0 
         
300 13 4.3 
   
102 0 0 
   
2831 27 1.0 5 3 
IN 
      
448 31 6.9 1005 0 0 
         
118 40 33.9 1 1 100.0 91 8 8.8 
   
1663 80 4.8 5 4 
KS 
         
1274 0 0 
         
624 36 5.8 2 1 50.0 103 0 0 
   
2003 37 1.9 4 2 
KY 
                     
416 35 8.4 2 2 100.0 118 5 4.2 
   
536 42 7.8 3 3 
LA 
   
107 0 0 128 0 0 
            
68 0 0 1 0 0 
   
62 0 0 366 0 0 5 0 
MA 
      
298 3 1.0 
            
53 6 11.3 
   
5 0 0 
   
356 9 2.5 3 2 
MD 
   
5 0 0 123 2 1.6 
            
29 7 24.1 
   
23 8 34.8 
   
180 17 9.4 4 3 
ME 
      
432 1 0.2 
         
34 0 0 23 6 26.1 
   
16 0 0 
   
505 7 1.4 4 2 
MI 
   
256 0 0 
   
1123 0 0 117 0 0 
      
277 9 3.2 
   
83 0 0 
   
1856 9 0.5 5 1 
MN 
         
1784 3 0.2 
         
853 199 23.3 
   
87 0 0 
   
2724 202 7.4 3 2 
MO 
   
203 0 0 111 0 0 312 0 0 
         
634 4 0.6 
   
114 1 0.9 
   
1374 5 0.4 5 2 
MS 
   
19 0 0 167 0 0 
            
112 0 0 
   
82 0 0 
   
380 0 0 4 0 
MT 
      
75 0 0 
            
52 7 13.5 
   
56 0 0 
   
183 7 3.8 3 1 
NC 
   
21 2 9.5 455 34 7.5 
            
77 33 42.9 
   
100 6 6.0 
   
653 75 11.5 4 4 
ND 
         
1314 0 0 
         
357 4 1.1 
   
53 0 0 
   
1724 4 0.2 3 1 
NE 
   
383 0 0 
   
419 0 0 
         
147 0 0 
   
93 0 0 
   
1042 0 0 4 0 
NH 
      
221 0 0 
            
13 0 0 
   
10 0 0 
   
244 0 0 3 0 
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state 
borough village town township charter township municipality plantation city city-county county parish SUM COUNT 
tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees tot
al fees 
tot
al 
fee
s 
# # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % # # % 
NJ 254 0 0 3 0 0 15 0 0 241 0 0 
         
52 0 0 
   
21 0 0 
   
586 0 0 6 0 
NM 
   
48 0 0 19 0 0 
            
36 1 2.8 
   
33 0 0 
   
136 1 0.7 4 1 
NV 
                     
19 2 10.5 
   
16 1 6.3 
   
35 3 8.6 2 2 
NY 
   
550 0 0 929 0 0 
            
62 1 1.6 
   
57 0 0 
   
1598 1 0.1 4 1 
OH 
   
689 145 21.0 
   
1308 261 20.0 
         
247 130 52.6 
   
88 6 6.8 
   
2332 542 23.2 4 4 
OK 
      
425 0 0 
            
164 22 13.4 
   
77 0 0 
   
666 22 3.3 3 1 
OR 
      
9 0 0 
            
232 48 20.7 
   
36 4 11.1 
   
277 52 18.8 3 2 
PA 955 5 1.0 
   
1 0 0 1546 4 0.3 
   
3 0 0 
   
55 2 3.6 1 1 100.0 66 0 0 
   
2627 12 0.5 7 4 
RI 
      
31 0 0 
            
8 0 0 
         
39 0 0 2 0 
SC 
      
201 7 3.5 
            
69 22 31.9 
   
46 9 19.6 
   
316 38 12.0 3 3 
SD 
   
1 0 0 153 0 0 909 0 0 
         
156 4 2.6 
   
66 0 0 
   
1285 4 0.3 5 1 
TN 
      
162 3 1.9 
            
180 21 11.7 3 1 33.3 92 2 2.2 
   
437 27 6.2 4 4 
TX 
   
23 0 0 233 6 2.6 
            
959 102 10.6 
   
254 1 0.4 
   
1469 109 7.4 4 3 
UT 
      
100 0 0 
            
144 36 25.0 
   
29 0 0 
   
273 36 13.2 3 1 
VA 
      
191 2 1.0 
            
38 21 55.3 
   
95 7 7.4 
   
324 30 9.3 3 3 
VT 
   
34 0 0 237 2 0.8 
            
9 2 22.2 
   
14 0 0 
   
294 4 1.4 4 2 
WA 
      
70 3 4.3 
            
211 100 47.4 
   
39 14 35.9 
   
320 117 36.6 3 3 
WI 
   
407 46 11.3 1255 13 1.0 
            
190 66 34.7 
   
72 1 1.4 
   
1924 126 6.5 4 4 
WV 
   
6 0 0 147 1 0.7 
            
79 8 10.1 
   
55 0 0 
   
287 9 3.1 4 2 
WY 
      
80 0 0 
            
19 0 0 
   
23 0 0 
   
122 0 0 3 0 
SUM 1219 5 0.4 3759 214 5.7 7899 134 1.7 12666 268 2.1 117 0 0 3 0 0 34 0 0 10012 1376 13.7 16 8 50.0 2957 111 3.8 62 0 0 38744 2116 5.5 
  COUNT 3 1 
 
19 5 
 
38 18 
 
12 3 
 
1 0 
 
1 0 
 
1 0 
 
49 41 
 
7 5 
 
45 19 
 
1 0 
 
49 41 
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In considering the geography of local governments across the United States, and in 
analyzing the diffusion of stormwater fees among those local governments, it is relevant to 
mention that states vary widely in the proportion of land area under the jurisdiction of various 
types of local government (Figure 3.1, Table B.3).  For instance, while over 90% of the land area 
is not under the jurisdiction of any general-purpose subcounty government in many southern and 
western states (e.g., New Mexico, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana), over 80% of the land area is 
under the jurisdiction of some form of general-purpose subcounty government in most 
northeastern and Great Lakes states (Figure 3.1, Table B.3). 
The proportion of stormwater fees with years of enactment recorded by Campbell et al. 
(2017) varies substantially by type of local government (Table 3.3).  For example, while 
recording enactment years for stormwater fees enacted by more than 75% of cities and counties, 
60% of towns, and 40% of villages, Campbell et al. (2017) record enactment years for just over 
5% of stormwater fees involving townships (Table 3.3).48 
Most of the stormwater fees established before 1990 were enacted by cities (Table 3.4).  
Most stormwater fees established by towns, villages, and counties were enacted after 2000 
(Table 3.4). 
                                                 
48 The primary reason for the low proportion of enactment years for stormwater fees applicable to 
townships is that almost all townships subject to a stormwater fee are associated with one of two special-district 
stormwater fees in Ohio with no enactment year recorded by Campbell et al. (2017):  the Muskingum Watershed 
Conservancy District and the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District. 
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Table 3.3.  Number and proportion of stormwater fees with enactment year recorded by government type. 
Enactment years as recorded by Campbell et al. (2017). 
government 
level 
government 
type 
example 
government 
name with 
stormwater 
fee 
state 
to
ta
l #
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 
to
ta
l #
 fe
es
 
%
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 
w
ith
 fe
e 
# 
fe
es
 w
ith
 
en
ac
tm
en
t y
ea
r 
%
 fe
es
 w
ith
 
en
ac
tm
en
t y
ea
r 
subcounty 
borough Dormont PA 1,219 5 0.4 5 100.0 
village Clemmons NC 3,759 214 5.7 88 41.1 
town Flower Mound TX 7,899 134 1.7 83 61.9 
township White Bear MN 12,666 268 2.1 14 5.2 
charter township   117 0 0 
  municipality   3 0 0 
  plantation   34 0 0 
  city San Diego CA 10,012 1,376 13.7 1,034 75.3 
city-county city-county Indianapolis IN 16 8 50.0 6 75.0 
county 
county King County WA 2,957 111 3.8 87 78.4 
parish   62 0 0 
   
 
Table 3.4.  Number of local governments that enacted new stormwater fees by decade and local government type. 
government 
type 
decade 
1970 - 1979 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2009 2010 - 2017 
borough 
    
5 
village  2 8 48 30 
town  1 16 42 24 
township   1 1 12 
city 6 66 297 470 195 
city-county 
 
1 
 
4 1 
county 
 
4 22 35 26 
SUM 6 74 344 600 293 
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3.4.3 Regression modeling 
To select continuous variables most correlated to the three aforementioned types of outcome 
variables (i.e., which, when, and in what order within states local governments enacted 
stormwater fees), I visually examined boxplots for each continuous variable grouped by the 
outcome variable of interest.  Once I selected an initial set of explanatory variables, I eliminated 
certain variables that were highly correlated with other explanatory variables.49  For categorical 
variables (e.g., MS4 regulation phase, local government type), I used cross-tabulation to examine 
relationships with outcome variables of interest, and I utilized boxplots to examine correlations 
with selected continuous variables.  Definitions and descriptions of each variable (Table B.1), 
along with the boxplots, correlation matrices, and cross-tabulations I used to select variables for 
inclusion in the following regression models are presented in Appendix B.  The analyses into the 
timing of stormwater fee enactment are necessarily restricted to the 1,317 records in the diffusion 
dataset with years of enactment recorded by Campbell et al. (2017).  In each of the tables of 
regression model results, I indicate the statistical significance of effects with a set of asterisk 
symbols.50 
3.4.3.1  Which 
An initial regression model on the binary dependent variable indicating if each local government 
has or has not enacted a stormwater fee confirms the significant effects of most selected 
explanatory variables, except for population and two land use variables (Table 3.5).  Adding 
effects for state and local government type to the initial regression model results in the effects of 
some factors in the initial model decreasing in significance, while the effects other factors in the 
initial model remain significant (Table 3.6). 
                                                 
49 To address concerns about intercorrelation among explanatory variables, I considered and evaluated 
some dimension reduction techniques (e.g., principal components analysis, factor analysis).  However, I decided to 
build regression models with the original explanatory variables rather than reduced dimensions for two main 
reasons.  First, collapsing the original variables into a smaller set of components or factors complicates 
interpretation of regression results, especially for data where the original variables are not easily separable into a 
smaller set of fairly distinct components or factors, as is the case here.  Second, what intercorrelation remained 
among the final set of selected variables was fairly moderate (Table B.4, Table B.6, Table B.8). 
 
50 I use the following symbols to indicate the statistical significance of effects in the regression models:  
**** for p-values less than 0.01; *** for p-values between 0.01 and 0.05; ** for p-values between 0.05 and 0.10; 
and * for p-values between 0.10 and 0.15. 
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Table 3.5.  Summary of regression model #1. 
Logistic regression on binary dependent variable indicating if each local government enacted a stormwater fee or not. 
Table sorted on rightmost column. 
variable coefficient std error p value odds ratio central extreme (odds ratio - 1) * (extreme - central) 
(intercept) -2.83E+00 2.55E-01 1.74E-28 **** 5.91E-02 
   MS4 Phase 1 2.32E+00 1.19E-01 2.30E-85 **** 1.02E+01 0 1 9.198 
% white 2.07E+00 2.03E-01 1.64E-24 **** 7.93E+00 0.50 0.95 3.118 
% developed (2011) 1.65E+00 2.13E-01 9.97E-15 **** 5.18E+00 0.25 0.85 2.509 
MS4 Phase 2 1.23E+00 6.77E-02 7.86E-74 **** 3.42E+00 0 1 2.423 
% urbanized (2010) 9.25E-01 1.16E-01 1.88E-15 **** 2.52E+00 0.05 0.95 1.371 
housing units newness index 1.03E+00 1.25E-01 3.00E-16 **** 2.79E+00 -0.25 0.25 0.894 
housing units % valued over $100,000 8.42E-01 1.52E-01 2.75E-08 **** 2.32E+00 0.50 0.95 0.595 
# CSO discharges 6.50E-03 2.75E-03 1.83E-02 *** 1.01E+00 0 50 0.326 
border complexity 1.27E-01 2.09E-02 1.25E-09 **** 1.14E+00 1.5 3.5 0.271 
perimeter 2.10E-03 6.38E-04 9.80E-04 **** 1.00E+00 30 100 0.147 
% agriculture (2011) 1.53E-01 1.62E-01 3.46E-01  1.16E+00 0.30 0.85 0.091 
population 1.18E-07 1.31E-07 3.70E-01  1.00E+00 2,500 50,000 0.006 
Δ % developed (2011-1992) -3.49E-01 2.36E-01 1.40E-01 * 7.05E-01 0.08 0.33 -0.074 
housing units % owner-occupied -1.54E+00 2.42E-01 1.82E-10 **** 2.14E-01 0.75 0.95 -0.157 
housing units median value -1.54E-06 2.56E-07 1.96E-09 **** 1.00E+00 125,000 333,333 -0.320 
population density -1.36E-04 2.48E-05 3.91E-08 **** 1.00E+00 500 3,000 -0.341 
median age -3.59E-02 5.13E-03 2.55E-12 **** 9.65E-01 42 52 -0.353 
land use diversity (2011) -7.24E+00 1.03E+00 2.39E-12 **** 7.20E-04 0.25 0.85 -0.600 
MS4 Phase 2 waiver -9.02E+00 1.02E+02 9.29E-01  1.21E-04 0 1 -1.000 
AIC = 12,357 
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Table 3.6.  Summary of regression model #2. 
Logistic regression on binary dependent variable indicating if each local government enacted a stormwater fee or 
not.  Table sorted on rightmost column.  Comparison bases are Florida for states and city for local government type 
variable coefficient std error p value odds ratio observed values (odds ratio - 1) * (extreme - central) central extreme 
         
(intercept) 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00  0.00E+00 
   DC 1.71E+01 1.08E+04 9.99E-01  2.72E+07 0 1 2.72E+07 
MS4 Phase 1 2.24E+00 1.61E-01 3.11E-44 **** 9.42E+00 0 1 8.422 
city-county 1.60E+00 7.99E-01 4.57E-02 *** 4.94E+00 0 1 3.941 
OH 1.54E+00 1.86E-01 1.16E-16 **** 4.67E+00 0 1 3.669 
MS4 Phase 2 1.53E+00 8.14E-02 9.00E-79 **** 4.62E+00 0 1 3.616 
MS4 Phase 2 waiver 9.46E-01 3.44E+03 1.00E+00  2.58E+00 0 1 1.575 
housing units % valued over $100,000 1.31E+00 1.93E-01 1.08E-11 **** 3.71E+00 0.5 0.95 1.221 
IA 5.78E-01 2.09E-01 5.63E-03 **** 1.78E+00 0 1 0.782 
% urbanized (2010) 5.38E-01 1.39E-01 1.08E-04 **** 1.71E+00 0.05 0.95 0.641 
perimeter 7.40E-03 9.86E-04 6.29E-14 **** 1.01E+00 30 100 0.520 
% developed (2011) 4.75E-01 2.90E-01 1.01E-01 * 1.61E+00 0.25 0.85 0.365 
% white 5.51E-01 2.61E-01 3.43E-02 *** 1.74E+00 0.5 0.95 0.331 
WA 2.04E-01 2.19E-01 3.51E-01  1.23E+00 0 1 0.227 
housing units newness index 3.20E-01 1.72E-01 6.25E-02 ** 1.38E+00 -0.25 0.25 0.189 
housing units median value 5.49E-07 2.71E-07 4.30E-02 *** 1.00E+00 125,000 333,333 0.114 
population density 2.29E-05 3.20E-05 4.74E-01  1.00E+00 500 3000 0.057 
population 1.13E-07 1.51E-07 4.55E-01  1.00E+00 2,500 50,000 0.005 
border complexity -3.02E-03 3.14E-02 9.23E-01  9.97E-01 1.5 3.5 -0.006 
MN -1.65E-02 1.84E-01 9.29E-01  9.84E-01 0 1 -0.016 
# CSO discharges -7.78E-04 4.12E-03 8.50E-01  9.99E-01 0 50 -0.039 
Δ % developed (2011-1992) -2.08E-01 2.98E-01 4.86E-01  8.12E-01 0.08 0.33 -0.047 
NC -6.09E-02 2.21E-01 7.83E-01  9.41E-01 0 1 -0.059 
land use diversity -1.05E+01 1.27E+00 1.00E-16 **** 2.65E-05 0.125 0.2 -0.075 
WI -9.49E-02 1.96E-01 6.28E-01  9.09E-01 0 1 -0.091 
housing units % owner-occupied -1.14E+00 3.06E-01 1.99E-04 **** 3.20E-01 0.75 0.95 -0.136 
IN -2.24E-01 2.14E-01 2.94E-01  7.99E-01 0 1 -0.201 
OR -4.13E-01 2.37E-01 8.09E-02 ** 6.62E-01 0 1 -0.338 
% agriculture (2011) -1.11E+00 1.96E-01 1.46E-08 **** 3.29E-01 0.3 0.85 -0.369 
SC -4.72E-01 2.68E-01 7.88E-02 ** 6.24E-01 0 1 -0.376 
township -5.71E-01 1.33E-01 1.73E-05 **** 5.65E-01 0 1 -0.435 
VA -6.35E-01 2.93E-01 3.03E-02 *** 5.30E-01 0 1 -0.470 
median age -5.16E-02 6.12E-03 3.18E-17 **** 9.50E-01 42 52 -0.503 
village -7.19E-01 1.23E-01 5.17E-09 **** 4.87E-01 0 1 -0.513 
CO -7.27E-01 2.70E-01 7.12E-03 **** 4.83E-01 0 1 -0.517 
KY -8.90E-01 2.39E-01 1.95E-04 **** 4.11E-01 0 1 -0.589 
parish -9.12E-01 1.35E+03 9.99E-01  4.02E-01 0 1 -0.598 
borough -1.01E+00 6.05E-01 9.65E-02 ** 3.66E-01 0 1 -0.634 
KS -1.06E+00 2.48E-01 1.90E-05 **** 3.46E-01 0 1 -0.654 
OK -1.25E+00 2.99E-01 2.89E-05 **** 2.86E-01 0 1 -0.714 
MD -1.32E+00 3.43E-01 1.19E-04 **** 2.67E-01 0 1 -0.733 
WV -1.33E+00 4.10E-01 1.13E-03 **** 2.63E-01 0 1 -0.737 
TN -1.34E+00 2.83E-01 2.01E-06 **** 2.61E-01 0 1 -0.739 
town -1.35E+00 1.24E-01 1.22E-27 **** 2.58E-01 0 1 -0.742 
TX -1.36E+00 1.90E-01 8.67E-13 **** 2.57E-01 0 1 -0.743 
UT -1.44E+00 2.75E-01 1.57E-07 **** 2.37E-01 0 1 -0.763 
MT -1.57E+00 4.76E-01 9.95E-04 **** 2.09E-01 0 1 -0.791 
GA -1.61E+00 2.22E-01 3.80E-13 **** 2.00E-01 0 1 -0.800 
county -1.67E+00 2.03E-01 1.61E-16 **** 1.88E-01 0 1 -0.812 
ME -1.78E+00 4.48E-01 7.37E-05 **** 1.69E-01 0 1 -0.831 
VT -1.96E+00 5.80E-01 7.15E-04 **** 1.41E-01 0 1 -0.859 
DE -2.21E+00 8.21E-01 7.20E-03 **** 1.10E-01 0 1 -0.890 
ND -2.51E+00 5.52E-01 5.44E-06 **** 8.13E-02 0 1 -0.919 
SD -2.54E+00 5.57E-01 5.02E-06 **** 7.86E-02 0 1 -0.921 
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variable coefficient std error p value odds ratio observed values (odds ratio - 1) * (extreme - central) central extreme 
         
ID -2.78E+00 5.57E-01 6.09E-07 **** 6.21E-02 0 1 -0.938 
NV -2.78E+00 7.47E-01 1.98E-04 **** 6.21E-02 0 1 -0.938 
IL -2.85E+00 2.67E-01 1.30E-26 **** 5.79E-02 0 1 -0.942 
AZ -2.92E+00 5.41E-01 6.88E-08 **** 5.39E-02 0 1 -0.946 
MA -3.22E+00 3.96E-01 4.36E-16 **** 4.00E-02 0 1 -0.960 
MI -3.46E+00 3.77E-01 4.82E-20 **** 3.15E-02 0 1 -0.969 
CA -3.52E+00 2.27E-01 4.56E-54 **** 2.97E-02 0 1 -0.970 
NM -3.54E+00 1.12E+00 1.57E-03 **** 2.91E-02 0 1 -0.971 
PA -3.58E+00 4.32E-01 1.11E-16 **** 2.77E-02 0 1 -0.972 
MO -4.00E+00 4.82E-01 1.02E-16 **** 1.83E-02 0 1 -0.982 
AL -4.57E+00 5.97E-01 1.91E-14 **** 1.03E-02 0 1 -0.990 
AR -4.62E+00 1.02E+00 6.43E-06 **** 9.87E-03 0 1 -0.990 
NY -6.09E+00 1.04E+00 5.28E-09 **** 2.26E-03 0 1 -0.998 
plantation -1.52E+01 2.03E+03 9.94E-01  2.60E-07 0 1 -1.000 
charter township -1.53E+01 9.14E+02 9.87E-01  2.20E-07 0 1 -1.000 
municipality -1.58E+01 6.16E+03 9.98E-01  1.43E-07 0 1 -1.000 
NE -1.70E+01 3.14E+02 9.57E-01  4.27E-08 0 1 -1.000 
NH -1.77E+01 6.23E+02 9.77E-01  2.10E-08 0 1 -1.000 
WY -1.78E+01 8.78E+02 9.84E-01  1.95E-08 0 1 -1.000 
MS -1.78E+01 4.83E+02 9.71E-01  1.94E-08 0 1 -1.000 
LA -1.82E+01 5.31E+02 9.73E-01  1.20E-08 0 1 -1.000 
CT -1.85E+01 7.14E+02 9.79E-01  8.85E-09 0 1 -1.000 
NJ -1.93E+01 4.30E+02 9.64E-01  4.36E-09 0 1 -1.000 
RI -1.93E+01 1.62E+03 9.90E-01  4.15E-09 0 1 -1.000 
AIC = 8,944 
 
The two preceding regression models suggest two major conclusions.  First, in both 
models, being regulated as an MS4 – either Phase 1 or Phase 2 – exhibits very strong, significant, 
positive effects on the likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee (Table 
3.5, Table 3.6).  More specifically, the models suggest that MS4 regulation increases the 
likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee by eight to nine times for 
Phase 1 MS4s and two to four times for Phase 2 MS4s (Table 3.5, Table 3.6).  The second major 
takeaway suggested by the preceding regression models is that the effects of certain states and 
certain local government types are by far the strongest significant negative factors on the 
likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee (Table 3.6).  In fact, compared 
with Florida,51 the likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee drops to 
nearly zero in certain states, including New York, Arkansas, Alabama, Missouri, Pennsylvania, 
New Mexico, California, California, Michigan, Massachusetts, Arizona, Illinois, Nevada, Idaho, 
South Dakota, and North Dakota (Table 3.6).  Compared with Florida, the likelihood of a local 
government having enacted a stormwater fee actually does drop to zero in the eight states with 
                                                 
51 Florida has the highest percentage of local governments that have enacted a stormwater fee and also is 
one of eight states where four types of local governments have enacted a stormwater fees (Table 3.2). 
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no stormwater fees (i.e., Rhode Island, New Jersey, Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Wyoming, New Hampshire, Nebraska), although the high standard errors due to the absence of 
enacted fee observations caused these effects to be statistically insignificant (Table 3.6).  On the 
other hand, local governments in two states – Ohio and, to a lesser extent, Iowa – were 
significantly more likely to have enacted a stormwater fee compared with Florida (Table 3.6). 
In addition to state effects, some local government types also exhibited fairly strong, 
significant effects on the likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee 
(Table 3.6).  Counties, towns, villages, and townships were all significantly less likely than 
cities52 to have enacted a stormwater fee, whereas city-county governments were significantly 
more likely than cities to have enacted a stormwater fee (Table 3.6).  Boroughs were also less 
likely than cities to have enacted a stormwater fee, but the borough effect was only marginally 
significant when controlling for state factors (Table 3.6), reflecting the facts that boroughs only 
exist in three states (i.e., Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) and that the only boroughs that 
have enacted stormwater fees so far are in Pennsylvania (Table 3.6).  As with states that have 
zero stormwater fees, some local government types with no enacted stormwater fees exhibited 
strong but statistically insignificant negative effects on the likelihood of stormwater fee 
enactment, namely:  charter townships, which only exist in Michigan; plantations, which only 
exist in Maine; municipalities, which only exist in Pennsylvania; and parishes, which only exist 
in Louisiana (Table 3.6). 
In addition to MS4 regulation, three other variables also exhibited significant, positive 
effects on the likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee consistently in 
both models:  perimeter; percent urbanized area in 2010; and percent owner-occupied housing 
units valued at $100,000 or more (Table 3.5, Table 3.6).  The consistently positive, significant 
effects of the percent urbanized area in 2010 variable – which exhibits moderately strong 
correlation with percent developed land use in 2011 and population density (Table B.4, Figure 
B.12) – and the percent owner-occupied housing units valued at $100,000 or more variable 
suggest that local governments in more urbanized areas and with larger proportions of owner-
occupied housing units valued at $100,000 or more have been more likely to enact stormwater 
fees.  Interpreting the consistently positive, significant effect of the perimeter variable is less 
                                                 
52 I chose city as the comparison local government type for the regression analyses because cities are 
located in every state and are second only to townships in number across the lower 48 states (Table 3.2). 
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obvious.  Perimeter is often correlated with land area, which suggests that local governments 
with larger areal jurisdictions have been more likely to enact stormwater fees.  However, some 
local governments with fairly small areal jurisdictions also have surprisingly large perimeters.  
This phenomenon of areally smaller local governments with relatively large perimeters is often 
associated with location in a jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan region and/or proximity to 
waterways and other drainage features, phenomena which are explored in greater detail in the 
border complexity section of Appendix B. 
Three other variables exhibit consistently positive effects in both models, but decrease 
substantially in effect size and significance in the second model:  percent white population; 
percent developed land use in 2011; and the housing unit newness index (Table 3.5, Table 3.6).  
The substantially decreased effect size and significance of these three variables in the model with 
local government type and state effects primarily reflects the fact that the distributions of these 
variables differs markedly between local governments that have and have not enacted a 
stormwater fee in most states, but that these distributions vary much less markedly in certain 
states with relatively large numbers of stormwater fees.  For instance, while local governments 
that have enacted stormwater fees tend to have substantially higher percentages of developed 
land use in most states, this pattern is not as pronounced in California, Iowa, and Ohio (Figure 
B.15).  The positive effect of the percent white population variable was unexpected because local 
governments that have enacted a stormwater fee tend to have lower percentages of white 
population than local governments that have not enacted a stormwater fee (Figure B.11).  
However, the difference in percentage white population between local governments that have 
and have not enacted stormwater fees is attenuated and even reversed when controlling for other 
factors, such as MS4 regulation phase (Figure B.16) or state (Figure B.17). 
In both of the preceding regression models, three factors consistently exhibit significant 
negative effects on the likelihood of a local government having enacted a stormwater fee:  
percent owner-occupied housing units; median age; and land use diversity (Table 3.5, Table 3.6).  
The consistent, significant negative effects of these variables suggest that local governments with 
higher percentages of owner-occupied housing units, higher median ages, and higher land use 
diversity have been less likely to enact a stormwater fee.  That said, the effect sizes of the percent 
owner-occupied housing units variable and the land use diversity variable were fairly small, 
especially in the model with local government type and state factors (Table 3.5, Table 3.6). 
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Several variables also exhibited inconsistent effects between the two preceding regression 
models.  Three variables with significant effects in the first model had insignificant effects in the 
model with state and local government type factors:  number of CSO discharges; border 
complexity; and population density (Table 3.5, Table 3.6).  The distributions of these variables 
differ substantially among local governments that have and have not enacted stormwater fees in 
most states and when looking at the nation as a whole, but the effect of these variables on 
stormwater fee enactment becomes insignificant when controlling for local government type and 
state effects for a couple main reasons.  While local governments that have enacted a stormwater 
fee tend to have higher population densities (Figure B.11), this tendency is much less 
pronounced in certain states, such as Ohio and California (Figure B.18).  Moreover, densely 
populated local governments that have not enacted a stormwater fee are quite numerous in some 
states, such as New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut (Figure B.18).  In contrast to the 
previously mentioned variables with inconsistent effects, the percent agricultural land use in 
2011 variable had an insignificant effect in the first model, but a highly significant – albeit 
moderately sized – negative effect in the model with state and local government type factors 
(Table 3.5, Table 3.6).  The significance of the percent agricultural land use variable in the model 
with state and local government type effects is largely attributable to the fact that local 
governments with lower percentages of agricultural land use were less likely to enact stormwater 
fees in many states (e.g., Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin), but that this 
pattern was less pronounced or not apparent in other states (e.g., California, Colorado, Florida, 
Iowa) (Figure B.19).  Finally, one variable – median value of owner-occupied housing units – 
exhibited significant effects in both models, but switched in the effect direction (Table 3.5, Table 
3.6), reflecting the fact that local governments regulated as Phase 1 and Phase 2 MS4s with 
lower median values of owner-occupied housing units were more likely to have enacted a 
stormwater fee (Figure B.20), but that local governments with higher median owner-occupied 
housing unit values were more likely to have enacted a stormwater fee for most local 
government types in most states (Figure B.21). 
Finally, two variables exhibited statistically insignificant effects in both preceding 
regression models:  population and change in percent developed land use from 1992 to 2011 
(Table 3.5, Table 3.6). 
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3.4.3.2 When 
To further investigate the timing of stormwater fee enactment by local governments in the United 
States, I implemented a multinominal logistic regression model53 on a categorical variable of 
stormwater fee enactment by decade54,55 (Table 3.7). 
 
                                                 
53 I utilized a multinomial regression model rather than an ordinal model primarily because the multinomial 
model allows for more flexible comparison among time periods. 
 
54 Decades defined as:  1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009, and 2010-2017. 
 
55 I chose to use decade rather than year as the dependent variable for the “when” analyses for two main 
reasons:  (1) to increase the number of observations for each value of the dependent variable; and (2) because the 
regulations posited to be most relevant to stormwater fee diffusion (i.e., the Phase 1 and Phase 2 MS4 regulations) 
were implemented roughly a decade apart. 
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Table 3.7.  Summary of regression model #3. 
Multinomial regression on categorical dependent variable indicating in which time period 
(1970-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009, 2010-2017) local governments enacted a stormwater fee.  Comparison period is 1990-1999. 
variable 
p value odds ratio observed values 
(odds ratio - 1) 
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(intercept) 0.157     0.612   0.201                       
MS4 Phase 1 0.417     0.592   0.023 **** 1.61   0.86 0.46 0 1 0.61   -0.14 -0.54 
MS4 Phase 2 0.013 ***   0.000 **** 0.100 * 3.61   2.30 1.43 0 1 2.61   1.30 0.43 
# CSO discharges 0.005 ****   0.396   0.951   1.03   1.01 1.00 0 50 1.47   0.42 0.04 
population 0.098 **   0.638   0.445   1.00   1.00 1.00 25,000 250,000 0.17   -0.04 0.08 
% urbanized (2010) 0.645     0.310   0.197   1.57   0.64 0.54 0.75 1 0.14   -0.09 -0.12 
% developed (2011) 0.560     0.094 ** 0.737   1.88   0.37 0.79 0.45 0.8 0.31   -0.22 -0.08 
% deciduous (2011) 0.006 ****   0.057 ** 0.066 ** 0.00   0.19 5.35 0.05 0.25 -0.20   -0.16 0.87 
% agriculture (2011) 0.005 ****   0.005 **** 0.244   38.28   7.31 2.60 0.1 0.5 14.91   2.53 0.64 
Δ % agriculture (2011-1992) 0.524     0.001 **** 0.004 **** 2.37   0.09 0.09 -0.1 -0.33 -0.31   0.21 0.21 
population % not white and not black 0.233     0.925   0.499   0.31   0.95 0.62 0.15 0.5 -0.24   -0.02 -0.13 
housing units % owner-occupied 0.108 *   0.778   0.310   0.18   1.19 2.08 0.666 0.9 -0.19   0.04 0.25 
housing units % built before 1950 0.208     0.446   0.017 *** 0.25   1.54 4.50 0.125 0.5 -0.28   0.20 1.31 
housing units % valued over $300,000 
- % valued under $150,000 0.111 *   0.000 **** 0.037 *** 1.57   0.55 0.66 -0.25 0.25 0.28   -0.23 -0.17 
AIC = 2,936 
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The two phases of MS4 regulation exhibited significant effects on the timing of 
stormwater fee enactment by local governments across the United States (Table 3.7).  Local 
governments regulated under the Phase 1 MS4 regulations were almost twice as likely to enact a 
stormwater fee in the 1990s56 – the decade immediately after the Phase 1 MS4 regulations were 
promulgated – compared with the period since 2010 (Table 3.7).  Similarly, local governments 
regulated under the Phase 2 MS4 regulations were 130% more likely to enact a stomwater fee in 
the 2000s – the decade when the Phase 2 MS4 regulations took effect – compared with the 1990s 
(Table 3.7).  Curiously, local governments regulated under the Phase 2 MS4 regulations were 
also significantly and substantially more likely to have enacted a stormwater fee prior to 199057 
compared with the 1990s (Table 3.7). 
Local governments with higher numbers of CSO discharges were also significantly and 
substantially more likely to enact a stormwater fee prior to 1990 compared with the 1990-1999 
timeframe (Table 3.7).  Local governments that enacted stormwater fees prior to 1990 that had 
relatively large number of CSO discharges were mainly larger cities, including:  Portland and 
Corvallis in Oregon; Detroit, Michigan; Cincinnati, Ohio; St. Paul, Minnesota; Seattle, 
Washington; Zanesville, Ohio; and Louisville, Kentucky.  Compared with the 1990s, local 
governments with large populations were also more likely to enact a stormwater fee prior to 
1990, although this effect was only marginally significant and fairly small in most cases (Table 
3.7). 
Some land use variables also exhibited significant effects on the timing of stormwater fee 
enactment.  Compared with the 1990s, local governments with higher percentages of agricultural 
land use were significantly more likely to enact a stormwater fee prior to 1990 and during the 
2000s, with a large effect size in extreme cases (Table 3.7).  Local governments that experienced 
greater losses of agricultural land use from 1992 to 2011 were also significantly, if slightly, more 
likely to enact a stormwater fee since 2000 compared with the 1990-1999 timeframe (Table 3.7).  
                                                 
56 I used 1990-1999 as the comparison period because this period had a substantial number of observations 
and was the first decade of MS4 regulation. 
 
57 In the “when” regression model, I grouped together the 1970-1979 and 1980-1989 decades due to small 
number observations in the 1970-1979 period. 
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Local governments with larger percentages of deciduous58 forested land use were also more 
likely to enact a stormwater fee after 2009 compared with the 1990s, although this effect was 
marginally significant (Table 3.7).  Taken together, the land use effects generally indicate that 
local governments with higher pecentages of agricultural and forested land use – and those that 
lost more agricultural land use between 1992 and 2011 – were more likely to enact stormwater 
fees in more recent years compared with earlier years. 
Two housing stock variables also exhibited significant effects on the timing of 
stormwater fee enactment.  First, local governments with larger percentages of housing units 
built prior to 1950 were significantly more likely to enact stormwater fees since 2010 compared 
with the 1990s (Table 3.7).  Second, local governments with smaller or negative differences in 
the percentage of housing units valued more than $300,000 and the percentage of housing units 
valued less than $150,000 were more likely to enact a stormwater fee since 2000 compared with 
the 1990s (Table 3.7).  The effects of these housing stock variables suggest that local 
governments with older and less highly valued housing stock were more likely to enact 
stormwater fees in recent years compared with earlier years. 
Some of the observed effects in the multinomial regression model on the timing of 
stormwater fee enactment would likely change with the inclusion of other potentially salient 
variables, such as government type and state factors.  For example, while the percentage of 
agricultural land use varied substantially across decades and MS4 regulation phases in states like 
Minnesota, Texas, and Iowa, this was less the case in states like Florida, Colorado, and 
California (Figure B.25).  However, there were not enough observations across time periods to 
add government type or state factors to the multinomial regression model on the timing of 
stormwater fee enactment. 
                                                 
58 The National Land Cover Dataset delineates three categories of forested land use:  deciduous, coniferous, 
and mixed.  The distribution of deciduous forest land use exhibited greater separation between decades of 
stormwater fee enactment than any other forested land use variable, included total forested land use (i.e., the sum of 
deciduous, coniferous, and mixed forested land use).  In the lower 48 states, very little deciduous forest is located 
west of roughly 100 degrees west longitude (i.e., from roughly Oklahoma City westward), excepting some areas of 
national forest in western Colorado and central Utah.  The areas with the greatest concentration of deciduous forest 
in the lower 48 states include:  the Appalachian Mountains regions of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and North Carolina; the Ozark Mountain regions of Missouri, Arkansas, and Oklahoma; New York and 
most New England states; the Great Lakes regions of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan; as well as parts of the 
Ohio River valley in Ohio and Indiana. 
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3.4.3.3 In what order within states 
To investigate the order in which local governments enacted stormwater fees in each state, I 
created a variable indicating the sequence in which local governments enacted stormwater fees in 
each state.  For this state-specific enactment sequence variable, the first local government to 
enact a stormwater fee in each state was assigned a value of one, and the twentieth local 
government to enact a stormwater fee in each state was assigned a value of 20.  The same value 
was assigned in instances where multiple local governments in the same state enacted a 
stormwater fee in the same year.  For example, in Georgia, the first local governments to enact a 
stormwater fee were:  the City of Griffin in 1988; Columbia County and the City of Decatur in 
1999; and the City of Conyers in 2002.  For the state-specific enactment sequence variable, 
Griffin was assigned a value of one, Columbia County and Decatur were both assigned values of 
two, and Conyers was assigned a value of four, skipping the value three. 
Using a binned version of this state-specific enactment sequence variable,59 I 
implemented an ordinal regression model to investigate potentially explanatory effects on 
patterns of stormwater fee enactment sequence in each state (Table 3.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 For the ordinal regression analysis, I grouped the state-specific enactment sequence variable into eight 
bins:  1-3; 4-9; 10-19; 20-39; 40-49; 50-74; 75-99; and ≥ 100. 
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Table 3.8.  Summary of regression model #4. 
Multinomial regression on categorical dependent variable indicating in what order (1-3, 4-9, 10-19, 20-39, 40-49, 
50-74, 75-99, ≥ 100) local governments enacted a stormwater fee in each state.  Table sorted on rightmost column.  
Comparison bases are 1-3 for state-specific enactment order group and city for local government type. 
variable coefficient std error p value odds ratio observed values (odds ratio - 1) * (extreme - central) central extreme 
intercept(4 to 9) -7.83E-01 5.34E-01 1.43E-01 *     
intercept(10 to 19) 3.04E-01 5.32E-01 5.67E-01      
intercept(20 to 39) 1.04E+00 5.32E-01 5.13E-02 **     
intercept(40 to 49) 1.95E+00 5.34E-01 2.56E-04 ****     
intercept(50 to 74) 2.26E+00 5.35E-01 2.33E-05 ****     
intercept(75 to 99) 2.83E+00 5.37E-01 1.36E-07 ****     
intercept(≥ 100) 3.96E+00 5.43E-01 3.20E-13 ****     
% forest (2011) 2.35E+00 4.76E-01 8.32E-07 **** 10.4644252 0.1 0.5 3.786 
borough 1.27E+00 8.25E-01 1.24E-01 * 3.5555860 0 1 2.556 
CSOs 5.59E-01 2.22E-01 1.17E-02 *** 1.7484863 0 1 0.748 
town 5.01E-01 2.09E-01 1.63E-02 *** 1.6505229 0 1 0.651 
% urbanized (2010) 1.15E+00 2.67E-01 1.85E-05 **** 3.1434910 0.75 1 0.536 
housing units % 
built before 1950 5.80E-01 3.75E-01 1.22E-01 * 1.7853084 0.1 0.5 0.314 
% agriculture (2011) 4.05E-01 4.80E-01 4.00E-01  1.4986156 0.05 0.5 0.224 
population 6.14E-07 2.94E-07 3.68E-02 *** 1.0000006 25,000 250,000 0.138 
county 9.45E-02 2.95E-01 7.49E-01  1.0991162 0 1 0.099 
Δ % forest (2011-1992) -4.66E-01 5.52E-01 3.99E-01  0.6275210 -0.05 -0.3 0.093 
land area 1.77E-04 2.37E-04 4.56E-01  1.0001769 25 500 0.084 
city-county -5.29E-02 7.47E-01 9.43E-01  0.9484475 0 1 -0.052 
racial diversity -1.97E+00 1.23E+00 1.08E-01 * 0.1389672 0.3 0.37 -0.060 
MS4 Phase 2 -2.31E-01 1.36E-01 9.02E-02 ** 0.7938406 0 1 -0.206 
housing units 
tenancy diversity -9.13E-01 3.70E-01 1.36E-02 *** 0.4011721 0.2 0.55 -0.210 
MS4 Phase 1 -2.85E-01 1.96E-01 1.46E-01 * 0.7516507 0 1 -0.248 
village -5.94E-01 2.02E-01 3.21E-03 **** 0.5520155 0 1 -0.448 
township -9.72E-01 4.91E-01 4.79E-02 *** 0.3782148 0 1 -0.622 
median age -4.98E-02 9.54E-03 1.81E-07 **** 0.9514372 35 50 -0.728 
AIC = 5,206 
 
The regression model on state-specific stormwater fee enactment sequence suggests that 
the earliest-enacting local governments in each state had the following characteristics:  higher 
percent forested land use in 2011; CSO discharges; lower median age; higher percent urbanized 
area in 2010; lower diversity of housing unit tenancy type; and larger population (Table 3.8).  
Additionally, compared with cities, the earliest-enacting local governments tended to be towns, 
whereas townships and villages tended to be later enactors (Table 3.8).  Although the Phase 1 
and Phase 2 MS4 regulation variables are associated with earlier stormwater fee enactment 
within a state, these effects are marginally insignificant (Table 3.8).  However, closer analysis 
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shows that all but one of the first-enacting local governments in each state was regulated as 
either a Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 community.60  Similarly, most of the local governments in the 
earliest-enacting bin (i.e., the first, second, or third local governments to enact a stormwater fee 
in each state) were also regulated under either the Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 regulations.  
Furthermore, most of the local governments in the earliest-enacting bin that were not regulated 
under the Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 regulations were part of the special-district stormwater fee 
enacted by Sanitation District 1 of Northern Kentucky.  These additional analyses suggest that 
implementing MS4 regulation as a single binary variable indicating if a local government was 
regulated under either the Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 regulations in the previous regression model 
would result in a more significant effect compared with implementing MS4 regulation effects in 
two distinct phases.  Local governments regulated under the Phase 1 MS4 regulations also 
tended to be cities with large land areas and populations (Figure B.27, Figure B.28), so the effect 
of the MS4 regulations is somewhat interrelated with the effects of other variables. 
To specifically assess the two hypothesized characteristics of the earliest-enacting local 
governments within states, I further examined the earliest-enacting local governments in each 
state with respect to size – both population and land area – and median household income.61  
Fairly large cities and counties – in terms of both 2010 population (i.e., more than 75,000) and 
land area (i.e., larger than 24 square miles) – were the earliest or among the earliest adopters62 of 
stormwater fees in some states, including:  Mobile, Alabama; Peoria, Arizona; San Jose, 
California; Boulder and Denver63 in Colorado; Tallahassee, Florida; Columbia County, Georgia; 
Sioux City, Iowa; Aurora, Illinois; Louisville, Kentucky;64 Montgomery County, Maryland; 
                                                 
60 The only local government that was first to enact a stormwater fee in its state that was not regulated 
under either the Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS regulations was the Village of Lake Delton in Sauk County, Wisconsin. 
 
61 Note that population exhibited a significant effect in the state-specific stormwater fee enactment 
sequence regression model (Table 3.8).  I did not include median household income in the regression model because 
my initial screening of this variable showed minimal covariation with the state-specific enactment sequence 
variable. 
 
62 While I use the term “early adopters” here, Rogers (2003) refers to the very earliest adopters of an 
innovation as “innovators.” 
 
63 The city and county of Denver, Colorado have been consolidated since 1902. 
 
64 Campbell et al. (2017) record the enactment year for the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government 
stormwater fee as 1987.  The City of Louisville was a distinct jurisdiction from Jefferson County until the metro 
government was formed in 2003. 
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Detroit, Ann Arbor, and Lansing in Michigan; Kansas City, Missouri; Charlotte and Greensboro 
in North Carolina; Cincinnati, Ohio; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon; Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Dallas and Garland in Texas; Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Chesapeake, Newport News, and Virginia Beach in Virginia; and Clark County and Bellevue in 
Washington (Figure 3.5, Table 3.9).  However, fairly small local governments (i.e., populations 
less than 45,000 and land areas less than 22 square miles) were the first to enact stormwater fees 
in many states, such as:  the City of Pinole, California; the City of Hallandale Beach, Florida; the 
City of Griffin, Georgia; the City of Coeur d’Alene, Idaho; the towns of Dyer and North 
Manchester in Indiana; the City of Winfield, Kansas; the City of Takoma Park, Maryland; the 
cities of Fridley, Richfield, Robbinsdale, and Roseville in Minnesota; the Village of Clemmons 
in North Carolina; the City of Ithaca, New York; the Municipality of Mt. Lebanon and the 
Borough of Jonestown in Pennsylvania; the cities of Florence and Georgetown in South 
Carolina; the City of North Ogden in Utah; the City of South Burlington, Vermont; the Village 
of Lake Delton, Wisconsin; and the cities of Oak Hill and Hurricane in West Virginia (Figure 
3.5, Table 3.10). 
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Figure 3.5.  Scatterplot of population vs. year of stormwater fee enactment by state. 
Population axis on logarithmic scale.  Year reference lines at 1990 and 2000.  Symbol shapes and colors indicate MS4 regulation status. 
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Similarly, some local governments with relatively high 2016 median household incomes 
(i.e., more than $66,666) were the earliest or among the earliest adopters of stormwater fees in 
some states, such as:  the cities Pinole and San Jose in California; the City of Decatur and 
Columbia County in Georgia; the Village of Tinley Park, Illinois; the Town of Dyer, Indiana; the 
City of Newton and the Town of Reading in Massachusetts; Montgomery County and the cities 
of Takoma Park and Annapolis in Maryland; the cities of Edina and Shakopee in Minnesota; the 
Village of Clemmons, North Carolina; the City of Edmond, Oklahoma; the Municipality of Mt. 
Lebanon, Pennsylvania; the City of North Ogden, Utah; the cities of Chesapeake and Virginia 
Beach in Virginia; the City of South Burlington, Vermont; and the City of Bellevue, Washington 
(Figure 3.6, Table 3.9).  However, local governments with relatively low 2016 median household 
incomes (i.e., less than $45,000) were the first to enact stormwater fees in some states, such as:  
the cities of Mobile and Anniston in Alabama; the City of Hot Springs, Arkansas; the cities of 
Hallandale Beach and Tallahassee in Florida; the City of Griffin, Georgia; the City of Coeur 
d’Alene, Idaho; the City of Winfield, Kansas; the City of Lewiston, Maine; the City of Detroit, 
Michigan; the City of Ithaca, New York; the cities of Cincinnati and Wooster and the Village of 
Montpelier in Ohio; the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma; the City of Corvallis, Oregon; the cities of 
Florence and Georgetown in South Carolina; the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee; the Village of 
Lake Delton, Wisconsin; and the City of Oak Hill, West Virginia (Figure 3.6, Table 3.10). 
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Figure 3.6.  Scatterplot of median household income vs. year of stormwater fee enactment by state. 
Year reference lines at 1990 and 2000.  Symbol shapes and colors indicate MS4 regulation status. 
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The only states where the first local government to enact a stormwater fee had both a 
2010 population over 75,000 and a 2016 median household income over $66,666 were Virginia 
(the City of Chesapeake) and Washington (the City of Bellevue) (Table 3.9).  In 19 other states, 
however, the first local government to enact a stormwater fee had either a 2010 population over 
75,000 or a 2016 median household income over $66,666 (Table 3.9). 
 
Table 3.9.  Relatively populous or affluent early enactors. 
Relatively populous (2010 population > 75,000) or relatively affluent (2016 median household income > $66,666) 
local governments that were the first in their respective states to enact a stormwater fee. 
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AL Mobile city 2009 195,111 179.8 $38,759 Mobile 
AZ Peoria city 1995 154,065 179.0 $66,163 Maricopa, Yavapai 
CA Pinole city 1979 18,390 11.8 $74,124 Contra Costa 
CO Boulder city 1974 97,385 25.9 $60,569 Boulder 
IA Sioux City city 1990 82,684 59.2 $46,028 Plymouth, Woodbury 
IL Tinley Park village 1983 56,703 16.0 $76,022 Cook, Will 
IN Dyer town 1991 16,390 6.1 $78,043 Lake 
MD Takoma Park city 1996 16,715 2.1 $78,921 Montgomery 
MI Detroit city 1979 713,777 142.9 $26,249 Wayne 
MO Kansas City city 1992 459,787 319.0 $47,489 Cass, Clay, Jackson, Platte 
NC Clemmons village 1993 18,627 12.1 $67,783 Forsyth 
OH Cincinnati city 1984 296,943 79.5 $34,629 Hamilton 
OK Tulsa city 1986 391,906 201.1 $43,045 Osage, Rogers, Tulsa, Wagoner 
OR Portland city 1977 583,776 145.1 $58,423 Clackamas, Multnomah, Washington 
PA Mt. Lebanon township 2011 33,137 6.1 $86,422 Allegheny 
SD Sioux Falls city 1982 153,888 73.8 $54,110 Lincoln, Minnehaha 
TN Chattanooga city 1993 167,674 149.7 $41,278 Hamilton 
UT North Ogden city 1987 17,357 7.2 $78,598 Weber 
VA Chesapeake city 1992 222,209 350.9 $69,978 Chesapeake city 
VT South Burlington city 2005 17,904 29.6 $66,728 Chittenden 
WA Bellevue city 1974 122,363 33.7 $100,703 King 
 
Conversely, in ten states, the first local government to enact a stormwater fee had both a 
2010 population under 45,000 and a 2016 median household income lower than $45,000 (Table 
3.10). 
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Table 3.10.  Relatively unpopulous and poor early enactors. 
Relatively unpopulous (2010 population < 45,000) and relatively poor (2016 median household income < $45,000) 
local governments that were the first in their respective states to enact a stormwater fee. 
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AR Hot Springs city 2008 35,193 35.1 $30,736 Garland 
FL Hallandale Beach city 1980 37,113 4.6 $34,400 Broward 
GA Griffin city 1998 23,643 14.1 $30,692 Spalding 
ID Coeur d'Alene city 2004 44,137 16.1 $43,770 Kootenai 
KS Winfield city 1991 12,301 12.5 $41,297 Cowley 
ME Lewiston city 2006 36,592 35.5 $38,199 Androscoggin 
NY Ithaca city 2014 30,014 6.1 $30,291 Tompkins 
SC Florence city 1981 37,056 21.2 $44,989 Florence 
WI Lake Delton village 1993 2,914 7.6 $43,384 Sauk 
WV Oak Hill city 2003 7,730 5.7 $38,291 Fayette 
3.4.4 Geospatial considerations 
Although a formal analysis of geographic factors influencing stormwater fee diffusion among 
local governments in the United States is presently beyond the scope of this research,65 a 
geospatial perspective on the subject suggests some compelling patterns. 
In Minnesota, for example, the pattern of stormwater fee diffusion suggests a strong 
geospatial element, particularly concentrated in and around the Minneapolis / St. Paul 
metropolitan area (Figure 3.7).  The first local government in Minnesota to enact a stormwater 
fee was Roseville, a 14-square mile city of roughly 33,000 people located just east of 
Minneapolis and just north of St. Paul, in 1984.  In 1985, five more cities (i.e., Edina, Fridley, 
Richfield, Robbinsdale, Shakopee) within 25 miles of downtown Minneapolis enacted 
stormwater fees.  By 1990, eight other cities in the region had enacted stormwater fees, including 
St. Paul in 1986.  By 1999, 54 of the 57 local governments with stormwater fees in Minnesota 
were located within roughly 50 miles of downtown Minneapolis.  By 2017, 113 of the 136 local 
governments with stormwater fees in Minnesota – as well as a few cities across the St. Croix 
                                                 
65 I plan to extend this research by incorporating explicitly geospatial models of stormwater fee diffusion 
among local governments in the United States. 
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River in western Wisconsin – were located within roughly 50 miles of downtown Minneapolis 
(Figure 3.7). 
Campbell et al. (2014) previously noted a geospatially clustered pattern of stormwater fee 
diffusion in the Twin Cities region, as well as in other metropolitan regions:  Dallas / Fort Worth, 
Texas; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Atlanta, Georgia (Figure 3.2).  Clusters of stormwater fees are 
also located in and around the Seattle / Tacoma region in Washington, the Portland region in 
Oregon, the Indianapolis region in Indiana, the Kansas City region in Kansas and Missouri, the 
Charlotte region in North Carolina and South Carolina, the Columbus region in Ohio, the 
Milwaukee region in Wisconsin, the Oklahoma City and Tulsa regions in Oklahoma, along the 
Interstate 35 corridor north of San Antonio in Texas, along the Front Range / Interstate 25 
corridor in Colorado, along the Wasatch Front / Interstate 15 corridor in Utah, in several regions 
along the coast of South Carolina, and in several regions in Florida and California (Figure 3.2).66  
Some plausible mechanisms driving geospatial clustering of stormwater fees include diffusion 
through regional governing institutions (e.g., the Metropolitan Council in the Minneapolis / St. 
Paul region) and – as discussed below – consulting firms with multiple local government clients. 
                                                 
66 As noted by Campbell (2013), stormwater fees tend to cluster along major road (e.g., interstate) corridors 
in many parts of the United States.  However, more developed and more populous localities also tend to cluster 
along major road corridors.  By explicitly modeling geospatial patterns, future research into stormwater fee diffusion 
may be better able to assess the relative influence of land use, population, proximity to major road corridors, and 
other interrelated factors. 
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Figure 3.7.  Map of stormwater fees in Minnesota. 
[Stormwater fee data from Campbell et al. (2017).  Jurisdiction boundaries from United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
Animated version available at http://youtu.be/r-IHzb2-_uc. 
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In addition to the spatially concentrated diffusion of stormwater fees among subcounty 
governments observed in the Twin Cities region and other areas of the contiguous United States, 
a stormwater fee enacted by a subcounty government can precede enactment of a stormwater fee 
by the encompassing county government.  For example, Volusia County in northeastern Florida 
enacted a stormwater fee 1992, not long after two cities in the county enacted stormwater fees:  
Ormond Beach in 1987 and South Daytona in 1989.  This ostensible “seeding” dynamic can also 
operate in a county-to-subcounty direction, such as in Cumberland County, North Carolina 
where the county enacted a stormwater fee in 1995 followed later by two subcounty governments 
in the county:  the City of Fayetteville in 2004 and the Town of Hope Mills in 2007.67 
Another geospatial diffusion pattern indicated in my analyses is that stormwater fees 
enacted by counties are mostly in counties with large proportions of unincorporated land in 
southern and western states, including Florida, Washington, Georgia, South Carolina, Kentucky, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Colorado, Oregon, and California (Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 
B.29).  That said, there are also several county stormwater fees in counties with very little 
unincorporated land in other states, such as Indiana and Ohio (Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 
B.29). 
These and other geospatial patterns of stormwater fee diffusion can be observed in many 
other areas of the United States, suggesting that models explicitly accounting for geospatial 
relationships among local governments will generate new insights into the mechanisms driving 
stormwater fee diffusion. 
3.4.5 State-specific factors 
Although a thorough, nationwide investigation of state-specific factors influencing stormwater 
fee diffusion among local governments in the United States is beyond the scope of this 
                                                 
67 In situations where a subcounty government assesses a stormwater fee within a county that also assesses 
a stormwater fee, the county stormwater fee often only applies to unincorporated areas of the county.  This situation 
is especially common in southern and western states where large areas of land are not incorporated into subcounty 
governments (Figure 3.2, Table B.3).  Jurisdictional overlap of stormwater fees is discussed further in Appendix B. 
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dissertation, my research and existing literature suggest two major factors influencing the 
diffusion of stormwater fees among and within states:  statutory law and case law.68 
3.4.5.1  Statutory law 
A brief exploration of statutory law in a couple of states will illustrate some of the reasons 
stormwater fees are more prevalent among local governments in some states versus others. 
As previously noted, Pennsylvania passed a series of laws in 2016 explicitly authorizing 
certain types of local governments (i.e., boroughs and townships) to enact stormwater fees.  Prior 
to passage of these laws the legal authority of these forms of local government in Pennsylvania 
to independently assess stormwater fees was unclear.  The state passed a law in 2013 explicitly 
empowering municipal authorities – legally distinct entities from the municipalities themselves – 
to assess fees for stormwater management.  As expressed by one of the people I interviewed as 
part of my inquiry into stormwater fee form, the legal uncertainty about the powers granted to 
certain forms of local government under state laws created hesitancy among many local 
governments to be an early mover in enacting a stormwater fee: 
 
“The Municipal Code was amended to include that I think in 2011 or 2012.  A lot of the 
areas – Dormont, Mt. Lebanon, a couple of the other areas – they did not implement 
theirs [stormwater fees] until that language was changed because they were worried about 
running afoul of the Municipal Code.  It says you can charge for water and wastewater, 
and there were some questions and vagaries around, ‘Is stormwater wastewater?  Or are 
they referring only to sanitary waste?’  A lot of municipalities were like, ‘Well, we’ll just 
wait and see.’  And they finally did clarify, ‘Yes, you can also charge for stormwater.’ 
 
I think that’s what a lot of municipalities were waiting for, was just to see, number one, 
‘Can we actually do this within the structure of the legal agreements we have?’ and two, 
‘Is it worth the effort to go through all of that only to have it maybe challenged or backed 
off?’” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
                                                 
68 Existing literature explores various state-specific factors, including statutory law and case law, 
influencing stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in Alabama (Campbell et al., 2014), Florida 
(Lienhart et al., 2013), Georgia (J. Smith, 2006; Whalen, III, 2000), Illinois (Chicago Metropolitan Agency for 
Planning, 2013; Hoskins, 2006; Keehner & Trivedi, 2013), Indiana (L. Wilson & Lindsey, 1995), Maryland 
(Maryland Department of the Environment, 2008), Massachusetts (Anantapadmanabhan, 2016), Michigan 
(Cooperwasser, 2012), Pennsylvania (Bowen, 2013; Chiaruttini, 2014; Glass, 2014; Horstmann & Bakare, 2017; 
PennFuture, 2017), Rhode Island (Marsello, 2011), Texas (Palmer, 1993), Vermont (Ali et al., 2013), and 
Washington (Diessner, 1993). 
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Now that state law clearly empowers local governments in Pennsylvania to directly 
assess stormwater fees, and now that several municipalities in the state have enacted stormwater 
fees, Pennsylvania is experiencing a surge in stormwater fee enactment by local governments. 
Local governments in New Jersey appear to be in a similar situation to where many local 
governments in Pennsylvania were until recent years.  Although several efforts to enact 
legislation explicitly empowering local governments to establish stormwater fees have emerged 
in the New Jersey state legislature – one of which made it all the way to a gubernatorial veto – 
none of these bills have yet been enacted into law (McKillop, 2018). 
3.4.5.2 Case law 
In addition to – and often based on – state statutory laws, case law developed by courts in many 
states is another important influence on the diffusion of stormwater fees in the United States.  
The salience of state-specific case law on stormwater fee enactment by local governments in the 
United States is well established in existing literature and extended by my research.  Here, I 
provide a brief review of stormwater fee case law in the United States.  This compilation of 
stormwater fee case law draws on my own research as well as existing literature (Burchmore et 
al., 2006; Kumar, Gaffney, Grantham, Gregory, & Millonzi, 2013; National Association of Clean 
Water Agencies, 2014, 2016; Obropta et al., 2007).69 
Most stormwater fee case law in the United States has been developed in state courts, 
with federal court cases largely limited to cases involving sovereign immunity claims on 
federally or tribally owned properties (Table 3.11).  In several states with predominately 
supportive case law, stormwater fees are relatively prevalent:  Colorado, Florida, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington (Table 3.11, Table 3.12, 
Figure 3.2, Table 3.2).  Likewise, some states with generally unsupportive case law have 
relatively few stormwater fees:  Idaho, Michigan, and Missouri (Table 3.11, Table 3.12, Figure 
3.2, Table 3.2).  Although these patterns support the hypothesis that supportive case law in a 
state is necessary for – or at least contributory to – the diffusion of stormwater fees, 
contradictory patterns appear in other states.  More specifically, in some states with supportive 
                                                 
69 My compilation of stormwater fee case law focuses on cases specifically concerning stormwater fees.  
My analysis does not extend to the precedential cases concerning other kinds of fees, principles of taxation, and 
intergovernmental relations on which stormwater fee cases often build.  Such precedential cases are included in 
some of the existing literature on stormwater fees (e.g., Burchmore et al. 2006; Whalen, III 2000). 
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case law, stormwater fees are not widespread:  Alabama, Arkansas, and Kansas (Table 3.11, 
Table 3.12, Figure 3.2, Table 3.2).  Similarly, stormwater fees are fairly prevalent in some states 
with generally unsupportive case law:  California and North Carolina (Table 3.11, Table 3.12, 
Figure 3.2, Table 3.2). 
While suggestive, this analysis of the influence of state case law on stormwater fee 
prevalence does not account for several salient factors.  First, the timing and accumulation of key 
judicial decisions likely influence enactment of stormwater fees by local governments.  For 
example, although a handful of local governments in Missouri have enacted stormwater fees, no 
local government in the state has enacted a stormwater fee since 2013 when the Missouri 
Supreme Court ruled that the stormwater fee assessed by the St. Louis Metropolitan Sewer 
District was actually a tax, which – since it was established without voter approval – violated the 
state’s constitution (Table 3.11).  Although stormwater fee case law is pretty solidly established 
in some states, the case law landscape in other states is less deeply rooted.  For instance, in 
Pennsylvania, ongoing lawsuits represent the first litigation in the state to explicitly deal with 
stormwater fees (Table 3.11).  In Maryland, fairly recent and somewhat conflicting judicial 
decisions (Table 3.11) – along with changing positions on stormwater fees in other branches of 
state government – have also created a somewhat unsettled legal landscape.  Even in Colorado, a 
state with more than three decades of case law supporting stormwater fees, a special-district 
stormwater fee was found to be an illegal tax in one recent case (Table 3.11). 
Second, this analysis of state case law on stormwater fees does not account for several 
potentially relevant details of each case, including:  the type and size of local government 
involved; the level of the deciding court; and the specific aspects of the stormwater fee disputed 
and analyzed in each case.70  A case in which a state supreme court upheld the authority of a 
large, populous city to assess a stormwater fee based on statutory and/or constitutional provisions 
may have a larger impact on stormwater fee enactment by other local governments in the state 
                                                 
70 Existing literature identifies two main aspects of stormwater fees that have been analyzed in stormwater 
fee cases:  the authority of a local government to assess a stormwater fee, including on property held by other levels 
of government (e.g., federal, state, tribal, county); and whether a stormwater fee constitutes a tax.  In evaluating 
whether stormwater fees are actually taxes, as opposed to service fees, courts have considered several interrelated 
factors, including:  the purpose of the fee; whether collected revenues are dedicated solely to providing stormwater 
services; the extent to which people paying the fee benefit from services financed by the fee; the extent to which 
people paying the fee can take actions to reduce or eliminate their assessments; the extent to which the fees paid are 
proportional to the costs of the service or benefits provided; and the extent to which fees are uniform across 
individual ratepayers or groups of ratepayers (Burchmore et al., 2006; Kumar et al., 2013; National Association of 
Clean Water Agencies, 2014, 2016; Obropta et al., 2007). 
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compared with a case considering more limited jurisdictional or fee structure details decided by a 
county or district court.  My present analysis does not deeply investigate these nuances of 
stormwater fee case law, but does indicate some support for these conjectures.  For example, the 
two cases that did not support stormwater fees in Florida were both cases involving whether 
cities had jurisdiction to assess stormwater fees on properties owned by state or county 
educational institutions (Table 3.11).  Moreover, these two cases were also decided after Florida 
courts had established fairly robust case law supporting stormwater fees over the preceding two 
decades (Table 3.11).  Similarly, the one negative-precedent stormwater fee case in Indiana 
(Table 3.11) was negative only in the sense that the court found that the town did not have the 
authority to assess stormwater fees outside the jurisdiction of the town. 
The effect of court decisions on stormwater fee enactment by local governments in a state 
also depends on the specific provisions in relevant statutory law.  For example, in a 2001 
decision, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a stormwater fee enacted by Jefferson County 
(Table 3.11), but this decision did not catalyze enactment of stormwater fees by other local 
governments in the state in large part because – as noted by Campbell (2013) – the state statute 
authorizing local governments to enact stormwater fees effectively only applied to Jefferson 
County and the City of Birmingham.71  As such, until Alabama enacted a law in 2014 extending 
the authority to enact stormwater fees to a larger population of local governments,72 only one 
city and one county in the state were explicitly authorized by state statutes to enact stormwater 
fees. 
 
                                                 
71 Act 95-775 only applies to Class 1 municipalities in Alabama, and to counties where Class 1 
municipalities are located.  The Alabama Code defines Class 1 municipalities as cities with a population of 300,000 
or more.  Curiously, no cities in Alabama have a population of 300,000 or more.  The largest city in the state is 
Birmingham, which had a population of 242,820 as of the 2000 Census.  Birmingham is located in Jefferson County.  
In the 2001 decision upholding the Jefferson County stormwater fee, the issue of whether Birmingham was a Class 1 
municipality was a key point of dissention, but was an issue largely sidestepped in the majority opinion. 
 
72 Act 2014-439 amended the Alabama Code to authorize all counties and municipalities in the state subject 
to MS4 regulation by USEPA to enact stormwater fees. 
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Table 3.11.  Summary of stormwater fee case law in the United States. 
Party assessing the stormwater fee in bolded text.  Precedent symbolized as either positive (+), negative (-), or neutral (o) for stormwater fees. 
plaintiff v. defendant 
st
at
e 
ye
ar
 
pr
ec
ed
en
t 
court 
Densmore v. Jefferson County AL 2001 + Supreme Court of Alabama 
Bradford & Little v. City of Anniston AL 2016 + Circuit Court of Calhoun County 
Morningstar & Shirley v. City of Hot Springs AR 2011 + Supreme Court of Arkansas 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Salinas CA 2002 - 6th District Court of Appeals of California 
Zelinger v. City and County of Denver CO 1986 + Supreme Court of Colorado 
City of Littleton v. State of Colorado CO 1993 + Supreme Court of Colorado 
Stop Stormwater Utility Association v. Adams County CO 2015 + 17th District Court of Colorado 
Grand Junction Area Chamber of Commerce v. Grand Valley Drainage District CO 2018 - Mesa County District Court 
City of Wilmington v. Diamond State Port Corporation DE 2014 +/o Superior Court of Delaware 
City of Boca Raton v. State of Florida FL 1992 + Supreme Court of Florida 
Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ FL 1995 + Supreme Court of Florida 
City of Cocoa v. School Board of Brevard County FL 1998 +/o 5th District Court of Appeal of Florida 
City of Gainesville v. State of Florida FL 2001 + 1st District Court of Appeal of Florida 
City of Gainesville v. State of Florida FL 2003 + Supreme Court of Florida 
City of Clearwater v. School Board of Pinellas County FL 2005 + 2nd District Court of Appeal of Florida 
City of Key West v. Florida Keys Community College FL 2012 - 3rd District Court of Appeal of Florida 
City of Fort Pierce v. Australian Properties FL 2015 + 4th District Court of Appeal of Florida 
City of Key West v. Key West Golf Club Homeowners' Association FL 2017 + 3rd District Court of Appeal of Florida 
School Board of Palm Beach County v. City of West Palm Beach FL 2017 - 15th Circuit Court of Palm Beach County 
Fulton County Taxpayers Association v. City of Atlanta GA 1999 - Georgia Superior Court 
McLeod v. Columbia County GA 2004 + Supreme Court of Georgia 
DeKalb County v. United States of America GA 2013 - United States Court of Federal Claims 
Homewood Village v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County GA 2013 + Supreme Court of Georgia 
Lewiston Independent School District #1 v. City of Lewiston ID 2011 - Supreme Court of Idaho 
Church of Peace v. City of Rock Island IL 2005 + Appellate Court of Illinois, 3rd District 
Green v. Village of Winnetka IL 2016 o Appellate Court of Illinois, 1st District 
Brockmann Enterprises v. City of New Haven IN 2007 + Court of Appeals of Indiana 
Daum v. Town of Plainfield IN 2009 - Court of Appeals of Indiana 
Mint Management & J&MW Holdings v. City of Richmond IN 2017 + Court of Appeals of Indiana 
City of Wichita v. Kansas Taxpayers Network KS 1994 + Supreme Court of Kansas 
Long Run Baptist Association v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District KY 1989 + Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
100 
plaintiff v. defendant 
st
at
e 
ye
ar
 
pr
ec
ed
en
t 
court 
Wessels Company v. Sanitation District #1 KY 2007 + Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
Chod v. Board of Appeals for Montgomery County MD 2015 - Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Shaarei Tfiloh Congregation v. City of Baltimore MD 2018 + Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
City of Lewiston v. Gladu ME 2012 + Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
City of Hallowell v. Greater Augusta Utility District ME 2013 + Maine Superior Court 
Bolt v. City of Lansing MI 1998 - Supreme Court of Michigan 
Jackson County v. City of Jackson MI 2013 - Court of Appeals of Michigan 
Zweig v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District MO 2013 - Supreme Court of Missouri 
City of Billings v. Nore MT 1966 + Supreme Court of Montana 
Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham NC 1999 - Supreme Court of North Carolina 
City of Wooster v. Graines OH 1990 + Supreme Court of Ohio 
City of Cincinnati v. United States of America OH 1998 -/o United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 
Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District v. Bath Township OH 2015 + Supreme Court of Ohio 
Dennehy v. City of Gresham OR 1992 - Supreme Court of Oregon 
Roseburg School District v. City of Roseburg OR 1993 + Supreme Court of Oregon 
Papa v. City of New Castle PA  2018 ? Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas 
Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority v. City of Allentown PA 2018 ? ??? 
South Carolina v. City of Charleston SC 1999 + Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Vandergriff v. City of Chattanooga TN 1998 + United States District Court, Eastern District 
Greater New Braunfels 
Home Builders Association v. City of New Braunfels TX 2007 - Texas Court of Appeals 
El Paso Apartment Association v. City of El Paso TX 2011 + United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 
Beck v. City of Lubbock TX 2018 + 237th District Court of Texas 
Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton VA 1998 + Supreme Court of Virginia 
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. City of Roanoke VA 2017 + United States District Court, Western District 
Teter v. Clark County WA 1985 + Supreme Court of Washington 
Smith v. Spokane County WA 1997 + Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 
Tukwila School District #406 v. City of Tukwila WA 2007 + Washington Court of Appeals, Division 1 
Storedahl Properties v. Clark County WA 2008 + Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2 
United States of America v. City of Renton and City of Vancouver WA 2012 + United States District Court, Western District 
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Village of Hobart WI 2012 - United States District Court, Eastern District 
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Table 3.12.  Status of case law and stormwater fee prevalence by state. 
 case law supportive unsupportive mixed unknown 
stormwater fee 
prevalence 
high CO, FL, GA, IN, KY, OH, SC, TN, VA, WA CA, NC MD, OR, TX UT, IA, MN, NY 
low AL, AR, KS ID, MI, MO IL PA, ND, SD, NE 
3.4.6 Consultants 
In addition to geospatial and state-specific factors, my research also suggests another potentially 
salient influence on stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United States:  
consultants.  One of the people I interviewed as part of my inquiry into stormwater fee forms 
indicated that the engineering firm contracted with the borough as its municipal engineer actively 
promoted stormwater fees among its network of clients: 
 
“Gateway Engineers was also the engineer for Mt. Lebanon.  They actually represent, I 
think, 24-25 municipal clients in this general area, Whitehall being one.  So, when Mt. 
Lebanon enacted it [a stormwater fee], she approached us about enacting something 
similar because we were facing some of the same challenges.  I’m going to guess that 
every single Gateway client at least has had the idea broached to them.  Where they all 
stand on it, I don’t know, but I’m sure that every Gateway client has at least at some point 
in time had the idea of a stormwater fee mentioned.” 
 
Borough of Whitehall, Pennsylvania 
Borough Manager 
 
Some preliminary research I conducted into consulting firms as a potentially salient 
means by which stormwater fees diffuse shows several instances of multiple local governments – 
sometimes in different states – that have contracted with the same consulting firms to conduct 
stormwater fee feasibility studies and/or to design a stormwater fee (Table 3.13). 
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Table 3.13.  Consulting firms with multiple stormwater fee clients. 
firm stormwater fee clients name type state county 
Gateway Engineers Mt. Lebanon municipality PA Allegheny 
Whitehall borough PA Allegheny 
Herbert, Rowland, and Grubic Derry township PA Dauphin 
Blooming Grove township PA Pike 
State College borough PA Centre 
West Goshen township PA Chester 
Wyoming Valley Sanitary Authority special PA Luzerne 
ARCADIS Williamsport city PA Lycoming 
Hampden township PA Cumberland 
Scranton city PA Lackawanna 
AMEC Foster Wheeler Easton city PA Northampton 
Bradford city PA McKean 
York county PA  
Hawksley Consulting / 
Baxter & Woodman 
Downers Grove village IL DuPage 
Wheaton city IL DuPage 
Geneva city IL Kane 
South Elgin village IL Kane 
Freese and Nichols Cedar Park city TX Travis / Williamson 
Frisco city TX Collin / Denton 
Hazen Sawyer Deerfield Beach city FL Broward 
Dormont borough PA Allegheny 
 
 
Taken together with my interviews into stormwater fee form and my preliminary research 
into consulting firms, my case study of Billings, Montana further suggests the salience of 
engineering firms contracted with local governments as a diffusion mechanism for stormwater 
fees.  The existing literature on stormwater fees also strongly indicates the importance of 
consultants as drivers of stormwater fee diffusion in the United States.  For example, several 
publications emphasize the key role that Hector Cyre played in popularizing stormwater utilities 
and stormwater fees through his firm, Water Resource Associates, based in Bellevue, 
Washington (B. D. Keller, 2002; Woolson, 2004).  Consultants also helped to popularize 
stormwater fees and stormwater utilities by conducting and publishing national surveys (Benson, 
2002; Kumar et al., 2016; Raftelis Environmental Consulting Group, 1998).  Some consulting 
firms have also published guides for local governments considering implementing stormwater 
fees (e.g., McIntosh and Vicari 2016). 
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3.4.7 Industry associations and publications 
The existing literature on stormwater fees also reflects the key role that professional industry 
associations have played in promoting stormwater fees in the United States.  In particular, the 
American Public Works Association (APWA) exhibited a concerted focus on stormwater fees – 
especially throughout the 1980s – in its publications (American Public Works Association, 1991; 
Cyre, 1983, 1987; Damico & Curtis, 2003; Honchell, 1986; B. Keller & Reese, 1999; Poertner, 
1981; Spray & Hoag, 2004; Stitt, 1986; Treadway & Reese, 2000) and conferences (Cyre, 1982, 
1986).  In discussing the formation of a stormwater utlity in Cincinnati, Ohio, Stitt (1986) 
explicitly noted that, “APWA's Special Report No. 49, Urban Stormwater Management, was 
helpful in developing our concept for the utility.”  The existing literature on stormwater fees also 
indicates that other professional industry associations – such as the Water Pollution Control 
Federation (Cyre et al., 1990), the Water Environment Federation (Garner et al., 1994; Matichich 
et al., 2013), and the American Society of Civil Engineers (Hon, 1993) – and industry 
publications and publishers – such as Public Works (Grimes & Schumacher, 1992; Null, 1995) 
and Forester Media (Busco & Lindsey, 2001; Chandler, 2015; Kaspersen, 2000, 2011, 2014, 
2016a, 2016b; B. D. Keller, 2002; Reese, 2007a, 2007b; Szalay, 2011; van der Tak et al., 2012; 
Veal & Mullins, 2003; Woolson, 2004) – have played a role in publicizing and popularizing 
stormwater fees.  In addition to the aforementioned mostly national-scale associations, 
stormwater fees have also been promoted through the publications, conferences, and workshops 
of professional industry associations with more regional, state, or local foci73 (Deiseroth, 2016; 
R. F. McIntosh, 2014; Norcini & Merritt, 2013; Schutz, Callahan, & Vicari, 2016; VanAuken, 
2016; A. Vicari, 2015; A. M. Vicari & Stinnett, II, 2016; Wyland & Stinnett, II, 2016).  The 
people publishing in and presenting at these professional industry association publications, 
                                                 
73 Organizations dedicated to stormwater management – some of which specifically serve the needs of 
regulated MS4s – exist in many states, including the Arizona Stormwater Outreach for Regional Municipalities, the 
California Stormwater Quality Association, the Indiana Association for Floodplain and Stormwater Management, 
the Iowa Stormwater Education Partnership, the Kentucky Stormwater Association, the Louisiana Urban 
Stormwater Coalition, the Minnesota Cities Stormwater Coalition, the Nebraska Floodplain and Stormwater 
Managers Association, the Ohio Stormwater Association, the Tennessee Stormwater Association, the Utah Storm 
Water Advisory Committee, and the Virginia Municipal Stormwater Association.  Many of these state stormwater 
organizations are members of the National Municipal Stormwater Alliance.  Numerous regional and local scale 
stormwater organizations also exist across the country, such as the Central Massachusetts Regional Stormwater 
Coalition and the Western New York Stormwater Coalition. 
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conferences, and workshops often are individuals who have helped implement stormwater fees, 
either as direct employees of local governments or consultants. 
3.4.8 Model ordinances 
Various organizations – including industry associations and partnerships, consultants, and 
universities –  have also promoted the enactment of stormwater fees by local governments 
through the development and distribution of model stormwater utility ordinances in certain 
states, including Florida (University of Florida - Levin College of Law, 2006), Iowa (Iowa 
Association of Municipal Utilities, 2010), Maine (Horsley Witten Group, 2005), and Tennessee 
(Chlarson & Hemsley, 2002). 
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
The primary conclusion from the preceding analyses of stormwater fee diffusion is that although 
both phases of MS4 regulation appear to have been major drivers of stormwater fee diffusion 
among local governments in the United States, state-specific factors can completely or largely 
negate the effect of MS4 regulation on local government stormwater fee enactment.  For 
instance, despite fairly widespread regulation of MS4s, stormwater fees have been enacted by 
very few local governments in some states, including New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and 
Pennsylvania.  This finding on the salience of MS4 regulation as a driver of stormwater fee 
enactment is consistent with and expands on previous research, such as Anantapadmanabhan 
(2016). 
My analyses also strongly suggest that the timing of stormwater fee enactment for many 
local governments across the United States was related to when the MS4 Phase 1 and Phase 2 
regulations took effect.  While local governments regulated under the MS4 Phase 1 regulations 
were significantly more likely to have enacted stormwater fees in the decade after those 
regulations took effect (i.e., the 1990s) compared with the 2010-2017 period, local governments 
regulated under the MS4 Phase 2 regulations were significantly more likely to have enacted 
stormwater fees in the decade after those regulations became final (i.e., the 2000s) compared 
with the 1990s.  These results on the timing of stormwater fee enactment relative to the two 
phases of MS4 regulation are consistent with and further specify the findings of Kea, Dymond, 
and Campbell (2016). 
The form of local governments also appears to have strongly influenced the diffusion of 
stormwater fees in the United States, with cities and city-county governments being significantly 
more likely to have enacted a stormwater fee than boroughs, villages, towns, townships, or 
counties.  My analyses also suggest significant effects on stormwater fee enactment of several 
other local government characteristics, including land use, housing stock, and demographic 
characteristics. 
From the perspective of policy diffusion theory, my analyses indicate strong support for 
the coercive diffusion of stormwater fees among local government in the United States, 
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specifically as pertains to federal regulation of MS4s.  However, my analyses of stormwater fee 
diffusion also point to several internal determinants of stormwater fee diffusion, including land 
use, housing stock, and demographic characteristics as well as local government type.  
Furthermore, this research also strongly suggests that consulting firms and industry associations 
have acted as important go-betweens in promoting the diffusion of stormwater fees among local 
governments in the United States over the past five decades.  These and other key go-betweens 
(e.g., regional governing organizations) have likely facilitated learning diffusion of stormwater 
fees among local governments in the United States. 
The influence of state-specific factors (e.g., statutes and case law) in modulating the 
federal coercion of local governments to enact stormwater fees (i.e., through MS4 permits) does 
not find clear expression in policy diffusion theory.  This lack of theoretical focus on state 
factors modulating federal influences on local governments likely stems from the relative dearth 
of research analyzing policy diffusion among local governments and the insignificance of state 
factors in the limited set of research investigating policy diffusion among local governments 
(e.g., Krause 2011).  In this respect, my research suggests policy diffusion theory may need to be 
amended for application to contexts where local governments are situated within states in a 
federal system. 
Although this research did not directly assess how the attributes of the stormwater fee 
policy have influenced diffusion of stormwater fees, I posit that local governments often perceive 
a relative advantage of a stormwater fee compared with other mechanisms for financing 
stormwater management, as discussed in Chapter 1.  I also suggest that stormwater fees are seen 
as highly compatible with the needs of local governments looking for a dedicated, reliable source 
of revenue to finance stormwater management functions, especially those local governments 
facing increasing costs associated with more stringent MS4 and CSO regulations.  Furthermore, 
as stormwater fees have become more widespread, I contend these policies have become more 
observable and increasingly perceived as relatively easy to understand and implement by local 
governments across the country, thanks in no small part to consulting firms and industry 
associations that have diligently promoted stormwater fees over the past three to five decades.  
Technological developments – particularly in aerial and satellite imaging as well as associated 
geospatial information system software (e.g., Correa, Adhityawarma, and Storvick 2003) – in 
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recent decades have also likely lowered implementation costs of stormwater fee policies for local 
governments. 
3.5.1 Hypotheses on stormwater fee diffusion 
The results from my analyses are consistent with some aspects of my hypotheses about 
stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United States, but are inconsistent with 
other aspects of my hypotheses. 
 
diffusion hypothesis 1: 
Stormwater fees were more likely to be enacted by local governments:  (a) located in 
states with clear, unambiguous state legislation empowering local governments to enact 
stormwater fees; (b) that were regulated under the Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 regulations; 
(c) with CSO permits; (d) with relatively high proportions of developed land use; and (e) 
with relatively homogenous polities. 
 
My analyses clearly show the importance of state-specific factors – including statutory 
law and case law – on the diffusion of stormwater fees among local governments across the 
United States.  While this research did not delve deeply into specific statutory laws in each state, 
my diffusion research – together with my inquiries into stormwater fee emergence and form – 
strongly supports the hypothesis that state legislation enabling local governments to implement 
stormwater fees has been and continues to be a necessary condition for local governments to 
enact stormwater fees. 
As previously discussed, this research also offers strong support for the hypothesis that 
local governments regulated under Phase 1 or Phase 2 MS4 regulations were more likely to enact 
stormwater fees.  My analyses offer more qualified support for the hypothesis about local 
governments with permitted CSOs being more likely to enact stormwater fees.  While my initial 
regression model supports this hypothesis, the model with state and local government type 
effects does not support the CSO hypothesis.  However, my analyses of the timing of stormwater 
fee enactment do suggest that local governments with permitted CSOs were more likely to enact 
stormwater fees sooner than local governments without permitted CSOs. 
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My analyses also support the hypotheses that local governments with relatively high 
proportions of developed land use and relatively homogeneous polities were more likely to enact 
stormwater fees. 
 
diffusion hypothesis 2: 
Significant acceleration in stormwater fee enactment across the country followed 
announcement of the Phase I and Phase II MS4 regulations by USEPA in larger and 
smaller MS4 communities, respectively. 
 
As discussed previously, my analyses offer fairly strong support – albeit qualified by 
state-specific factors – for this hypothesis about the timing stormwater fee diffusion among local 
government in the United States. 
 
 
diffusion hypothesis 3: 
Large, rich cities were the first local governments to enact stormwater fees in each state. 
 
Fairly large and relatively affluent cities were the first local governments to enact a 
stormwater fee in two states (i.e., Virginia and Washington), but larger or more affluent local 
governments were the first entities to enact stormwater fees in 21 states.  However, smaller and 
less affluent local governments were the first to enact a stormwater fee in ten states, suggesting 
mixed support for my third diffusion hypothesis.  My analyses also indicate that local 
governments regulated under the Phase 1 MS4 regulations – which tended to be relatively 
populous cities – were more likely to have enacted stormwater fees earlier than other local 
governments that enacted stormwater fees. 
3.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
My research on stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United States suggests 
several potential extensions for future research.  First, fortifying my cross-sectional diffusion 
dataset with variables measuring other potentially salient internal characteristics of each local 
government (e.g., physiographic and political characteristics), as well as shared characteristics 
among local governments (e.g., shared metropolitan regions and media markets) may illuminate 
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additional factors influencing stormwater fee diffusion in the United States.  Second, 
reconfiguring my diffusion dataset into a network dataset would allow for more rigorous 
analyses of variables accounting for relationships among local governments.74  One particular 
area where analyses of a network dataset may prove illuminating is in more rigorously analyzing 
the geospatial patterns of stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the United 
States.  A third potentially fruitful extension of this research would be expanding my cross-
sectional dataset into a longitudinal dataset to allow for more powerful analyses (e.g., event 
history analyses, dynamic network analyses) of stormwater fee diffusion.  Creating a robust 
longitudinal dataset for analyzing stormwater fee diffusion will require overcoming a couple key 
data challenges:  (1) populating dates of incorporation75 – as well as disincorporation, 
consolidation, annexation, or de-annexation, where relevant – for each local government;76 and 
(2) compiling more time-varying data on each local government.77  As previously discussed, 
other ways to build on my research into stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in 
the United States would be to more thoroughly investigate the influence of regional governing 
institutions, drainage/irrigation districts, consulting firms, industry associations and publications, 
as well as potentially germane state-specific factors, particularly statutory law and case law.  
With respect to consultants, future research might assess the extent to which the influence of 
consultants on stormwater fee diffusion varies with local government structures.  For instance, 
future research could test the hypothesis that consultants are more likely to influence stormwater 
fee enactment by local governments of council-manager forms versus mayor-council forms. 
                                                 
74 Network models of diffusion have long histories (e.g., Bhola 1965; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1957), 
can be implemented in a variety of forms (Valente, 1995), and have been applied to analyses of various policies 
(Boehmke, 2009; Gilardi & Füglister, 2008; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998; Volden, 2006). 
 
75 Census Bureau data document date of incorporation for many local governments in the United States, but 
these data include a substantial number of missing values. 
 
76 Census Bureau data from the 2012 Census of Governments documents 371 more general-purpose, 
subcounty governments nationwide in 2012 compared with 1972, with great state-to-state variation.  For instance, 
the number of general-purpose, subcounty governments in Texas gradually rose from 981 in 1972 to 1,214 in 2012 
while the number of general-purpose, subcounty governments in Kansas shrank from 2,143 to 1,894 over the same 
period. 
 
77 The only time-varying data in my diffusion dataset were derived from national land use datasets, which 
are currently available in 1992, 2001, 2006, and 2011 editions, and will soon be available in a 2016 edition.  My 
diffusion dataset incorporated data from the 1992 and 2011 editions of the national land use datasets. 
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These suggested avenues of future research into stormwater fee diffusion among local 
governments in the United States should allow for improved ability to discern among 
theoretically posited diffusion mechanisms.  For instance, the suggested extensions of my 
diffusion data and research may help better discern between coercive and learning diffusion of 
stormwater fees among local governments in the United States. 
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4.0  FORM 
While the vast majority of stormwater fees in the United States have been independently enacted 
by individual local governments, some stormwater fees have taken forms involving multiple 
local governments (Table 3.1).  Stormwater fees involving multiple local governments have been 
enacted by special-purpose districts, such as metropolitan sewer districts and organizations with 
jurisdiction over specific watersheds (Table 3.1).  Some county governments have also enacted 
stormwater fees involving all or some of the subcounty governments in the county.  This chapter 
investigates why most stormwater fees in the United States have been independently enacted by 
individual local governments rather than by institutions involving multiple local governments 
(e.g., all or some of the subcounty governments within a county or special-purpose district). 
4.1 THEORY 
To inquire into variations in stormwater fee form, I apply the institutional collective action 
framework (Feiock, 2013).  I chose this framework to apply to the form branch of this research 
because the institutional collective action framework deals centrally with issues of institutional 
fragmentation across jurisdictions and associated collective action problems.  Furthermore, the 
institutional collective action framework seems particularly relevant to my research questions 
regarding stormwater fee form because the framework was developed in large part out of 
empirical analyses of the organization – or disorganization – of metropolitan regions in the 
United States. 
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4.1.1 Institutional collective action 
The institutional collective action framework aims to investigate collective action dilemmas 
among local governments and authorities in metropolitan areas where jurisdictional 
fragmentation creates opportunities for externalities, diseconomies of scale, and common 
property resource problems (Feiock, 2013).  As such, the institutional collective action 
framework supports structured analysis of the interdependent decisions of local governments in a 
federal system (Feiock & Scholz, 2010).  Drawing insights and inspiration from a rich array of 
research traditions and theoretical approaches, the institutional collective action framework 
stands firmly on the foundation of individual collective action theory expressed by Olson (1971), 
which explains how individuals acting according to their own personal preferences and 
incentives can create collective outcomes not preferred by any of the individuals involved.  The 
institutional collective action framework extends individual collective action theory to 
“composite actors” (Feiock 2013, p. 399), such as local polities and governments, comprised of 
multiple individuals.78  Whereas individual collective action theory focuses on collective action 
among individuals comprising a group (e.g., the citizens of a local government), institutional 
collection action theory focuses on collective action among groups of groups (e.g., multiple local 
governments in a metropolitan region), where position and authority rules empower certain 
individuals (e.g., elected officials) to represent group preferences (Feiock, 2013).  As such, 
institutional collective action depends on the capacity of group decision-makers to integrate and 
resolve conflicts of individual members of the group (Feiock, 2013). 
To mitigate institutional collective action dilemmas, the institutional collective action 
framework posits a spectrum of governance mechanisms, which can be arrayed along two 
dimensions:  means of enforcement and scope (Feiock, 2013).  Means of enforcing governance 
mechanisms to mitigate institutional collective action dilemmas range from “social 
embeddedness,” where participation is completely voluntary, to coercively imposed political 
authority, with mutually binding contractual and legal arrangements comprising the middle 
ground between the two extremes (Feiock, 2013).  The scope of governance mechanisms to 
mitigate an institutional collective action dilemma can range from agreements between two 
                                                 
78 Scholz and Stiftel (2005, p. 1) refer to this collective kind of collective action as “second-order” 
collective action.  Ostrom (1998) uses the term “second-order social dilemma” to describe similar phenomena. 
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institutions on a single policy issue to multilateral solutions for more complex policy problems 
(Feiock, 2013).  An example of a contractual, bilateral, single-issue arrangement would be where 
one local government contracts with another for certain police services.  An example of a 
mitigating mechanism enforced by a legal arrangement wherein participating parties delegate 
authority for a more complex, encompassing set of policy issues would be where a group of local 
governments agree to form and abide by a regional authority to handle water and sewer services. 
The goal of the institutional collective action framework is to explain why certain 
mitigating mechanisms emerge for certain institutional collective action dilemmas, or – in other 
words – how mitigating mechanisms are matched to institutional collective action dilemmas 
(Feiock, 2013).  The institutional collective action framework posits two primary factors that 
influence which mitigating mechanisms manifest for which institutional collective action 
dilemmas:  collaboration risk and transaction costs (Feiock, 2013).  Collaboration risk refers to 
the risk that a collective action will fail to hold together or fail to adequately resolve the intended 
collective dilemma (Feiock, 2013).  The institutional collective action framework posits three 
types of collaboration risk:  incoordination risk, unfair division risk, and defection risk (Feiock, 
2013).  These three types of collaboration risk are discussed further in the next paragraph.  The 
institutional collective action framework evaluates how well governance mechanisms mitigate 
the underlying collective action dilemma as well as the magnitude of the transaction costs the 
mechanisms impose on participants (Feiock, 2013).  The transaction costs theorized in the 
institutional collective action framework include information, bargaining, and enforcement costs 
of coordinating the collective action, as well as the loss of autonomy to individual actors 
involved in the collective action (Feiock, 2013).79  The institutional collective action framework 
focuses sharply on the effects of choice externalities arising from fragmentation of authority 
(Feiock & Scholz, 2010). 
Depending on the particular institutional collective action problem, the characteristics of 
the particular jurisdictions involved, and the particular institutional contexts – all factors which 
can influence the risk of participating or collaborating in a given mitigating mechanism – the 
institutional collective action framework theorizes that participation incentives will tend to favor 
mitigating mechanisms that yield the greatest gain for the least cost, including transaction costs 
                                                 
79 The autonomy loss costs posited in the institutional collective action framework equate to what 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) refer to as the imposition of external decision costs. 
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(Feiock, 2013).80  While more expansive and authoritative mechanisms are more effective for 
addressing difficult institutional collective action dilemmas, these mechanisms often impose 
higher transaction costs on participants (Feiock, 2013).  Where the collective action problem is 
one of simple coordination (e.g., arranging for joint purchasing or sequencing traffic signals) 
with no division or defection risk, voluntary or contractual enforcement will likely suffice to 
mitigate the dilemma, so long as transaction costs are low.  Division risks enter in when 
participants agree on general goals and when collective action produces mutual net gains 
(Steinacker, 2004), but disagreements over how to distribute the gains arise.  If severe enough, 
division risks may preclude or sink a collaborative arrangement (Feiock, 2013).  Defection risks 
emerge in collective action when the defection of one participant from the collective 
arrangement can result in a worse condition for other non-defecting participants (Feiock, 2013), 
similar to the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory (Poundstone, 1992; Rapoport & Chammah, 
1965).  Dilemmas with significant defection risks may require third-party (i.e., imposed) 
enforcement to ensure participating parties make credible commitments to stay engaged in the 
collaboration (Feiock, 2013).  The institutional collective action framework identifies three 
sources of collaboration risk:  the nature of the relevant collective action dilemma; the 
distribution of preferences within and across the relevant institutions; and the characteristics of 
any relevant higher-level rules, local political institutions, and mechanisms in place to resolve 
other institutional collective action dilemmas (Feiock, 2013).  Regarding preference distribution, 
Feiock (2013, p. 412) maintains that “community homophily in terms of the racial, economic, 
partisan, and ideological composition of citizens in a jurisdiction reduces decision costs in 
aggregating preferences” and can also “safeguard against political and economic power 
asymmetries that would advantage one of the parties and create problems for negotiating fair 
divisions of benefits.”  As with transactional hazards (Williamson, 1996), hazards or risks to 
collaboration in the institutional collective action framework arise from three main factors:  
bounded rationality (Simon, 1997) or limited information; the potential for opportunistic 
behavior; and uncertainty (Feiock, 2013). 
                                                 
80 In this respect, the intuition and expectation of the institutional collective action framework mirrors that 
of transaction cost economics:  simple governance arrangements should mediate simple transactions, with complex 
governance arrangements reserved for complex transactions (Williamson, 1996). 
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The framework also posits four types of benefits that can be derived through institutional 
collective action:  coordination gains from coordinating service delivery across jurisdictions; 
economies of scale in the production of goods or services; minimization of common pool 
resource problems; and the internalization of jurisdictional externalities (Feiock, 2013).  
Particularly relevant to stormwater and sewer management among hydrologically interconnected 
entitles, Feiock (2013, p. 411) notes that "negative externality problems create the hardest case 
because incentives of local authorities are directly opposed.” 
My case studies of stormwater fee form aim to contribute to development of the 
institutional collective action framework in at least three ways.  First, by conducting detailed 
case studies of institutional collective action in three metropolitan regions, I follow the advice 
Feiock (2013) and directly examine the dynamics that generate solutions to problems of 
institutional fragmentation and centralization.  Secondly, although scholars have applied the 
institutional collective action framework in a variety of metropolitan policy arenas including 
water resource management (Berardo, 2009), economic development (Minkoff, 2013), regional 
planning (Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013), and public safety (Andrew, 2010), no one has yet 
applied the institutional collective action framework to stormwater governance.  Stormwater 
governance in metropolitan regions presents an extreme test of the scope of the institutional 
collective action framework because hydrologically interconnected and politically fragmented 
metropolitan areas are rife with opportunities for upslope jurisdictions to externalize stormwater 
flows and associated costs onto neighboring jurisdictions downslope.  In this respect, this 
research meets the call of Feiock (2013) for institutional collective action researchers to analyze 
if and how various governance mechanisms can effectively mitigate institutional collective 
action dilemmas in new policy areas and in different local and state contexts.  Finally, in addition 
to breaking new ground in terms of the policy arena of application, my research also contributes 
to the growing body of work (e.g., Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010; Shrestha and Feiock 2011) 
using the institutional collective action framework to analyze interactions among various service 
arrangements and governance mechanisms in the interlocal, metropolitan institutional ecosystem. 
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4.1.2 Hypotheses on stormwater fee form 
Informed by the institutional collective action framework, my inquiry into the form of 
stormwater fees in the United States aims to test the following hypotheses. 
 
form hypothesis 1: 
Collective stormwater fees in the United States formed and endured only by coercion 
from a higher level of government. 
 
form hypothesis 2: 
General-purpose, subcounty governments typically enact stormwater fees independently 
because the transaction costs – particularly negotiation costs associated with a larger 
number of more diverse actors – and defection risks preclude collective action to enact a 
collective stormwater fee, and because stormwater provides the opportunity for easy 
downstream cost externalization. 
4.2 METHODS 
For my inquiry into stormwater fee form, I conducted a set of nested case studies, where the 
units of analysis were general-purpose, subcounty governments embedded (Yin, 2018) or nested 
– geographically and institutionally – within metropolitan sewer districts.  The case study 
method complements my selected theoretical framework for inquiring into stormwater fee form 
because the institutional collective action framework emphasizes the importance of 
understanding the particular institutional ecology of a metropolitan region.  I chose a nested 
approach because the sewer district has an institutional scope sufficient to internalize most – if 
not all – of the hydrologic and hydraulic interdependencies associated with stormwater and 
sewer system flows in many metropolitan regions.  As such, the metropolitan sewer district 
appears a potentially well-suited institution to manage stormwater and sewer systems.  By 
embedding local government cases in their respective metropolitan sewer districts, I intended to 
gain better insight into the pertinent physiographic and political dynamics influencing each local 
government.  In other words, I utilized this nested case study structure to examine the conditions 
under which stormwater fees are enacted by individual local governments despite the existing 
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institutional and administrative infrastructure of the metropolitan sewer district or other similarly 
scaled institutions (e.g., county governments). 
4.2.1 Case selection 
Since this branch of my research seeks to explain variation in stormwater fee form (i.e., why 
stormwater fees involving multiple local governments are enacted in some places and not 
others), I selected three metropolitan sewer districts that exhibit stormwater fees of different 
forms:  (1) the Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati (MSDGC) in southwestern 
Ohio, where stormwater fees were implemented by a combination of the county government and 
individual subcounty governments; (2) the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (NEORSD), 
which serves the greater Cleveland region, where a stormwater fee was implemented by the 
metropolitan sewer district; and (3) the Allegheny County Sanitary Authority (ALCOSAN), 
which serves the greater Pittsburgh region in southwestern Pennsylvania, where the only 
stormwater fees to date have been implemented by individual subcounty governments. 
Many other possible choices of county-level stormwater fees exist in the United States 
besides the county-based fee in the MSDGC service area.  However – as noted previously – most 
county stormwater fees encompass substantial amounts of unincorporated land in southern and 
western states (e.g., Florida, Washington, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, 
Maryland).  While county stormwater fees in largely unincorporated counties may be interesting 
cases in their own right, these cases do not involve the same institutional complexity as county 
stormwater fees in counties with multiple incorporated subcounty governments.  As such, I chose 
to focus selection of a county stormwater fee on the few states with county fees in counites with 
predominately incorporated land:  Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  Of these three states, only 
Ohio and Wisconsin had stormwater fees enacted by special-purpose governments.  As noted in 
the Chapter 3, the only special-district stormwater fee in Wisconsin involves just two general-
purpose, subcounty governments, while the special-district stormwater fees in Ohio involve 
many more general-purpose, subcounty governments (Table 3.1).  For these reasons, I focused 
selection of county and special-district stormwater fee cases on Ohio.  Studying cases of two 
different stormwater fee forms in the same state also offers the possibility of providing greater 
insight into some of the state-level factors influencing stormwater fee form.  In Ohio, there are 
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two special-district stormwater fees (i.e., the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District and 
NEORSD) and six unconsolidated county stormwater fees (i.e., Butler, Hamilton, Lake, Lorain, 
Lucas, Trumbull counties).  I chose NEORSD and Hamilton County (MSDGC) as cases 
primarily because they are both regionally large metropolitan centers, with the idea that at least 
some of the sociopolitical dynamics exhibited in these metropolitan cases with respect to 
stormwater fee form should exhibit some external validity for less densely populated areas, 
whereas the reverse may not be true.  Moreover, these two cases are particularly interesting 
because of the relatively high level of municipal fragmentation in each.  The two Ohio cases also 
make for interesting cases for this research because these cases involve instances of stormwater 
fee defection and disputation, as discussed below.  Finally, while I chose the ALCOSAN case 
partly due to personal familiarity, the main reasons I selected this case were:  (1) the only 
existing stormwater fees in the ALCOSAN service area have been independently enacted by 
individual subcounty governments, providing contrast with the stormwater fee forms in the 
MSDGC and NEORSD cases; and (2) recent changes in state legislation seem to have set off a 
flurry of stormwater fee enactment in Pennsylvania, making a case study of stormwater fee 
forms in the state particularly timely.81 
In addition to their diversity with respect to stormwater fee forms, I chose MSDGC, 
NEORSD, and ALCOSAN as case studies for a few other reasons.  First and foremost, although 
stormwater fees of different forms were enacted in these metropolitan sewer districts, the three 
districts are fairly similar in size (i.e., land area, population, sewer system size) and in broad 
economic, social, and political trajectory.82  Furthermore, the sewer and stormwater 
infrastructure systems in each of these three regions exhibit a configuration and history very 
similar to one another and to many older cities throughout the Northeast, Great Lakes, and mid-
Atlantic regions of the United States:  a network of combined sewer systems centered in the 
older, typically lowland urban cores with newer, separated systems connected in from suburban, 
often upland communities.  In these infrastructure systems, the smaller “collector” systems are 
often owned and operated by local governments, either individually or in groups, whereas the 
                                                 
81 The ALCOSAN case study may provide insights into stormwater fee formation not only for other 
communities in Pennsylvania, but also for communities in other states like Pennsylvania where stormwater fees are 
not yet established or widespread. 
 
82 All three are metropolitan regions in the “Rust Belt” of the United States. 
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largest “interceptor” pipes, pump stations, and treatment plant(s) positioned in the lower reaches 
of the system are typically owned by a regional entity (e.g., a metropolitan sewer district).  To 
the extent they are shared with other regions, these similarities in infrastructural configuration 
and history among my cases may bolster the external validity of my evidence and analyses. 
Within each of these three metropolitan sewer districts, I targeted five general-purpose, 
subcounty governments for detailed inquiry.  These targeted local governments represent 
subcases nested within each of the three broader metropolitan sewer district cases.  Within each 
sewer district, I targeted specific subcounty governments with the goal of capturing diverse 
perspectives on stormwater management and financing.83  More specifically, in each 
metropolitan sewer district, I targeted the central city (i.e., Cincinnati in MSDGC, Cleveland in 
NEORSD, Pittsburgh in ALCOSAN) along with four other subcounty governments by 
considering a few principal dimensions:  size, in terms of land area and population; wealth, as 
measured by median household income; and relative landscape position (i.e., relatively upland or 
low-lying).  In each sewer district, I also targeted subcounty governments to reflect diversity 
with respect to stormwater fees:  those that do or do not participate in the stormwater fee 
administered by the county in the MSDGC case; those that supported or opposed the sewer 
district stormwater fee in the NEORSD case; and those with or without individual stormwater 
fees in the ALCOSAN case.  In combination with the aforementioned factors, I also took into 
account some geospatial and hydrological relationships in targeting certain local governments.  
For instance, in the NEORSD case, I targeted the City of Independence and the Village of Valley 
View because – despite sharing Mill Creek as a common border, and despite being fairly similar 
size, demographics, and wealth – Valley View supported the NEORSD stormwater fee while 
Independence vigorously opposed the NEORSD stormwater fee.  In the ALCOSAN case, I 
targeted Shaler Township and the Borough of Etna because these two localities exhibit marked 
differences in size, demographics, and wealth, but share very strong hydrologic and hydraulic 
interconnections, with Shaler situated directly upstream of Etna.  In addition to the targeted 
subcounty governments, I also targeted other relevant local government institutions in each 
                                                 
83 While my primary criteria for selecting local governments in each metropolitan sewer district were 
related to encompassing a diversity of characteristics hypothesized to influence preferences for stormwater fee form, 
selecting diverse local governments within each region also should have helped attenuate any “convergent 
sensemaking” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
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region for detailed inquiry, namely the Hamilton County Storm Water District in the MSDGC 
case and NEORSD itself in the NEORSD case. 
In summary, my case selection strategy for inquiring into stormwater fee form intended 
to maximize differences in the outcome, or dependent variable, (i.e., stormwater fee form) while 
minimizing differences in the factors hypothesized to influence that outcome, or independent 
variables, across cases.  Insofar as I targeted a range of stormwater fee forms (i.e., special-
district, county, individual subcounty), my case selection strategy for inquiring into stormwater 
fee form corresponds to “diverse” (Gerring & Seawright, 2007) or “polar types” (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) case selection, where the selected cases illuminate the full 
range of variation on the dependent variable.  At the same time, I aimed to facilitate comparisons 
across cases and support the external validity of my inquiries by selecting three metropolitan 
regions that exhibit broad similarities in size, infrastructural configuration, and other 
aforementioned characteristics (i.e., independent variables) that may influence stormwater fee 
form.  Nested within each metropolitan sewer district, I targeted local governments with diverse 
characteristics likely to influence their perspectives of stormwater fee form.  However, by 
targeting a similarly diverse range of local governments in each metropolitan sewer district, my 
case selection strategy also facilitated direct comparison of how local government diversity 
influenced stormwater fee forms across the three regions.  Applying similar evidence collection 
methods and a single theoretical framework across three cases selected to maximize differences 
in stormwater fee form while minimizing differences in factors hypothesized to influence 
stormwater fee form enabled my research to hone in on key reasons why and how different 
stormwater fee forms evolved in each case.  In these respects, my case studies of stormwater fee 
form employ explanatory typological analysis (Elman, 2005), using existing theory to explain 
variations across three cases representing diverse types of stormwater fee forms. 
4.2.2 Sources of evidence 
As noted in the introduction, for the stormwater fee form cases, I generated, extracted, and 
collected evidence from archival and documentary sources in addition to a series of in-person, 
semi-structured interviews with representatives of targeted local governments.  Interview 
excerpts quoted in the text have been lightly edited for readability.  Further methodological 
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details – including interview scripts, information about interviewees, and characteristics of 
targeted local governments – are provided in Appendix C. 
4.2.3 Evidence coding 
I coded interview transcripts84 using a coding framework comprised of key concepts and 
processes identified in the institutional collective action framework (Figure C.1) including 
concepts shared with other related theoretical frameworks (Figure C.2).85,86 
4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 MSDGC (Cincinnati) 
Centered on the Cincinnati metropolitan region in southwestern Ohio, the MSDGC service area 
includes all or parts of 43 of the 49 general-purpose subcounty governments in Hamilton County 
along with very small parts of a handful of general-purpose subcounty governments in 
neighboring Butler, Warren, and Clermont counties (Figure 4.1).  Six subcounty governments in 
the MSDGC service area (i.e., the Village of Amberley plus the cities of Cincinnati, Forest Park, 
Harrison, Loveland, and Milford)87 have each independently established stormwater fees for 
                                                 
84 Transcriptions of interview audio recordings was performed by staff of the Qualitative Data Analysis 
Program at the University of Pittsburgh Center for Social and Urban Research. 
 
85 Coding performed using NVivo 11 software. 
 
86 In addition to the institutional collective action framework, I considered applying two other theoretical 
frameworks – the ecology of games framework (Lubell, 2013) and the local public economy framework (Oakerson 
& Parks, 2011) – to my case studies of stormwater fee form.  Although I opted to present results using only the 
institutional collective action framework, I coded the interview transcripts using coding frameworks derived from 
each of these three theoretical frameworks, including concepts shared among all three frameworks. 
 
87 Campbell et al. (2017) record enactment years for these independent, subcounty stormwater fees as:  
Cincinnati in 1984; Forest Park in 1988; Amberley and Loveland in 2003; Milford in 2004; and Harrison in 2007. 
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their respective jurisdictions (Figure 4.2).88  Another 30 subcounty governments in the MSDGC 
service area – along with four subcounty governments in Hamilton County outside the MSDGC 
service area89 – currently participate in the Hamilton County Storm Water District (HCSWD), 
which administers a stormwater fee (Figure 4.2).  The Village of Amberley is the only 
jurisdiction in the MSDGC service area to participate in HCSWD and to charge its own 
stormwater fee (Figure 4.2).90,91  Designed and administered as “level of service” program, cities 
and villages in Hamilton County can choose whether and at what level they want to participate in 
HCSWD.  Under Ohio state law, townships without home-rule status have fairly limited 
sovereignty from their respective county government.  As such, townships without home-rule 
status in Hamilton County are effectively required by state law to participate in HCSWD.  
Currently, all 12 townships, 16 of the 19 villages, and 7 of the 18 cities in Hamilton County 
participate at some level in HCSWD (Figure 4.2). 
                                                 
88 Despite being recorded by Campbell et al. (2017), the City of Wyoming does not have a stormwater fee.  
Wyoming did participate in HCSWD until 2010, but has since funded stormwater activities out of the city’s general 
fund.  Interestingly, Wyoming is the only record where Campbell et al. (2017) record “general fund” rather than a 
dollar amount in the monthly fee field. 
 
89 The four general-purpose, subcounty governments in Hamilton County not served by MSDGC are the 
Village of Terrace Park, Harrison Township, along with the cities of Harrison and Milford. 
 
90 Amberley uses part of the revenues generated by the village-specific stormwater fee to pay for services 
offered by HCSWD. 
 
91 The map of stormwater fees in the MSDGC service area (Figure 4.2) appears to show that the City of 
Harrison in the northwestern part of Hamilton County also has its own stormwater fee and participates in HCSWD.  
The City of Harrison does have its own stormwater fee, but does not participate in HCSWD.  The issue with the map 
is caused by the fact that the jurisdiction boundary data has the City of Harrison overlapping with Harrison 
Township and Crosby Township, both of which participate in HCSWD. 
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Figure 4.1.  Map of the MSDGC service area. 
MSDGC service area (inverted silhouette) with interview targets labeled.  Also shows waterways and waterbodies [National Hydrography Dataset] and land use 
[2011 National Land Cover Dataset].  [Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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Figure 4.2.  Map of stormwater fees in the MSDGC service area. 
MSDGC service area (inverted silhouette) with interview targets labeled. 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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Administered by the Hamilton County Engineer’s Office, HCSWD is formally governed 
by the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners (Figure 4.3).  The HCSWD organizational 
structure also includes an Oversight Board (Figure 4.3) comprised of representatives from the 
county and member subcounty governments.92  Although the Oversight Board was originally 
intended to be the decision-making body for HCSWD, state law actually places formal control 
over HCSWD exclusively with the Board of County Commissioners: 
 
“When we were starting this up, we formed a stormwater Oversight Board that was going 
to be the decision-making body for the district.  What we learned after the fact was that 
board is actually only – under the statutes – given recommendation authority.  The 
embodied power of legislative body is actually the Board of County Commissioners, 
exclusively.” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
Finalization of the Phase II MS4 regulations was the primary and direct motivation for 
the formation of HCSWD, which was incorporated in 2003 following two to three years of 
meetings between representatives of the county, subcounty governments in the county, and other 
stakeholders (e.g., local watershed organizations): 
 
“It was about 2000 when we first started studying it, and then it rolled out officially in 
2003.  Each municipality within Hamilton County was named as an MS4, so people were 
trying to gather, ‘What does this mean?  Where are we going to go?’  We were looking at 
it, saying, ‘Well, we kind of have a similar problem’ – if you will, if the permit was 
considered a problem – ‘How are we going to solve this issue?’  We put together this 
large study to determine, were we all gonna go it alone, or was there some greater good 
that could be accomplished by forming a district?” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
                                                 
92 The HCSWD Oversight Board consists of six elected officials in Hamilton County, including:  one 
representative from the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners; one representative of the Hamilton County 
Engineer's Office; two representatives from the Hamilton County Township Association; and two representatives 
from the Hamilton County Municipal League, which represents the interests of villages and cities in the county.  The 
HCSWD Oversight Board also formerly included one representative from the City of Cincinnati. 
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While the Phase II MS4 regulations spurred some cities and villages to enact their own 
independent stormwater fees,93 many localities chose to partner with the county:   
 
“... we didn’t really consider a stormwater fee.  We just partnered with the county.” 
 
City of Sharonville 
Community Development Director 
 
A primary reason the county was selected to coordinate MS4 permit obligations was that 
many of the required activities were already being performed by county agencies: 
 
“So, we had this permit.  We looked at it, started reading through all the things we were 
going to have to do, and we realized that, ‘Gosh, here in Hamilton County, we have a 
number of different departments that are already doing pieces of each of the things that 
this is requiring.  We’ve got the County General Health District doing certain portions of 
our program.  We’ve got the Planning and Development Department, the County 
Engineer’s Office, the Soil and Water Conservation District, certain aspects of the 
Metropolitan Sewer District...’  We decided, rather than form this brand-new district, 
let’s just augment the services that each department might be providing and – from the 
county’s perspective – then, we can offer those services to the locals, the municipalities, 
the cities and villages...  If they don’t have the wherewithal to do it themselves, we can 
do it.” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
This coordination with other entities on MS4 permit requirements helps HCSWD keep its 
stormwater fee modest: 
 
“The reason we’re able to keep our fees so low, primarily, is because the person who is 
out there doing education with [the] Soil and Water [Conservation District], is already in 
the school, already doing it.  So, we’re giving that institution a little bit more for the 
stormwater program.” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
                                                 
93 As noted above, the cities of Amberley and Loveland each independently enacted a stormwater fee in 
2003, the year Phase II MS4 permit coverage was first required.  The City of Milford also independently enacted a 
stormwater fee the following year, in 2004. 
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Reflecting the fact that the program evolved in direct response to the Phase II MS4 
regulations, the organizational structure of HCSWD corresponds to the six minimum control 
measures (MCMs) required by MS4 permits (Figure 4.3).  The annual budgeting process for 
HCSWD is also directly related to MS4 permit requirements: 
 
“... year over year, we create the budget based exclusively on what the [MS4] permit 
requires us to do.  So, each of the six Minimum Control Measures get broken down into 
tasks, sub-tasks...” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
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Figure 4.3.  HCSWD organizational chart. 
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The various services offered by HCSWD to member communities also map either 
directly or indirectly to the MCMs required under MS4 permits (Figure 4.4).  In addition to a 
required base level of service for “district-wide permit activities” – which includes activities 
related to public education and outreach (MCM1) and public participation/involvement (MCM2) 
– each HCSWD member can choose any or all of three additional services:  illicit discharge 
detection and elimination (MCM3); development review and inspection (MCM4/5); and GIS 
map development (Figure 4.4).  The institutional design of HCSWD thus offers its participating 
members flexibility in selecting their desired level of service: 
 
“... we could say, ‘County, you do it all.’  Or, we could say, ‘We’re just gonna do it all.’” 
 
City of Sharonville 
Community Development Director 
 
The flexible, level-of-service, MCM-menu design of HCSWD was at least partly a result 
of the fact that local governments in the county had varying levels of need with respect to the 
MS4 permit requirements: 
 
“You had larger communities, such as the City of Cincinnati... when it came to mapping, 
for instance, the City of Cincinnati had already done it so why would they want to pay us 
to do it again?  So, functionally, to get this moving, we really had to provide a level-of-
service, an á la carte menu, if you will.  That brought a lot of people on board.” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
For 2019, if a member community elects to receive all the services offered by HCSWD, 
the estimated HCSWD annual stormwater fee would be $8.13 per single-family unit (Figure 4.4), 
with a single-family unit defined as 3,300 square feet of impervious surface.  The 2019 estimated 
base annual stormwater fee for a member community participating in HCSWD is $3.68 per 
single-family unit (Figure 4.4). 
In addition to choosing which services to receive, HCSWD member communities can 
choose a billing method for those services:  a “direct bill” option where HCSWD bills the 
member community government or a “tax bill” where HCSWD bills individual property owners 
as part of the county property tax bill (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4.  HCSWD level of service agreement. 
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At least partly in response to the formation of HCSWD, the Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency (OHEPA) – the designated NPDES permitting authority in Ohio – has 
formally allowed MS4 permits in the state to be administered to a set of “co-permittees” rather 
than requiring individual permits for regulated MS4s participating in a collective program to 
meet permit requirements, like HCSWD:94 
 
“Initially, there was no co-permittee; there was an MS4 permit.  We banded together and 
said, ‘We’re all in it together.’  We put together our program and said, ‘Here, the 44 of us 
are together, [OH]EPA.  Here’s our plan.’  They accepted it, and, I think, thereafter – the 
second permit cycle around – they came up with this co-permittee thing, which was, 
‘Well, we want to kind of codify this.’  I think they looked at us as kind of the model and 
said, ‘Well, we’ve got to find some way to capture this.’” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
According to the HCSWD Program Director, OHEPA allowing regulated MS4s 
participating in a collective permit management effort like HCSWD as co-permittees on a shared 
MS4 permit has been a crucial factor in HCSWD helping member communities realize the 
benefits of collective action: 
 
“I’ve advocated quite loudly at storm conventions and the like with the [OH]EPA that 
this [co-permittee status] is a really important element for what we can do in southwest 
Ohio.  These communities really want and need us to provide the district because, 
otherwise, they’d have to put together a whole staff of people.  And we’re talking about 
some communities that are disadvantaged enough where they’re struggling to keep fire 
and EMS and all this together.  And now they’re gonna deal with a stormwater problem?” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
Coordination on MS4 permit obligations with OHEPA is one of the most appealing 
functions of HCSWD for at least one of the people I interviewed: 
 
“... just so that I don’t have to go deal with the [OH]EPA.” 
 
Village of Evendale 
Service Department Director 
                                                 
94 Currently, all HCSWD participating member communities are co-permittees on the OHEPA Small MS4 
General Permit 1GQ00046*CG. 
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As a voluntary program except for townships, participation of villages and cities in 
HCSWD has fluctuated over time.  Initially, 44 of the 49 subcounty governments in Hamilton 
County participated in HCSWD, as opposed to the current 35 members.95  Significantly, the City 
of Cincinnati participated in HCSWD until May 2016,96 when the city opted to leave HCSWD 
and administer its own independent stormwater utility, the Cincinnati Stormwater Management 
Utility.97  As the largest and most populous general-purpose subcounty jurisdiction in Hamilton 
County by far, the departure of Cincinnati was a substantial shock to HCSWD: 
 
“Cincinnati is pulling out of the district, so that’s a big loss to the district.  So, the district 
is having to evaluate what it’s going to do going forward.  One of the options is raise the 
rates:  no one wants to see that.  Another option is to eliminate this menu system, to 
basically say, ‘You’re either in or out.’  If that happens, then Sharonville will likely be 
out.  It’d be more cost-effective for us to hire a full-time administrator, probably a 
planner that could also help with some other work in here.  But some of it, they would 
just administer that [MS4] permit in-house.  We may almost wanna do that anyway.” 
 
City of Sharonville 
Community Development Director 
 
“... you’re asking about the fee structure:  this number kind of floats back and forth over 
the years, depending on... sometimes, they have the [MS4 permit] renewals, every five or 
ten years... sometimes, it’ll be a little heavier in one area and then a little lighter in 
another area... constantly adjusting.  Obviously, the big change is gonna be next year with 
the City of Cincinnati being out of it.” 
 
Village of Evendale 
Service Department Director 
 
                                                 
95 Although my research only directly confirms that the cities of Cincinnati and Wyoming both formerly 
participated in HCSWD – until 2016 and 2010, respectively – MS4 permit cycle records from OHEPA suggest that 
the other former HCSWD participants include the cities of Norwood, Cheviot, and North College Hill, along with 
the villages of St. Bernard and Woodlawn. 
 
96 I conducted interviews for the MSDGC case in May 2016, approximately the same time as the City of 
Cincinnati officially ended its participation in HCSWD. 
 
97 The City of Cincinnati has had its own stormwater fee and utility since the mid-1980s.  The Cincinnati 
Stormwater Management Utility was formerly part of MSDGC, but – since July 2016 – is now a division of the 
Greater Cincinnati Water Works. 
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Cities and villages have opted not to participate in HCSWD for a variety of reasons, some 
of which boil down to simple economics: 
 
“... 44 is the most we’ve ever had.  Subsequently, we’ve had a little bit of dwindle.  A lot 
of it is economic decisions.  We send out a bill, communities feel they can find a better 
price somewhere else.  They might have a consultant who comes in and says, ‘Now that 
you’ve done all this lifting to create all these rates, do all this work, map all this stuff out, 
we think we could do it cheaper.’” 
 
HCSWD 
Program Director 
 
The person I interviewed representing the City of Wyoming – which participated in 
HCSWD until 2010 – related that the city council felt that the land use and development patterns 
in Wyoming were different enough from the rest of the participating communities98 that 
continued participation in HCSWD would little benefit Wyoming: 
 
“Council made the decision.  The council was concerned that:  we were a small 
community; we’re built out; there’s no development, essentially, here.  So, we looked at 
some of the other communities and they were just starting to get more development and 
more industrial, and it’s like, ‘Well, we have almost nothing in common with these other 
communities.  If there’s any kind of projects, they’re not gonna be doing anything for us.’ 
 
... all our development since we’ve gone on our own, has been in the combined sewer 
area, so, we’ve never applied the earthworks or the post construction regulations to 
anything because everything’s been like:  a house here; a house there...  This is where it 
seems like Wyoming’s so unique:  for all the people in that Hamilton County District, 
there’s some that are like us, but it seems like most of them are either more industrial or 
they are just a lot more developable lots.” 
 
City of Wyoming 
Assistant Public Works Director 
 
                                                 
98 Wyoming is fairly unique among the general-purpose subcounty governments in Hamilton County in that 
the city has a relatively high percentage of low density residential land use and among the highest median household 
income. 
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The person I spoke with representing the City of Cheviot also emphasized unique local 
conditions – specifically the fact that almost all the sewers in the city are combined – as a reason 
for not participating in HCSWD.99 
In addition to unique local conditions, the person I interviewed representing Wyoming 
also noted that the city opted out of HCSWD to better coordinate MS4 permit requirements with 
other city functions: 
 
“We were supposed to map our storm system.  We got some help from an engineer and 
we did it.  But the thing that we did that the county would not have helped us in is we 
also mapped our drinking water system at the same time.  That killed two birds with one 
stone.” 
 
City of Wyoming 
Assistant Public Works Director 
 
A third reason for not participating in HCSWD offered by the person I interviewed 
representing Wyoming suggested some duplication of responsibilities and efforts between 
HCSWD and the other co-permittees on the HCSWD MS4 permit: 
 
“The [OH]EPA, when they audit, people say, ‘Oh, I’m part of the district:  ask them.’  
[laughter]  Well, Hamilton County, to their credit, was always like, ‘Well, you can’t say 
that, you guys.  You need to be on the ball.  You need to do this stuff.’  And I was like, 
‘Well, if I’m doing all this stuff, why are you guys even involved?  What’s the point of 
being in the district?’” 
 
City of Wyoming 
Assistant Public Works Director 
 
                                                 
99 Of the four general-purpose, subcounty governments in Hamilton County with a substantial proportion of 
combined sewers (i.e., the Village of St. Bernard, Delhi Township, the cities of Cheviot and Cincinnati), the only 
one currently participating in HCSWD is Delhi Township, which – as a township – is compelled to participate. 
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Finally, the person I interviewed representing Wyoming also indicated that the city has 
had a sufficient general fund – funded mainly through income and property taxes – and modest 
enough stormwater-related expenses to not need a stormwater fee, either through HCSWD or 
independently just for the city: 
 
“We’ve had enough money to fund everything we needed.” 
 
 
City of Wyoming 
Assistant Public Works Director 
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4.3.2 NEORSD (Cleveland) 
Centered on the Cleveland metropolitan region in northeastern Ohio, the NEORSD service area 
for sanitary sewage includes all or parts of 56 of the 59 general-purpose subcounty governments 
in Cuyahoga County, along with parts of 11 general-purpose subcounty governments in Summit 
County, and part of Columbia Township in Lorain County (Figure 4.5).  The NEORSD 
stormwater service area is largely the same as the NEORSD sanitary sewer service area, except 
that six communities in Summit County (i.e., the townships of Bath, Northfield Center, 
Richfield, and Twinsburg, along with the Village of Boston Heights and the City of Twinsburg) 
that are partly or entirely within the NEORSD sanitary sewer service area are not included in the 
NEORSD stormwater service area, and one community (i.e., the City of Willoughby Hills in 
Lake County) outside the sanitary sewer service area is included in the stormwater service area 
(Figure 4.6).  Subject to some exceptions,100 NEORSD assesses a stormwater fee on all parcels 
of real property within the NEORSD stormwater service area.  Only one subcounty government 
in the NEORSD stormwater service area (i.e., the City of Broadview Heights) currently has an 
independent stormwater fee.101,102 
                                                 
100 Certain parcels are exempt from the NEORSD stormwater fee, including:  public roads and highways; 
public airport runways and taxiways; railroad rights-of-way; public and not-for-profit cemeteries; as well as parcels 
with less than 400 square feet of impervious surface. 
 
101 Broadview Heights established a city-specific stormwater fee in 2007. 
 
102 Campbell et al. (2017) also record a stormwater fee – with no enactment year – for the City of Hudson.  
However, the codified ordinances of Hudson show that the chapter authorizing the city-specific stormwater fee (i.e., 
Chapter 1045) was repealed with the enactment of Ordinance 04-67 on 05 May 2004. 
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Figure 4.5.  Map of the NEORSD sanitary sewer service area. 
NEORSD sanitary sewer service area (inverted silhouette) with interview targets labeled.  Also shows waterways and waterbodies [National Hydrography 
Dataset] and land use [2011 National Land Cover Dataset].  [Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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Figure 4.6.  Map of NEORSD sanitary sewer and stormwater service areas. 
NEORSD sanitary sewer service area (inverted silhouette). 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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The NEORSD stormwater fee serves as the primary financing mechanism for the 
NEORSD Regional Stormwater Management Program (RSMP).  The seven-member NEORSD 
Board of Trustees103 – the governing body of the district – formally approved the RSMP, 
including the associated stormwater fee, in 2010.  While formal governance and budgetary 
powers within NEORSD rest with the Board of Trustees, the RSMP includes five Watershed 
Advisory Committees (WACs).104,105  
The NEORSD RSMP – including the associated stormwater fee – evolved largely out of 
the NEORSD Regional Intercommunity Drainage Evaluation (RIDE) Study, which formally 
began in October 2000, building on a series of earlier studies and surveys of sanitary and storm 
sewer issues in the NEORSD service area.  Although the Phase II MS4 regulations were 
finalized and negotiations over CSO regulations were going on around the same time as the 
RIDE Study, the RIDE Study was not entirely initiated in response to either of these federally 
driven regulatory initiatives.  While the intensifying regulatory focus on MS4s and CSOs were 
certainly important factors accounted for in the RIDE Study, the study represented the 
continuation of decades-long efforts within NEORSD to regionally integrate the management of 
sanitary sewers and stormwater.106 
                                                 
103 Members of the NEORSD Board of Trustees are appointed by:  the Mayor of the City of Cleveland (two 
members); the Suburban Council of Governments (two members); the Cuyahoga County Executive (one member); 
an appointed representative of the subdistrict in the service area with the most sewage flow (one member), currently 
the Mayor of the City of Cleveland; and an appointed representative of the subdistrict in the service area with the 
largest population (one member), which is currently the Suburban Council of Governments. 
 
104 The five WAC watersheds are:  Cuyahoga River North; Cuyahoga River South; Chagrin River; Lake 
Erie direct tributaries; and Rocky River.  The two smallest WACs (i.e., Lake Erie direct tributaries and Rocky River) 
are administrated jointly. 
 
105 Each subcounty government has one representative on each applicable WAC.  Some other public 
entities and agencies that own and operate stormwater-related infrastructure within the NEORSD service area are 
also represented on the WACs.  These agencies and entities include:  Cuyahoga, Lorain, and Summit counties; the 
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority; relevant park districts (e.g., Cleveland Metroparks, Summit Metro 
Parks); the Ohio Department of Transportation; and the Ohio Turnpike Commission.  While not formally 
represented, some watershed organizations (e.g., the Rocky River Watershed Council, the Doan Brook Watershed 
Partnership) also regularly attend relevant WAC meetings. 
 
106 The executive summary of the RIDE Study prominently cites a 1975 order from Judge George J. 
McMonagle of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas mandating that NEORSD, “... develop a detailed 
integrated capital improvement plan for regional management of wastewater collection and storm drainage to 
identify a capital improvement program for the solution of all intercommunity drainage problems (both storm and 
sanitary) in the District...” 
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The manner in which the NEORSD RSMP and associated stormwater fee were 
conceived, designed, and publicized seems to be remembered differently by different people.  
Beginning in 2009, NEORSD met with representatives of each general-purpose subcounty 
government in the stormwater service area about the RSMP.  While the person I interviewed 
representing the City of Strongsville107 characterized these meetings as NEORSD introducing or 
rolling out a mostly finalized RSMP with little interest in receiving feedback, the person I 
interviewed representing the City of Independence characterized the meetings as much more 
collaborative and participatory: 
 
“The administration from the region’s sewer district came out to the mayor’s office, sat 
down and tried to explain the premise behind the fee and the value.  It was an opportunity 
to give some dialogue and some feedback.  They really did engage the communities, the 
engineers, and seemed very willing and wanting to say, ‘We know municipalities don’t 
have funding for stormwater-related issues.  And we want to be the people that come in 
here and help you solve these major problems.’  They were going and reaching out to all 
the communities and that was gonna be the list that then, when this big pot of money 
came in, that they would then be solving all of these projects.” 
 
City of Independence 
City Engineer 
 
Reflecting the varied perceptions of these initial meetings between NEORSD and the 
subcounty governments about the RSMP, some people I interviewed referred to these meetings 
as collaborative “listening sessions” while others saw them more as “a PR [public relations] 
campaign,” “marketing,” and “a rollout.” 
Soon after the introduction of the RSMP and associated stormwater fee, organized 
opposition arose, and went to court.  In January 2010, NEORSD filed action with the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas seeking a judgment declaring the authority of NEORSD to 
implement the RSMP and associated stormwater fee.108  A group of general-purpose subcounty 
governments in the NEORSD service area soon filed an answer and counterclaims in this suit, 
                                                 
107 As discussed in Appendix C, I did not record audio for the interview I conducted with the person 
representing Strongsville, so I cannot provide direct quotes from that interview. 
 
108 This action was filed on the same day that the NEORSD Board of Trustees enacted Title V, the 
amendments to the district’s Code of Regulations that created the RSMP. 
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seeking to permanently enjoin NEORSD from implementing the RSMP.109  The subcounty 
governments who opposed the NEORSD RSMP in this initial case became known to some as 
“the Gang of 12” (Figure 4.7).110  In April 2011, the common pleas judge presiding over the case 
issued a ruling finding that – under the Ohio Revised Code111 – NEORSD had authority to enact 
the RSMP.  During these initial proceedings the issue of the validity and implementation of the 
stormwater fee was set aside and reserved for a later trial.  In February 2012 – following a bench 
trial – the common pleas court ruled that the NEORSD stormwater fee was valid, although the 
court found several issues with the implementation of the fee, including that the proposed 7.5% 
minimum allocation of stormwater fee revenues to the fund for member communities was too 
low, and should be at least 25%. 
On appeal by “the Gang of 12” subcounty governments and other parties, a split112 panel 
of appeals court judges issued a ruling in September 2013 that found NEORSD had no authority 
under relevant state law to enact the RSMP, and enjoined NEORSD from implementing the 
RSMP and associated stormwater fee.  Following nearly two more years of legal proceedings on 
appeal by NEORSD, the Ohio Supreme Court decided in September 2015 that NEORSD did 
have authority under state law to implement the RSMP and associated stormwater fee.  In the 
case before the Ohio Supreme Court, all but one member113 of “the Gang of 12” submitted 
amicus briefs in opposition to NEORSD, while only five members114 of this coalition appealed 
the decision (Figure 4.7).115  In the case before the Ohio Supreme Court, another 19 subcounty 
                                                 
109 A group of property owners including the Bishop of the Diocese of Cleveland and the Cleveland 
Municipal School District Board of Education also joined this case in opposition to the NEORSD RSMP. 
 
110 The Gang of 12 were:  the cities of Beachwood, Bedford Heights, Brecksville, Cleveland Heights, 
Independence, Lyndhurst, North Royalton, Olmsted Falls, and Strongsville; the villages of Glenwillow and 
Oakwood; along with Bath Township. 
 
111 Specifically, Chapter 6119, the chapter under which NEORSD was originally incorporated. 
 
112 One of the three judges issued a lengthy, mostly dissenting opinion. 
 
113 The City of North Royalton took no official action in the case before the Ohio Supreme Court. 
 
114 The five communities that appealed the decision were the cities of Beachwood, Brecksville, 
Independence, Lyndhurst, and Strongsville. 
 
115 The appeal was denied. 
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governments116 in the NEORSD service area submitted amicus briefs in support of NEORSD 
(Figure 4.7).  While many issues were debated during the legal proceedings contesting the 
NEORSD RSMP and stormwater fee, much of the argument in these cases concerned whether or 
not the purview of NEORSD authorized under the district charter and under state law included 
only sanitary sewerage or also extended to stormwater. 
 
 
                                                 
116 The 19 subcounty governments that submitted amicus briefs in support of NEORSD in the case before 
the Ohio Supreme Court were:  the cities of Brook Park, Brooklyn, Cleveland, Middleburg Heights, Parma, Parma 
Heights, Seven Hills, Shaker Heights, South Euclid, and Warrensville Heights; the villages of Brooklyn, Cuyahoga 
Heights, Highland Hills, Mayfield, Moreland Hills, Newburgh Heights, Orange, and Valley View; along with 
Olmsted Township. 
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Figure 4.7.  Map of NEORSD stormwater fee litigation positions. 
NEORSD sanitary sewer service area (inverted silhouette). 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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The reasons some communities opposed the NEORSD RSMP were varied, but a common 
reason was concern about unfair division risks: 
 
“It was always a concern that:  you collect the money here, you spend it here; versus, 
collect the money and spend it somewhere else.  That was always the fear.” 
 
City of Independence 
City Engineer 
 
As emphasized by the people I interviewed representing the City of Independence and the 
City of Strongsville – both members of “the Gang of 12” – this concern about unfair division 
risks associated with the NEORSD RSMP was particularly acute in communities that had long 
been adequately funding stormwater costs locally: 
 
“We’re one of probably the few communities that annually we programmed $200,000-
$300,000 a year for stormwater management, drainage, excavating for repairs of sewers.  
And, it was 100% local.” 
 
City of Independence 
City Engineer 
 
 
The person I interviewed from Strongsville tied this issue of local versus regional 
financing of stormwater management to the issue of accountability:  whereas state law requires 
voter approval of the city’s local “drainage levy” every five years, the NEORSD stormwater fee 
does not require direct voter approval, only approval by the unelected NEORSD Board of 
Trustees. 
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Another reason for the organized opposition to the NEORSD RSMP was the belief that 
the initially proposed allocation of stormwater fee revenues between regional and local purposes 
was too heavily skewed towards regional purposes.  As noted previously, the common pleas 
court agreed with this argument, and required NEORSD to bump the local allocation from the 
originally proposed 7.5% to a minimum of 25%.  In this respect, the extensive litigation over the 
NEORSD RSMP can be viewed – at least in part – as negotiating cost: 
 
“Ultimately, while we lost the suit, I think we still prevailed in that 25 cents on the dollar 
came back.  That made it a little bit worth the while.  At least we got something tangible 
out of the fight, because it was years of litigation.” 
 
City of Independence 
City Engineer 
 
Bills for the NEORSD stormwater fee are sent directly to individual property owners, 
with billing administered in coordination with the Cleveland Water Department.  In accordance 
with court decisions, the NEORSD stormwater fee was not assessed from autumn 2013 through 
the end of 2015.  The NEORSD stormwater fee applies different rates to different types and sizes 
of properties (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1.  Monthly NEORSD stormwater fees for 2018-2019. 
property 
type 
impervious surface area 
(square feet) 
monthly 
fee 
Residential 
  
Tier 1 < 2,000 $3.09  
Tier 2/Base 2,000 to 3,999 $5.15  
Tier 3 ≥ 4,000 $9.27  
Homestead Any size $2.07  
Non-residential per ERU* (3,000 square feet) $5.15  
* ERU = equivalent residential unit 
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Of the stormwater fee revenues collected from each member community, NEORSD 
allocates 75% to the RSMP, with the remaining 25% allocated to each member community’s 
account under the Community Cost-Share Program (CCSP).  Member communities must apply 
to NEORSD for disbursement of CCSP funds, with disbursements subject to certain criteria set 
by NEORSD.  Member communities can also apply for RSMP funds through the Member 
Community Infrastructure Program, which will fund up to 75% of costs for eligible projects.  
Eligible costs for CCSP funds include costs related to MS4 permit requirements, and some 
communities use CCSP funds to pay partner organizations to handle certain MCMs: 
 
“Minimum Control Measures 1, 2, 4, and 5 are eligible.  A lot of them are becoming 
more eligible for this [CCSP] money to help us meet our [MS4] permit requirements.  So, 
the public education and outreach:  we pay like $25,000 to Cuyahoga [Soil and] Water 
[Conservation] District because they help us do that, because they’re good at it.  Well, we 
can submit for reimbursement of those costs.  So, now it’s positive to say, ‘Look, our 
[OH]EPA MS4 permit requirements, those costs are being funded through this regional 
sewer program, regional utility.’  So, it’s kind of positive...” 
 
City of Independence 
City Engineer 
 
Using RSMP funds, NEORSD also contracts directly with partner organizations to handle 
certain MCMs: 
 
“We contract with the Cuyahoga County Board of Health and the Summit County Board 
of Health to do Minimum Control Measure 3:  illicit discharge detection.  So, all the 
outfall screening that’s required, updates to the outfall mapping... that’s all contracted 
through the boards of health, directly for the member communities.” 
 
NEORSD 
Watershed Team Leader 
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While the general-purpose subcounty governments in the NEORSD stormwater service 
area do not have a choice regarding the assessment of the NEORSD stormwater fee on properties 
within their local jurisdictions, one local government has voluntarily chosen to participate in the 
NEORSD RSMP.  A small part of the City of North Royalton is in the NEORSD sanitary sewer 
service area, and was included in the initial NEORSD stormwater service area.117  Despite being 
one of “the Gang of 12” initially opposing the RSMP, North Royalton officials later signed an 
agreement that brought the entire city into the RSMP:118 
 
“It just goes to show these utilities are useful.  It’s painful to have to pay fees, but they do 
serve a greater purpose.  You’ve got communities now coming in that aren’t required to 
be in.” 
 
NEORSD 
Watershed Team Leader 
                                                 
117 The part of North Royalton in the NEORSD sanitary sewer service area is an approximately 2.5-square-
mile area – which accounts for roughly 11% of the city’s total land area – in the northeastern corner of the city, 
much of which is in the Big Creek watershed. 
 
118 Since 2014, the mayor of North Royalton has also served on the NEORSD Board of Trustees as one of 
the two representatives for the Suburban Council of Governments. 
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4.3.3 ALCOSAN (Pittsburgh) 
Centered on the Pittsburgh metropolitan region in southwestern Pennsylvania, the ALCOSAN 
service area includes all or part of 81 of the 130 general-purpose subcounty governments in 
Allegheny County,119 along with parts of two townships in Westmoreland County, and Peters 
Township in Washington County (Figure 4.8).  To date, the only stormwater fees enacted in the 
ALCOSAN service area have been enacted by individual subcounty governments:  the 
Municipality of Mt. Lebanon, the Borough of Whitehall, and the Borough of Dormont.  Mt. 
Lebanon enacted the first stormwater fee in the region in 2011,120 followed by Whitehall in 
2014,121 and Dormont in 2015.122  Both Mt. Lebanon and Whitehall are governed by home-rule 
charters, which provide them a greater degree of local autonomy compared with local 
governments without home-rule charters (Pennsylvania Department of Community and 
Economic Development, 2017; Vanlandingham, 1968).  As such, the stormwater fees in Mt. 
Lebanon and Whitehall are assessed directly by each local government, whereas the Dormont 
stormwater fee is assessed by the Dormont Stormwater Authority, an entity that – while legally 
and fiscally distinct from the borough – has the same geographic jurisdiction as the borough and 
has board members appointed by the borough council.  As noted previously, prior to 
amendments to state law in 2016, the authority for boroughs and townships in Pennsylvania to 
directly assess stormwater fees was unclear. 
                                                 
119 The jurisdictions of two boroughs in the ALCOSAN service area cross county boundaries.  Roughly 
one-third of the land area of McDonald is located in Allegheny County, with the remaining parts of the borough 
located in Washington County.  Over three-quarters of the land area of Trafford is located in Westmoreland County, 
with the remaining parts of the borough located in Allegheny County. 
 
120 The stormwater fee in Mt. Lebanon has been in place since August 2011. 
 
121 Whitehall’s stormwater fee – which is not recorded by Campbell et al. (2017) – was enacted in 
November 2014 and effective January 2015. 
 
122 Formally incorporated in August 2015 with the approval of an ordinance by borough council, the 
Dormont Stormwater Authority sent out its first stormwater fee bills in June 2016. 
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Figure 4.8.  Map of The ALCOSAN service area. 
ALCOSAN service area (inverted silhouette) with interview targets labeled.  Also shows waterways and waterbodies [National Hydrography Dataset] and land 
use [2011 National Land Cover Dataset].  [Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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All three stormwater fees in the ALCOSAN service area are currently assessed at $8 per 
equivalent residential unit (ERU) per month, but each varies in the definition of an ERU.  In Mt. 
Lebanon, an ERU equals 2,400 square feet of impervious surface, whereas an ERU in Dormont 
equals 1,883 square feet of impervious surface.  Documentation defining an ERU in Whitehall 
was not readily available. 
The stormwater fees enacted in the ALCOSAN service area have been at least partially 
motivated by MS4 permit requirements: 
 
“We had a couple of people come to a meeting and say, ‘Is this really necessary?’  We 
explained to them, ‘The [flooding] issues that you’re having, the MS4 coming... with 
those issues coming in, having to license your collection system through the state for 
stormwater, that was going to require certain maintenance, and record keeping, all that.’” 
 
Borough of Whitehall 
Borough Manager 
 
“Neighborhoods in the state were getting fined, and that was a rude awakening for 
everybody in the western part of the state because [PADEP] were hitting some people out 
east.  So, along with that, and the [MS4 permit] requirements that need to be met, and just 
everything that needs to be repaired, the council at the time thought it was best to form 
the authority.” 
 
Dormont Stormwater Authority 
Administrative Manager 
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As a highly fragmented region with scores of general-purpose subcounty local 
governments, people I interviewed in the ALCOSAN service area expressed trepidation about 
each local government – many of which cover very small areas of land – enacting stormwater 
fees independently: 
 
“I have great concerns over the fact that we have 130 municipalities in Allegheny County 
and we’ll have 130 different stormwater fees that are all structured differently, have 
different rates, different values, and are enforced differently.” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
 
“I’m one of the guys out there that’s opposed to stormwater fees, and my opposition is 
primarily based on my opposition to creating another bureaucracy.  There’s way, way too 
many bureaucracies out here:  130 municipalities.  To have 130 municipalities and then 
creating 130 more bureaucracies that control stormwater in what is a one-square-mile 
town like Etna, Millvale, Sharpsburg, Blawnox, Aspinwall...” 
 
Shaler Township 
Township Manager 
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Similarly – to prevent further institutional fragmentation, and to account for hydrologic 
and hydraulic interconnections among local governments – several people I interviewed in the 
ALCOSAN service area suggested a collective approach to stormwater management and 
financing in the region: 
 
“I think if we could have this regional/county-wide effort or larger service-area-wide 
effort, whatever that may be, to unify this... because it’s bad enough that we have so 
many municipalities and so many different local zoning codes and laws and fees and 
structure for everything.  We don’t need another layer of that.” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
 
“The upstream communities in the watershed are all sanitary only.  So, that makes it 
difficult, because they’re like, ‘Well, [as a community with combined sewers] you’re 
putting your [storm]water right in there; we’re not.’  But water runs downhill, and they’re 
not capturing all their stormwater...  It’s just geography.  It’s not their fault.  It just 
complicates the issue more and more, which is why we believe it needs to be done on a 
regional basis.  We would be amenable to paying a fee as part of a larger-scale thing.” 
 
Borough of Etna 
Borough Manager 
 
“It is unfair that I’m pushing all of my stuff down to the Borough of Etna, the Borough of 
Millvale, just saying, ‘Hey, I hope you guys can handle this.’  Ultimately, it’s going to 
come to a regional solution.” 
 
Shaler Township 
Township Manager 
 
“I think in the future what we should look towards is maybe a watershed-wide authority:  
you pool all your money, and you’re doing these better projects, and you’re affecting the 
watershed in a better way, rather than thinking, ‘Okay, my water stops at my line, at my 
municipal boundary.’  That’s just not gonna work.” 
 
Dormont Stormwater Authority 
Administrative Manager 
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For at least one community in the region, an independently enacted stormwater fee would 
be “futile” compared with a collective approach: 
 
“We’re in the bottom of the valley, and the bottom of the watershed.  Pine Creek 
watershed is actually 67 square miles, and we have like 0.6 square miles.  So, we couldn’t 
possibly collect enough money or address the issues.  The work really needs to be done 
outside of the community...  If we looked at the whole watershed and said, ‘Okay, if we 
put a basin here, it’s going to be the most effective for this whole, bigger area,’ then 
we’re happy to pay.  It would be futile for us – especially with the small population we 
have – if we instituted a fee.  You couldn’t collect enough to really do anything of 
substance.  I think there needs to be some overall, regional look at everything.” 
 
Borough of Etna 
Borough Manager 
 
 On the other hand, the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority has been studying 
and developing a stormwater fee, and seems poised to implement one in the near future: 
 
“As we’re looking at this greater responsibility within PWSA for stormwater, we want to 
be able to fund it properly, so we are looking at a stormwater fee to do that.  We’re at the 
position now where multiple times we’ve had this thing teed up and ready to go:  we’ve 
done the feasibility study; we know how many impervious acres of surface we have; we 
know what our stormwater costs are for a given year.  So, we need some refinement, but, 
basically, it’s just a math exercise to take the total amount of square footage divided by 
our budget and that’s the rate per square foot is gonna be.” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
 
While several people I interviewed expressed support for a collective approach to 
stormwater management and financing in the region, the person I interviewed representing the 
Whitehall noted that a collective approach may be complicated by the fact that some local 
governments have already independently enacted stormwater fees: 
 
“We were one of the first to do it as a home-rule.  Now, we’re talking about this multi-
municipal approach.  The county had talked about doing a county-wide approach.  We’ve 
already implemented a fee; we’re already collecting it; we’ve already taken a third of it 
every year for debt service.  So, for us to get out of our own and jump into somebody 
else’s, it’s going to be way more complicated than if you were just going in from scratch 
and starting from there.” 
 
Borough of Whitehall 
Borough Manager 
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The people I interviewed in the ALCOSAN service area identified several candidate 
organizations that could potentially coordinate or help coordinate collective stormwater 
management and finance, including:  Allegheny County, the Allegheny County Conservation 
District,123 ALCOSAN, the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, the Southwest Pennsylvania 
Commission,124 the Congress of Neighboring Communities,125 3 Rivers Wet Weather,126 as well 
as various watershed organizations and councils of government in the region.  A couple of 
people I interviewed seemed to particularly favor a county-level collective effort to stormwater 
management and finance: 
 
“I can see something in the county.  I’m beginning to develop a stronger trust for the 
county, and I think a county-wide system would make sense.” 
 
 
Shaler Township 
Township Manager 
 
“Well, there are some watershed groups.  The Northern Area Environmental Council is 
pretty much Pine Creek, but not all of Pine Creek.  So, I think it has to be done on a 
county level because that’s really the arm of everybody, because that’s all the watersheds 
within the county.  Some of those watersheds actually go outside of the county, but, I 
think, on a county level, you’re capturing a good portion of it.  And then it’s not, you 
know, sanitary versus combined; it’s not rich versus poor.” 
 
Borough of Etna 
Borough Manager 
 
                                                 
123 Despite its name, the Allegheny County Conservation District is governed directly by the state, and is 
neither affiliated with nor governed by Allegheny County. 
 
124 The Southwest Pennsylvania Commission is the regional planning agency for a 10-county region 
including Allegheny and neighboring counties. 
 
125 The Congress of Neighboring Communities is an organization comprised of representatives from the 
City of Pittsburgh and the general-purpose subcounty governments that share a border with the City of Pittsburgh, as 
well as a few general-purpose subcounty governments from other parts of the region. 
 
126 3 Rivers Wet Weather is a nonprofit organization created in 1998 to support communities in the 
ALCOSAN service area in addressing CSO issues. 
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One of the people I interviewed representing the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
even indicated that the county had looked into a county-wide stormwater fee decades ago: 
 
“There’s a study from the ‘80s where Allegheny County looked into having a county-
wide stormwater fee... 1988 I think it was, they apparently looked into it.”127 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Green Infrastructure Program and Policy Manager 
 
However, the people I interviewed also expressed concerns about the institutional 
challenges for many of the candidate regional organizations, including a county-level approach:  
 
“What concerns me about the county is, if they’re taking in this money, where’s it gonna 
go?  They’re not gonna look at little Dormont.  When we have a project that has to be 
done, when we have some flooding going on, how do we get in line with the county?” 
 
Dormont Stormwater Authority 
Administrative Manager 
 
“ALCOSAN I don’t think would be allowed to, because I don’t think the county and the 
state would allow them to mix storm and sanitary.” 
 
Borough of Whitehall 
Borough Manager 
 
“The two people I don’t want to have do this is PWSA, because they’re just simply too 
fucked up, and ALCOSAN.  ALCOSAN’s strength is in sanitary sewer, and they do a 
very good job at it, but ALCOSAN has issues with legacy cost and governance issues.  
So, I’m not too crazy about either one of them jumping in.” 
 
Shaler Township 
Township Manager 
 
Along with these institutional challenges, the people I interviewed in the ALCOSAN 
service area also noted a number of ongoing collaborative efforts and discussions that may help 
lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive approach to stormwater management and finance 
in the region, including:  a regional grant program administered by ALCOSAN; a variety of 
                                                 
127 Indeed, the idea of a stormwater fee in Allegheny County was evaluated by Coopers & Lybrand (1988, 
1990). 
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inter-municipal agreements; an effort to transfer inter-municipal trunk sewers to ALCOSAN;128 
various collaborative projects coordinated through councils of governments; and a watershed-
based initiative in the Saw Mill Run watershed: 
 
“We started talking with the rest of the municipalities, and 3 Rivers Wet Weather, and 
some of the other regional groups like CONNECT [the Congress of Neighboring 
Communities] and the Southwest Pennsylvania Commission...  How we can work with 
them to do this regionally and approach this from a regional standpoint?  We need 
somebody to look from a watershed perspective.  One of our approaches to that has been 
in Saw Mill Run where we’ve worked really closely with the communities tributary to 
Saw Mill Run.” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
 
In addition to the challenges of identifying or forming a coordinating institution, one of 
the people I interviewed representing the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority also noted 
challenges – as well as benefits – from a collective regional approach from the perspective of the 
designated NPDES permitting authority for the state (i.e., the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection):129 
 
“We have had pretty good discussions with the folks over at [PA]DEP.  They are 
supportive of it, and I’m sure they would love to get one Pollution Reduction Plan instead 
of 12.  They would rather have one permit than 12.  Their one caveat, though, is the 
worry that they will have one or two of the municipalities doing all the work, and the 
other ones will not.  And, then, how do we hold them responsible if they’re not 
participating to the level they should?” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
 
                                                 
128 The initiative to transfer inter-municipal trunk sewers to ALCOSAN emerged out the recommendations 
of a recent sewer regionalization study (Cohon et al., 2013).  This study is one in a long line of studies evaluating 
sewer regionalization options in the region (Barazzone et al., 2014; Burns, Sr., Muller, Blaustein, Volz, & French, 
2006; Gilbert et al., 2005; Greeley and Hansen, 2002; McElfish, Jr. & Jacoby, 1999; Roberts & Clark, 2011; 
Southwestern Pennsylvania Water and Sewer Infrastructure Project Steering Committee, 2002). 
 
129 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection has – at least in recent years – actively 
promoted regional collaborations on meeting MS4 permit requirements, including allowing collaborative regional 
entities to meet certain permit requirements, similar to the co-permittee status institutionalized by OHEPA. 
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4.3.4 Comparing fees 
A quick comparison of the stormwater fees discussed in each of the case studies will help inform 
and frame the subsequent discussion.  Standardizing the stormwater fees discussed in each of the 
preceding case studies to an annualized fee per 1,000 square feet of impervious surface shows 
that the HCSWD stormwater fee rates are substantially (i.e., up to 33 times) lower than the 
NEORSD stormwater fee rates for various property classes and tiers, which – in turn – are 
generally about half the stormwater fee rates assessed by the three local governments in the 
ALCOSAN service area (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2.  Comparison of stormwater fees. 
* Where impervious areas are ranges (NEORSD residential tiers) or unknown (Whitehall), central values 
of the range or best-guess values were used for purposes of comparison. 
entity fee / property class impervious square feet* 
annualized 
fee 
annualized fee per 
1,000 impervious ft2 
HCSWD base service 3,300 $3.60 $1.09 
full service 3,300 $8.13 $2.46 
NEORSD 
residential:  tier 1 1,000 $37.08 $37.08 
residential:  tier 2 / base 3,000 $61.80 $20.60 
residential:  tier 3 5,000 $111.24 $22.25 
homestead 3,000 $24.84 $8.28 
non-residential 3,000 $61.80 $20.60 
Mt. Lebanon 
 
2,400 $96.00 $40.00 
Whitehall 
 
2,000 $96.00 $48.00 
Dormont 
 
1,883 $96.00 $50.98 
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4.4 DISCUSSION 
Most of concepts identified in the institutional collective action framework were reflected in the 
interviews I conducted on stormwater fee forms (Table 4.3, Figure C.3). 
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Table 4.3.  Coding summary for the form case studies. 
Numbers indicate how many times each concept was coded in each interview.  Sum and count columns total within each case and across all cases. 
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INSTITUTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION   
     
  
     
   
          ICA governance mechanisms   
     
  
     
   
              key dimensions   
     
  
     
   
                  means of enforcement 4 4 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                coercion by higher level government 51 14 2 5 4 1 3 15 5 0 7 15 3 2 27 4 4 1 1 2 1 9 5 
                voluntary solutions 31 11 1 2 1 4 0 8 4 1 5 7 5 3 21 5 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 
            scope 36 10 1 4 10 0 1 16 4 0 4 8 2 4 18 4 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 
        primary factors   
     
  
     
   
                  collaboration risk 4 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                defection risk 17 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 1 1 15 4 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 
                incoordination risk 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                unfair divisions risk 29 11 1 0 6 1 1 9 4 1 3 1 0 3 8 4 9 0 1 2 0 12 3 
SHARED CONCEPTS   
     
  
     
   
          benefits 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
        coordination gains 30 10 2 3 5 1 0 11 4 0 3 5 0 1 9 3 4 5 1 0 0 10 3 
        economies of scale 13 6 1 1 0 2 0 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 5 2 0 0 0 7 2 
        internalizing externalities 12 4 0 8 0 1 0 9 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 
        minimizing common-pool resource problems 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 
    institutional fragmentation 100 14 4 21 16 5 5 51 5 0 4 18 2 2 26 4 7 12 1 2 1 23 5 
    transaction costs 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
        bargaining ~ coordination costs 22 10 1 0 1 1 3 6 4 0 1 2 0 2 5 3 8 2 1 0 0 11 3 
        enforcement costs 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 3 
        external decision costs 19 9 0 0 2 3 1 6 3 0 1 2 0 3 6 3 3 0 2 2 0 7 3 
        information costs 11 6 0 1 2 1 0 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 3 2 0 0 0 5 2 
    trust 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        trust - 9 4 1 2 0 5 0 8 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        trust + 6 5 0 1 0 2 0 3 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Examining the coding of concepts in my interviews on stormwater fee form reveals 
several interesting patterns.  Institutional fragmentation was by far the most frequently coded 
concept, and was coded in all but one brief telephone interview, as was the second-most 
frequently coded concept, coercion by higher level government (Table 4.3).  These findings 
emphasize the fact that challenges of institutional fragmentation in managing stormwater are 
widely recognized across all three regions, and that vertical relationships among levels of 
government (i.e., federal, state, regional, county, subcounty) are central to navigating these 
challenges.  Concepts about the benefits of collective action (e.g., coordination gains, economies 
of scale, internalizing externalities, minimizing common-pool resource problems) were also 
mostly all coded in interviews across all three cases, especially coordination gains (Table 4.3).  
In the MSDGC case, however, several concepts about collective action benefits were only coded 
in the HCSWD interview (Table 4.3).  Similarly, most transaction cost concepts – especially 
bargaining / coordination costs, external decision costs, and information costs – were also coded 
fairly frequently in multiple interviews across all three cases, as was the concept of unfair 
divisions risk (Table 4.3). The widespread discussions about coordination gains and transaction 
costs suggests that individuals and institutions in each region are well aware of both the benefits 
to collectively managing stormwater as well as the transaction costs that have to be surmounted 
to realize those benefits. 
In contrast to the sets of concepts that were coded fairly evenly across all three cases, 
other sets of concepts were coded exclusively in only one or two cases.  For instance, the 
collaboration risk concepts of defection risk and incoordination risk were almost exclusively 
concentrated in the MSDGC case (Table 4.3), reflecting the particular salience of these risks in a 
voluntary approach to collective stormwater management.  Two other distinct sets of concepts 
were coded mostly or entirely in the ALCOSAN and MSDGC cases:  one set of concepts about 
trust; and another set of concepts about voluntary solutions and institutional scope (Table 4.3).  
The relative rareness of these concepts in the NEORSD case reflects the fact that the collective 
approach to stormwater management in the NEORSD service area was effectively required by 
NEORSD and the courts, and was also largely driven by NEORSD from the outset, with 
relatively little non-litigious negotiation about the scope of the RSMP. 
Viewing my case studies of stormwater fee forms in the MSDGC/HCSWD, NEORSD, 
and ALCOSAN service areas through the lens of the institutional collective action framework 
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brings focus to a couple salient features across the cases.  First, as mechanisms for mitigating 
institutional collective action dilemmas associated with stormwater management in 
institutionally fragmented metropolitan regions, the stormwater fees and associated stormwater 
management programs administered by HCSWD and NEORSD130 fit fairly squarely into the 
array of mitigating mechanisms along dimensions of scope and means of enforcement as a 
single-purpose special district and an imposed district, respectively (Feiock, 2013).  While the 
NEORSD RSMP is a much larger institution with a broader scope than HCSWD, both 
institutions are fairly narrowly focused on the single issue of stormwater management.  Thus, 
from the perspective of the institutional collective action framework, the key difference between 
HCSWD and NEORSD is in the means of enforcement:  the delegated authority of HCSWD 
versus the imposed authority of NEORSD. 
So, why did different means of enforcement manifest in HCSWD and NEORSD?  The 
institutional collective action framework posits that participation incentives favor mitigating 
mechanisms that yield the greatest gains for the least cost.  A second feature of my case studies 
that appears particularly salient through the lens of the institutional collective action framework 
is that the relative similarity of the three metropolitan regions in terms of sewer and stormwater 
infrastructure configurations and in terms of abundant jurisdictional fragmentation among 
diverse local governments makes the potential benefits of mitigating the collective action 
dilemma (i.e., coordination gains, economies of scale, minimization of common-pool resource 
problems, and internalization of externalities) at least generally comparable across the cases.  If 
mitigating mechanisms tend to maximize the difference between benefits and costs of 
institutional collective action, and the potential benefits are relatively comparable across cases, 
then the institutional collective action framework focuses attention on the differences in relative 
costs across cases, as well as the other major factor posited by the framework to influence which 
mitigating mechanisms manifest in which contexts:  collaboration risks (Feiock, 2013). 
As mitigating mechanisms for institutional collection action dilemmas of stormwater 
management and financing in fragmented metropolitan regions, the HCSWD and NEORSD 
stormwater programs and associated stormwater fees differ markedly in the relative transaction 
costs and coordination risks.  With the NEORSD RSMP, mandated participation across the entire 
                                                 
130 In the ALCOSAN case, a regional institution for mitigating the institutional collective action dilemma of 
stormwater management and financing has yet to be collectively agreed upon. 
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service area minimizes defection and incoordination risks, but arguably raises unfair division 
risks.  Member communities cannot defect from the NEORSD RSMP, and the geographic scope 
of the RSMP enables NEORSD to coordinate activities for the entire service area.  However, by 
requiring member communities to collectively finance regional projects, the NEORSD RSMP 
raises unfair division risks for at least some member communities.  By contrast with the 
NEORSD RSMP, the more limited scope and voluntary nature of participation in HCSWD result 
in relatively higher defection and incoordination risks, but also lower unfair division risks.  As 
acutely illustrated by the relatively recent defection of the City of Cincinnati, cities and villages 
participating in HCSWD can choose to defect at any time.  The obligatory participation of 
townships, however, sets somewhat of an upper bound on the defection risks in HCSWD. 
Compared with the broader, more capital-intensive focus of the NEORSD RSMP, the 
more limited scope of HCSWD – which focuses almost entirely on MS4 permit administration – 
raises incoordination risks and defection risks, but also lowers transaction costs.  However, the 
more limited scope of HCSWD also likely substantially limits the collective benefits that can be 
achieved compared with the NEORSD RSMP.  A more expansive programmatic scope may 
enable the NEORSD RSMP to realize greater collective benefits compared with HCSWD, but 
the NEORSD RSMP has also incurred substantial transaction costs, including the nearly six 
years of litigation over the program and associated stormwater fee, which can be viewed as 
manifestations of bargaining and enforcement costs.  In these respects, the NEORSD and 
HCSWD cases suggest that institutional collective action – at least with respect to stormwater 
management and finance – may involve a district set of tradeoffs between certain collaboration 
risks and transaction costs:  lowering unfair division risks, bargaining costs, and enforcement 
costs may incur higher defection and incoordination risks. 
In addition to making the benefits of institutional collective action largely comparable 
across the three cases, the cross-case similarities of highly fragmented, diverse metropolitan 
regions with substantial hydrologic and hydraulic interdependencies also make the cases fairly 
similar in two key sources of collaboration risk identified by the institutional collective action 
framework:  the specific nature of the underlying institutional collective action dilemma of 
stormwater management and financing; and the distribution preferences within and across the 
jurisdictions affected by this dilemma.  As such, the institutional collective action framework 
suggests that the key source of collaboration risk responsible for the different mitigating 
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mechanisms (i.e., the different stormwater fee forms) in each case must lie in the third source of 
collaboration risk identified by the framework:  the higher-level rules, local political institutions, 
and existing mitigating mechanisms in place. 
Together with my research into stormwater fee diffusion, my case study of the 
ALCOSAN service area strongly suggests that higher-level rules – namely state laws – largely 
explain why local governments have only recently started to enact stormwater fees in 
Pennsylvania.  The previous lack of clarity in state law about the power of local governments to 
assess stormwater fees seems to at least partly explain why no collective stormwater fee has yet 
emerged in the ALCOSAN service area.131  Even though HCSWD and NEORSD were 
incorporated under different chapters of the Ohio Revised Code,132 state law authorizes both 
organizations to assess fees.  Thus, the different forms of stormwater fees observed in HCSWD 
and NEORSD seem to have been determined more by differences in the local political 
institutions and pre-existing mitigating mechanisms between the two regions.  Particularly 
through the RIDE Study, NEORSD – which can be seen as a pre-existing mitigating mechanism 
for institutional collective action dilemmas related to sanitary sewerage – had been focusing 
more on stormwater leading up to the formation of the RSMP.  In contrast, MSDGC – the pre-
existing regional sanitary sewer district in the Cincinnati metropolitan region – did not drive the 
collective effort to finance stormwater management in southwest Ohio.  Rather, the collective 
efforts in the MSDGC service area were more animated by the Hamilton County government in 
collaboration with subcounty governments.  Much of the initial discussions leading to the 
formation of HCSWD concerned the appropriate scope of the program.  While there was general 
agreement on the benefits of collectively managing MS4 permit requirements, agreement could 
not be reached on expanding the collective stormwater effort more broadly to focus on issues 
like flood abatement and CSOs. 
                                                 
131 At least one collective stormwater fee has recently been enacted in Pennsylvania:  the Wyoming Valley 
Sanitary Authority recently enacted a stormwater fee involving more than 30 general-purpose subcounty 
governments in Luzerne County. 
 
132 Within Title 61 (Water Supply, Sanitation, Ditches) of the Ohio Revised Code, HCSWD was 
incorporated under Chapter 6117 (Sewer Districts, County Sewers) while NEORSD was incorporated under Chapter 
6119 (Regional Water and Sewer Districts). 
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Further insights into variations in stormwater fee form as seen through the lens of the 
institutional collective action framework can be gleaned by considering my hypotheses on 
stormwater fee forms. 
4.4.1 Hypotheses on stormwater fee form 
My case studies of stormwater fees in the MSDGC, NEORSD, and ALCOSAN service areas 
offer qualified support for my hypotheses about stormwater fee forms. 
 
form hypothesis 1: 
Collective stormwater fees in the United States formed and endured only by coercion 
from a higher level of government. 
 
While higher-level legislation and judicial decisions were certainly critical in the 
endurance of the NEORSD stormwater fee, the HCSWD stormwater fee illustrates that collective 
stormwater fees can form and endure on a largely voluntary basis.  That said, the fact that Ohio 
state law effectively compels townships to participate in HCSWD should not be overlooked.  
The assured participation of townships in HCSWD provides some guard against defection risk 
reaching a critical threshold for the collective HCSWD enterprise. 
 
form hypothesis 2: 
General-purpose, subcounty governments typically enact stormwater fees independently 
because the transaction costs – particularly negotiation costs associated with a larger 
number of more diverse actors – and defection risks preclude collective action to enact a 
collective stormwater fee, and because stormwater provides the opportunity for easy 
downstream cost externalization. 
 
The ALCOSAN case study provides strong evidence that several types of transaction 
costs – including information costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costs, and external decision 
costs – present barriers to collective action on stormwater management and financing.  Some of 
the information costs associated with instituting a collective approach to stormwater 
management and financing in the ALCOSAN service area have already been absorbed by 
various organizations, including ALCOSAN, that have already taken on a lot of the costs 
associated with studying and prioritizing cost-effective projects for alleviating wet weather 
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issues on a regional basis.  The group of entities collaborating in the Saw Mill Run watershed 
have absorbed similar informational costs in identifying and prioritizing projects in that 
watershed.  Other organizations, such as 3 Rivers Wet Weather, have also taken on substantial 
informational costs towards a collective approach to stormwater management and finance in the 
Pittsburgh region: 
 
“One of the things that helped was 3 Rivers Wet Weather, they did some pretty good 
mapping, and they’ve divided the county into drainage basins:  both stormwater drainage 
basins and sanitary sewer drain basins.  So, that kind of gives you a footprint for where 
you could have sub-authorities...” 
 
Shaler Township 
Township Manager 
 
For a collective approach to stormwater management and financing to take shape in the 
ALCOSAN service area, significant negotiation costs and concerns about external decision costs 
have yet to be resolved: 
 
“In theory, I think that’s probably the way I would like to see it, but – in reality – it’s 
difficult to get them all to agree on a cost share.  Should Baldwin pay the same amount or 
percentage as Castle Shannon when Castle Shannon borders both sides of the stream for a 
mile and a half and Baldwin is only up here on the hill and just has a small tributary 
trickle down to it or something?  So, it’s difficult to get everybody to feel good about 
their share because everybody has an idea of what their share should be.” 
 
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
Sustainability Manager 
 
As noted previously, there also seem to be substantial concerns from the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection regarding added enforcement costs that may arise from 
instituting some sort of collective MS4 permit administration, specifically regarding 
enforceability of permit conditions on potential free riders within the collective. 
With respect to cost externalization, the hydrologically and politically fragmented nature 
of many metropolitan regions – including my three case studies into stormwater fee form – make 
them rife with opportunities for individual local governments to externalize stormwater costs 
onto downstream neighbors.  My case studies suggest that a broadly scoped collective action to 
finance stormwater management (e.g., the NEORSD RSMP) may necessitate coercive mandate 
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to overcome the significant transaction costs associated with negotiating and enforcing such an 
institution.  My case studies also suggest that a more limited institutional scope (e.g., HCSWD) 
may enable a more voluntary, self-organized institution, but that such an institution can be 
subject to higher defection and incoordination risks, and may also be able to realize a lower level 
of collective benefits. 
4.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research into stormwater fee forms can build on my research in at least two ways.  First, 
inquiring into other cases where collective stormwater fees have or have not formed will help 
test the external validity of my findings.  Second, applying other theoretical frameworks – such 
as the local public economy framework (Oakerson & Parks, 2011) or the ecology of games 
framework (Lubell, 2013) – to case studies of stormwater fee from may qualify or complement 
the insights generated using the institutional collective action framework in my case studies. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation inquired into why local governments in the United States enacted stormwater 
fees in certain places, at certain times, and in certain forms.  My inquiries into the emergence, 
diffusion, and form of stormwater fees in the United States showed that federal regulation of 
stormwater and sewer systems may not have been relevant factors in the emergence of the 
nation’s first stormwater fee enacted in Billings, Montana in 1964, but increasingly stringent and 
widespread regulation of these infrastructure systems has strongly influenced the diffusion and 
form of stormwater fees across the country over the past 25 years.  More specifically, the 
diffusion and form branches of this research strongly suggest that the Phase 1 and Phase 2 MS4 
regulations have been major drivers of stormwater fee enactment by local governments in many 
parts of the country since 1990.  However, my research into the emergence, diffusion, and form 
of stormwater fees also underscores that state-specific factors (e.g., statutory law, case law, 
approaches to permit administration) can either promote or preclude the enactment of stormwater 
fees by individual local governments, and can either enable or enjoin stormwater fees involving 
multiple local governments.  Additionally, all three branches of this research suggest an 
important role for private actors – particularly consulting firms and professional industry 
associations – in seeding and spreading the stormwater fee policy among local governments 
across the United States.  Furthermore, my case studies of stormwater fee form suggest that the 
challenges to broadly scoped collective action characterizing stormwater management and 
finance in highly fragmented metropolitan regions may present transaction cost barriers too high 
to be surmounted without coercive intervention from a higher level of government, but that 
collective action of more limited scope can be achieved in relatively self-organized manner.  My 
research also shows that the concerns about unfair division risks – about who benefits and who 
pays – that permeated the debate over the appropriate form of the first stormwater fee in the 
nation more than 50 years ago continue to shape debates about stormwater fee forms today. 
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5.1 PRAXIS 
As noted in Chapter 1, this research advances the existing literature on stormwater fees in the 
United States in at least four key ways.  First, my novel case study of the stormwater fee enacted 
in Billings, Montana in 1964 clarifies why, how, and under what conditions the first stormwater 
fee in the United States was enacted.  The Billings case identifies several important issues and 
themes that continue to characterize stormwater fee debates and deliberations today:  the 
importance of state statutory law and case law; arguments about the distribution of costs and 
benefits; and the influence of private companies.  Second, the dataset and analyses in the 
diffusion branch of this research represent substantial advances in the study of how, why, and 
under what conditions stormwater fees spread among local governments across the United States 
over the past half-century.  More specifically, by incorporating an array of political, geographic, 
and demographic data, and by extending to the full population of general-purpose local 
governments rather than only those that have enacted stormwater fees, my diffusion dataset and 
analyses significantly extend and advance the scant existing research (i.e., Kea, Dymond, and 
Campbell 2016) systematically and rigorously analyzing drivers of stormwater fee diffusion in 
the United States.  Third, by contributing structured analyses of factors facilitating or inhibiting 
the formation and endurance of multi-jurisdictional stormwater fees, the form branch of this 
dissertation substantially extends the relatively limited subset of existing research into multi-
jurisdictional stormwater fees. 
The fourth way this research advances existing literature on stormwater fees is by 
structuring inquiries into stormwater fee phenomena according to various theoretical frameworks 
of public policy processes.  In this respect, my research represents an initial step towards more 
structured, consistent, and comparable stormwater fee research.  This theoretical framing of 
stormwater fee research is crucial for discerning key causal mechanisms and contextual factors 
shaping stormwater fee policy outcomes across states, regions, and localities.  As such, the 
theoretically structured research presented in this dissertation complements the extensive 
inductively derived principles, strategies, best practices, and learned lessons in existing 
stormwater fee literature. 
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5.2 THEORY 
This dissertation also contributes in several ways to the theoretical frameworks used to structure 
and frame my inquiries. 
The emergence branch of this research indicates strong correspondence between some 
aspects of the collective learning framework and the multiple streams framework, particularly 
with respect to the salience of norms and values along with exogenous focusing events on the 
processes of policy emergence.  However, my emergence case study also suggests that the 
collective learning framework may have limited utility in historical case studies where much of 
the evidence for the kinds of learning processes at the core of the framework is not readily 
available.  In contrast, my emergence case study further instantiates the versatility of the multiple 
streams framework, demonstrating the good fit of the framework in a case study of a novel 
policy (i.e., stormwater fees) at the local level. 
By exploring the diffusion of the stormwater fee policy among local governments, the 
diffusion branch of this research extends the fairly limited body of existing research investigating 
policy diffusion among local governments (e.g., Krause 2011).  My research clearly indicates the 
importance of coercive diffusion of stormwater fees among local governments in the United 
States, particularly related to federal regulation of MS4s.  However, by demonstrating the 
salience of state-specific factors, my research also identifies a key gap in policy diffusion theory 
regarding concepts and mechanisms focused on how state-specific factors can modulate federal 
influences on policy diffusion among local governments.  My research also suggests that 
learning diffusion – often mediated by consulting firms and industry associations acting as key 
go-betweens – has played an important role in the spread of stormwater fees across the United 
States.  This research also points to several internal local determinants of stormwater fee 
diffusion, including local government type and land use characteristics.  Moreover, by 
combining quantitative analyses of a large, unprecedented dataset with detailed qualitative case 
studies of stormwater fee emergence and form, this research provided more finely resolved 
analyses of the mechanisms driving stormwater fee diffusion among local governments in the 
United States. 
My inquiries into stormwater fee form contribute to the development of the institutional 
collective action framework by extending application of the framework into a new policy arena 
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(i.e., stormwater management and financing in jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan regions).  
My case studies of stormwater fee form suggest widespread recognition of the benefits of 
collective action in stormwater management and finance in hydrologically interconnected and 
politically fragmented metropolitan regions.  However, this research also indicates that several 
concepts posited by the institutional collective action framework present substantial barriers to 
collective action on stormwater management and finance in jurisdictionally fragmented, 
hydrologically interdependent metropolitan regions:  abundant opportunities for externalization 
of stormwater flows and associated costs; significant informational, coordination, and external 
decision costs; and unfair division risks.  My research also indicates broad recognition that 
vertical relationships among levels of government are central to navigating the substantial 
challenges of institutional fragmentation in stormwater management and financing in 
hydrologically interconnected metropolitan regions.  Moreover, application of the institutional 
collective framework to my case studies of stormwater fee form suggests that state laws, local 
political institutions, and existing mitigating mechanisms play a key role in shaping the 
collaboration risks involved in collective action for stormwater management and finance in 
hydrologically interconnected, institutionally fragmented metropolitan regions.  Finally, my case 
studies of stormwater fee form suggest that mechanisms mitigating collective action dilemmas of 
stormwater management and finance in hydrologically interconnected, jurisdictionally 
fragmented regions involve a distinct set of tradeoffs:  more broadly scoped mitigating 
mechanisms may have to incur higher bargaining and enforcement costs and expose participants 
to higher unfair division risks in order to realize greater collective benefits and to minimize 
defection and incoordination risks. 
All three branches of my research into stormwater fee phenomena emphasize the central 
role that vertical relationships among levels of government play in shaping stormwater fee policy 
outcomes in the federalist system of government in the United States.  Federal legislation – often 
mediated by state agencies – has strongly influenced stormwater fee diffusion.  State statutes and 
case law have moderated the effect of federal legislation on stormwater fee diffusion and 
influenced stormwater fee form.  Regional and county institutions have also crucially shaped the 
incentives for the formation and endurance of multi-jurisdictional stormwater fees. 
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5.3 SUMMARY 
Having spread from Billings, Montana in 1964 to at least 1,600 communities across 40 states in 
2017, stormwater fees are now a firmly established American institution.  As local governments 
across the country continue to face significant infrastructure investments required by 
increasingly stringent federal and state regulations of stormwater and combined sewer systems, 
the appeal of stormwater fees as relatively equitable and reliable financing mechanisms seems 
unlikely to diminish.  I hope this research will help citizens, consultants, and public decision-
makers in cities, counties, towns, boroughs, villages, metropolitan sewer districts, and other 
special-purpose districts across the United States better understand, design, and debate 
stormwater fees in their communities. 
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APPENDIX A 
EMERGENCE 
A.1 EVIDENCE CODING FRAMEWORKS 
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Figure A.1. Coding framework for the multiple streams framework. 
 
 
Figure A.2.  Coding framework for the collective learning framework. 
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A.2 EVIDENCE IMAGES 
 
 
 
Figure A.3.  Excerpts from the 27 Jul 1964 regular meeting minutes of the Billings city council. 
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Figure A.4.  “City Aldermen Give Okay To Sewer Rates, Charges” 
by Sam Blythe in the Billings Gazette (28 Jul 1964, p. 2). 
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Figure A.5.  “COUNCIL SETS RATES, CHARGES AND RENTALS 
TO PAY FOR $4 MILLION DOLLAR STORM SEWER” 
in the Billings Times (30 Jul 1964, p. 1).
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Figure A.6.  “NOTICE OF SPECIAL ELECTION CITY OF BILLINGS, MONTANA” 
in the Billings Times (14 May 1964, p. 5).  This same notice also ran in the Times 21 May 1964 (p. 5) and 28 May 1964 (p. 3).
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Figure A.7.  “Bond Issues Appear To Make Clean Sweep” 
in the Billings Gazette (03 Jun 1964, p. 2L). 
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Figure A.8.  “Primary Ballots Could Be 203,000” 
in the Billings Gazette (13 May 1964, p. 11).
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Figure A.9.  “Why Vote for New Storm Sewers” 
by Sam Blythe in the Billings Gazette (19 May 1964, p. 16L).
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Figure A.10.  “HEARING SET IN AIRPORT MANAGER DISMISSAL CASE” 
in the Billings Times (25 Jun 1964, p. 4 continued from p. 1). 
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Figure A.11.  “Absentee Voters Cast Bond Ballots” 
in the Billings Gazette (23 May 1964, p. 9H). 
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Figure A.12.  Greater Billings Association’s full-page ad supporting bond issues 
in the Billings Gazette (Tuesday 26 May 1964, p. 11).  This same ad also ran 
in the Gazette Monday 01 June 1964 (p. 12), one day before the vote. 
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Figure A.13.  May 1964 Campaign Facts for Billings 
published by the League of Women Voters.
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Figure A.14.  “Mayor Sees Major Need for Sewers” 
in the Billings Gazette (20 May 1964, p. 2). 
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Figure A.15.  “Sewers Come Before Good Roads” 
by Sam Blythe in the Billings Gazette (22 May 1964, p. 12L). 
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Figure A.16.  “Vote ‘Yes’ on the Bond Issues” 
in the Billings Gazette (29 May 1964, p. 4)
 
 
Figure A.17.  “For a Better Billings” 
in the Billings Gazette (31 May 1964, p. 17).
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Figure A.18.  “Bond Issue Votes Please Officials” 
in the Billings Gazette (04 Jun 1964, p. 16). 
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Figure A.19.  “Payments End When Sewer Bonds Retired” 
by Sam Blythe in the Billings Gazette (29 May 1964, p. 3H). 
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Figure A.20.  “Rain Sends Creek Over Banks” 
in the Billings Gazette (12 May 1964, p. 3). 
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Figure A.21.  “Storm Leaves Road, Bridge Crews Busy” 
in the Billings Gazette (05 May 1964, p. 3).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.22.  “City’s Rainfall 3 Times Normal” 
in the Billings Gazette (11 May 1964, p. 2L).
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Figure A.23.  “Torrential Rains Hit Billings” 
in the Billings Gazette (30 May 1964, p. 1 and p. 5). 
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Figure A.24.  “Leak in a Ditch Undermines Road” 
by Billye Proctor in the Billings Gazette (29 May 1964, p. 7). 
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Figure A.25.  “City Streets–Or Puddles?” 
by Sam Blythe in the Billings Gazette (30 May 1964, p. 2). 
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Figure A.26.  “SOUTHEAST BILLINGS SLOUGH” 
caption on photo by Carl Kubo in the Billings Gazette (01 June 1964, p. 8L). 
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Figure A.27.  “Fraser’s Deciding Vote Stalls Sanitary Sewers” 
by Sam Blythe in the Billings Gazette (05 May 1964, p. 2L).
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Figure A.28.  “Commissioners Approve MSID” 
in the Billings Gazette (22 May 1964, p. 17L). 
 
 
Figure A.29.  “Sanitary Sewer Suit Still On” 
in the Billings Gazette (29 May 1964, p. 6H).
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Figure A.30.  “Group May Protest Charges For $4 Million Bond Issue” 
in the Billings Gazette (08 Oct 1964, p. 11).
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A.3 ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE CODING RESULTS 
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Figure A.31.  Dendrogram of coded concepts for the emergence case study.  Concepts clustered by Pearson correlation coefficient based on number of times 
each concept was coded to each piece of evidence.  Grey highlighting indicates concepts from the collective learning framework. 
Numbers indicate the number of times each concept was coded across all evidence. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
- - - - - - 1 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 2 
- - - 4 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 15 
- - - - - - - - 14 
- - 14 
 
201 
APPENDIX B 
DIFFUSION 
B.1 DATA FOUNDATION 
I created the foundation of my diffusion dataset by merging together three TIGER/Line 
shapefiles from the United States Census Bureau:  (1) county subdivisions, (2) places, and (3) 
counties.133,134  The Census Bureau distinguishes between places and county subdivisions in that 
places are generally population-based areas including boroughs, cities, and villages, whereas 
county subdivisions geographically defined areas, primarily townships (United States Census 
Bureau, 2013).  From this merged shapefile, I selected only those records indicated as being 
legally valid.135  Next, I deleted certain redundant records associated with consolidated city-
county governments, such as the City of Indianapolis / Marion County in Indiana.136 
                                                 
133 All three shapefiles were 2014 edition. 
 
134 I also merged in Washington, D.C. from the state shapefile. 
 
135 I based my definition of legally valid records on two data fields defined by the Census Bureau:  
legal/statistical area description (LSAD) codes; and functional status (funcstat) codes. 
 
136 For each pair of records associated with consolidated city-county governments, I deleted the less 
geographically expansive record, generally representing the city. 
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B.2 DATA ATTRIBUTES 
The attributes I added to the merged and pruned Census Bureau shapefiles were derived from six 
other national datasets (Table B.1):  (1) the National Land Cover Database (NLCD); (2) the 
urbanized area shapefiles from the Census Bureau; (3) various demographic, housing stock, and 
income data from the Census Bureau 2016 American Community Survey and 2010 Census; (4) a 
dataset on regulated MS4s from USEPA;137 (5) a publicly available dataset of permitted CSOs; 
and (6) the 2017 Western Kentucky University Stormwater Utility Survey (Campbell et al., 
2017). 
From the NLCD, I used GIS software to calculate the percentage of each land use 
recorded in the dataset for each polygon in the foundation shapefile.  I calculated these percent 
land use attributes based on the 2011 and 1992 editions of the NLCD.  I also calculated the 
change in percent land use between 2011 and 1992 for each polygon in the foundation shapefile. 
Similarly, for each polygon in the foundation shapefile, I used the urbanized area 
shapefiles from the Census Bureau – both 2000 and 2010 editions – to calculate the percent 
urbanized area for each polygon in the foundation dataset. 
Data from the 2010 Census and the 2016 American Community Survey were easily 
joined with the foundation shapefile based on a common unique identifier field (GEOID).  An 
important consideration with the population data has to do with overlapping jurisdictions.  For 
example, the population data indicate a population of 34,200 for Silver Bow County, Montana.  
There is only one legally recognized, general-purpose subcounty government in Silver Bow 
County:  the Town of Walkerville, which has a population of 675.  Because the jurisdiction of 
Silver Bow County overlaps the Town of Walkerville, the 675 people in Walkerville are counted 
in the population data for the town and in the population data for the county.  This “double 
counting” of population is fairly minimal in places like Silver Bow County where the population 
in overlapped jurisdictions represents a very small proportion of the total population (e.g., in 
many western and southern states where large proportions of land and population are 
unincorporated by subcounty governments).  Population double counting becomes more 
pronounced in areas where most or all land and population are incorporated by subcounty 
                                                 
137 Holly Galavotti, USEPA Office of Wastewater Management 
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governments.  For instance, the population data indicate the population of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania as 1,223,348.  However, nearly all of the land and population in Allegheny County 
is incorporated in subcounty governments, and the population of Allegheny County is simply the 
sum of the population of the 130 subcounty governments in the county.  As a result, the 
population data count the people living in Allegheny County twice:  once as residents of their 
respective subcounty jurisdictions and once as residents of the county.  This double counting also 
applies to the land area data:  summing all the land area in my diffusion dataset results in a sum 
greater than the total land area of the contiguous United States due to jurisdictional overlap in 
many regions.  Because some county and special-district governments enact stormwater fees 
involving all or some of the subcounty governments they encompass, this “double counting” of 
population and land area associated with jurisdictional overlap are not necessarily problematic 
for purposes of this research.  That said, issues of jurisdictional overlap do merit awareness and 
discussion as pertains to my research and other research on stormwater fees.  As discussed 
further below in relation to special-district stormwater fees, future research can build on my 
research by further assessing and accounting for aspects of jurisdictional overlap related to 
stormwater fees.  The median household income data from the 2016 American Community 
Survey and the 2010 Census contained a substantial number of missing values (i.e., more than 
5,000).  Due to the relatively large proportion of missing values, I did not use the median 
household income data in the regression analyses. 
I joined the regulated MS4 and permitted CSO datasets to the records in the foundation 
dataset by matching state, name, and government type (e.g., city, county, village).  Due to some 
ambiguities in the regulated MS4 and permitted CSO data (e.g., two distinct records with the 
same state, name, and government type), I reviewed several dozen records individually to make 
sure records were appropriately matched to the foundation dataset.  While the vast majority of 
records in the regulated MS4 database could be unambigously matched with records in the 
foundation shapefile, 265 records in the regulated MS4 data could not be matched due to 
ambiguity.  For example, there were multiple records in the regulated MS4 data for Washington 
Township in Pennsylvania.  It was impossible to disambiguate these records and accurately 
match them with the multiple Washington Township, Pennsylvania records in the foundation 
shapefile without further information (e.g., knowing the county for each record in the regulated 
MS4 data).  The ambigous records in the regulated MS4 data were mostly townships (220 
204 
townships) in seven states – mostly in Pennsylvania (123 townships) and Ohio (60 townships) – 
along with towns (20 towns) in five states – mostly in Wisconsin (13 towns).  In instances where 
CSO permits are held by special-purpose districts, I associated the permitted CSO data with the 
general-purpose local government where the CSO permittee was predominately located.  For 
instance, I associated the ALCOSAN CSO permit data with the City of Pittsburgh.  This 
approach to the permitted CSO data provdies a reasonable indication of which general-purpose 
local governments are served by combined sewer systems, which was my primary interest in 
incorporating the permitted CSO data.  However, future research in stormwater fee diffusion 
may want to consider alternative ways of incorporating CSO data. 
I used a similar process for matching records from the 2017 Western Kentucky 
University Stormwater Utiltiy Survey (Campbell et al., 2017) as I did for the regulated MS4 and 
permitted CSO data:  matching unambigous records based on state and name, then reviewing and 
resolving any remaining ambigous records individually.  Some records in the 2017 Western 
Kentucky Univesity Stormwater Utility Survey (Campbell et al., 2017) represented special-
district governments, which I address in greater detail in the following section. 
 
205 
Table B.1.  Variables used in diffusion regression analyses. 
category name description/formula units source/basis (year) notes 
jurisdiction 
geometry 
land area   square miles Census Tiger (2014) 
NLCD (2011) 
polygons from Census Tiger (2014) 
land area (excluding water) from NLCD (2011) 
perimeter   miles Census Tiger (2014)   
border complexity perimeter / (2 * (π * area)0.5)  dimensionless Census Tiger (2014) see below for further details 
regulatory 
status  
  
# CSO discharges number of permitted CSO discharges   USEPA (2018) implemented as a binary variable for state-
specific enactment sequence regression 
MS4 phase MS4 regulation phase   USEPA (2018)   
demographics 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
population total population human beings Census (2010, 2016)   
population density total population divided by land area human beings 
per square mile 
Census (2010, 2016) 
NLCD (2011) 
  
median age   years Census (2010, 2016)   
% white percent of population identifying 
racially as white 
  Census (2010, 2016)   
% black percent of population identifying 
racially as black 
  Census (2010, 2016)   
% not white and not black         
racial diversity standard deviation 
across all % racial identities 
  Census (2010, 2016) white, black, native, asian, island, two or more, 
latino 
land use 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
% developed percent developed land use   NLCD (2011, 1992) includes low, medium, and high intensity 
developed use, but not open space developed 
use 
% forest     NLCD (2011, 1992) includes deciduous, coniferous, and mixed use 
% deciduous     NLCD (2011, 1992) subset of % forest 
% agriculture     NLCD (2011, 1992)   
% wetland     NLCD (2011, 1992)   
land use diversity standard deviation across all % land 
uses 
dimensionless NLCD (2011, 1992)   
change in % [developed, forested, 
agricultural] land use (2011-1992) 
(% [developed, forested, agricultural] 
land use in 2011) - (% [developed, 
forested, agricultural] land use in 
1992) 
  NLCD (2011, 1992)   
demographics 
and land use 
  
% urbanized the Census Bureau defines 
geographic areas as "urbanized" 
based on population density and 
land use 
proportion Census (2010, 2000) I evaluated urbanized area based on the 
delineations from the 2010 census and 2000 
census, but I only used the 2010 delineations in 
the analyses presented here. 
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category name description/formula units source/basis (year) notes 
housing  
  
  
  
  
  
tenancy 
  
housing units % owner-occupied percent of occupied housing units 
occupied by owners (vs. renters) 
  Census (2010, 2016)   
housing units tenancy diversity standard deviation of (housing units 
% owner-occupied) and (housing 
units % renter-occupied) 
  Census (2010, 2016)   
vintage 
  
  
  
housing units % built before 1950     Census (2010, 2016)   
housing units % built after 1999     Census (2010, 2016)   
housing units newness index difference between (housing units % 
built after 1999) and (housing units 
% built before 1950) 
  Census (2010, 2016)   
housing unit vintage diversity standard deviation of (housing units 
% built after 1999) and (housing 
units % built before 1950) 
  Census (2010, 2016)   
value 
  
housing units median value median value of owner-occupied 
housing units 
dollars Census (2010, 2016)   
housing units % valued under/over [$]  percent of owner-occupied housing 
units valued over or under some 
amount 
 Census (2010, 2016) also implemented as differences (e.g., % valued 
over $300,000 minus % valued under $150,000) 
income median household income   dollars Census (2016)   
stormwater fee enactment year     Campbell et al. (2017)   
state state     Census Tiger (2014)   
local government type local government type     Census Tiger (2014)   
All geometry and % land use calculations executed under an Albers equal-area, conic projection for the contiguous United States (EPSG 102003).  NLDC refers 
to the National Land Cover Dataset.  Census (2016) records refer to 5-year esimates from the 2016 American Community Survey.  Census (2010, 2016) records 
indicate a combination of data from the 2010 decennial census and 5-year estimates from the 2016 American Community Survey.  All % metrics implemented 
as proportions (i.e., 50.0% = 0.500). 
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B.2.1 Jurisdictional considerations 
The geographic jurisdictions of some stormwater fees recorded by Campbell et al. (2017) – 
especially some of the special-district fees – do not align exactly with the boundaries of general-
purpose local government units.  For example, in the southeastern suburbs of Denver, Colorado, 
the jurisdiction of the Southeast Metro Stormwater Authority includes all of the City of 
Centennial, plus the developed areas of unincorporated Arapahoe County, and small portions of 
unincorporated Douglas County (Figure B.1).  For local governments where only part of the 
jurisdiction was assessed a stormwater fee, I considered the entire jurisdiction as having a 
stormwater fee rather than breaking up these jurisdictions into separate records corresponding to 
which parts of the jurisdiction are subject to a stormwater fee.  For example, since parts of 
unincorporated Arapahoe and Douglas counties in Colorado are subject to the Southeast Metro 
Stormwater Authority stormwater fee, in my diffusion dataset, Arapahoe and Douglas counties 
are considered to have stormwater fees. 
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Figure B.1.  Service area of the Southeast Metro Stormwater Authority in Colorado. 
Arapahoe County and Douglas County labeled along with nearby cities, towns, and villages.  Also shows land use [2011 National Land Cover Dataset].  
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.]
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Another jurisdictional issue with special-district stormwater fees has to do with local 
governments that are part of a special-district stormwater fee, but also have their own stormwater 
fees.  For example, the jurisdiction of the Long Creek Watershed Management District includes 
small portions of three cities (i.e., Portland, South Portland, Westbrook), plus a sliver of one 
town (i.e., Scarborough) in southern Maine.  However, the City of Portland also enacted its own 
city-specific stormwater fee subsequent to the enactment of the Long Creek Watershed 
Management District stormwater fee.138,139  Campbell et al. (2017) document the enactment year 
for the Long Creek Watershed Management District stormwater fee as 2010, and include a 
separate stormwater fee record without an enactment year for the City of Portland.  In my 
diffusion dataset, I associated the attributes (e.g., enactment year) of the Long Creek Watershed 
Management District with South Portland and Westbrook, but not with Portland, which I 
associated only with the Portland record from Campbell et al. (2017). 
A similar situation exists with the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District, which 
began assessing a stormwater fee – technically a “maintenance assessment” – in 2008 on roughly 
750,000 parcels across all or parts of 381 local governments in eastern Ohio.  Campbell et al. 
(2017) do not record an enactment year for the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District 
stormwater fee, but do record various enactment years – ranging from 1985 to 2013 – for nine 
local governments140 included in the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District.  I handled 
these records in the same way as I the records associated with the Long Creek Watershed 
Management District:  associating attributes recorded by Campbell et al. (2017) for the special-
district stormwater fee only with any relevant local governments records that did not also have 
an individual stormwater fee also recorded by Campbell et al. (2017). 
While the partial-jurisdiction issues associated with special-district stormwater fees 
appear to be extremely rare, future research may benefit by assessing and accounting 
jurisdictional issues in a more detailed and nuanced manner.  Similarly, future research may 
                                                 
138 Although the enactment year was not recorded by Campbell et al. (2017), the City of Portland’s website 
indicates the city’s stormwater fee was enacted 21 January 2015. 
 
139 The credit manual for Portland’s stormwater fee indicates that property owners can receive up to 100% 
credit against the city stormwater fee for stormwater fees paid to the Long Creek Watershed Management District. 
 
140 These nine local governments are:  the cities of Wooster (Wayne County, 1985), Zanesville 
(Muskingum County, 1987), Newark (Licking County, 2005), Louisville (Stark County, 2005), Ashland (Ashland 
County, 2006), Barberton (Summit County, 2006), Massillon (Stark County, 2010), and Coshocton (Coshocton 
County, 2010); as well as the Village of Buckeye Lake (Fairfield/Licking counties, 2013). 
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benefit from more detailed accounting of jurisdictional extents even for some stormwater fees 
implemented by individual local governments.  As noted in Chapter 3, some stormwater fees 
enacted by individual county governments only apply to certain areas (e.g., unincorporated 
areas) within the county.  For purposes of this research, if a county was recorded by Campbell et 
al. (2017) as having enacted a stormwater fee, I considered the fee applicable to the entire 
county.  In at least one case, a stormwater fee was enacted on a subdivision scale.  At the request 
of the Homeowners Association of Miami Trails Subdivision, located in Miami Township in 
northwestern Clermont County, Ohio, the county commissioners created a stormwater district 
and associated stormwater fee encompassing the lots in that specific subdivision.  Future 
research could improve upon my diffusion dataset by better accounting for these jurisdictional 
nuances. 
B.2.2 Border complexity 
I used the following formula to calculate the border complexity metric: 
 
border complexity = perimeter / (2 * (π * area)0.5)  
 
The relationship between the area and border complexity among local governments in the 
contiguous United States varies notably by local government type (Figure B.2).  The vast 
majority of the largest local governments (i.e., those with jurisdictions of 250 square miles or 
more) are parish, county, or consolidated city-county governments, which tend to have fairly low 
border complexity (i.e., generally less than two) (Figure B.2).  Local governments with 
jurisdictions between 10 square miles and 100 square miles and border complexity less than two 
are mostly townships (Figure B.2) in several midwestern states (e.g., Minnesota, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Ohio, Kansas, Michigan, Indiana, South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Missouri), along with towns (Figure B.2) in Wisconsin, New York, and several New England 
states (e.g., Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island).  
Smaller local governments with low border complexity (i.e., those with jurisdictions less than ten 
square miles and border complexity less than two) are largely boroughs, cities, and villages, 
along with towns (Figure B.2) in several southern and midwestern states.  Local governments 
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with more complex borders (i.e., border complexity greater than 2.5) are mostly cities (Figure 
B.2) in California and several southern and midwestern states (e.g., Texas, Illinois, Georgia, 
Missouri, Florida, Ohio, Alabama, Kentucky, Kansas, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, 
Arkansas, Minnesota), along with many villages in Illinois and towns in North Carolina. 
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Figure B.2.  Scatterplot of border complexity vs. land area for legally valid, general-purpose governments in the 
United States.  Symbols correspond to government type:  township (black dot); city (blue dot); town (green dot); 
village (orange dot); county (purple dot); parish (light purple dot); borough (red dot); charter township (grey 
square); plantation (grey triangle); city-county (grey diamond); and municipality (grey circle).  Locally weighted 
smoothing curve shown in dark grey.  Both axes log scaled. 
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The lowest possible value for the border complexity metric is one, which indicates a 
perfect circle.  Perhaps surprisingly, many local governments in the United States have circular 
jurisdictions, such as the City of Eatonton in Putnam County, Georgia (Figure B.3).  Local 
governments with circular jurisdictions are mostly cities and towns located in the southern states 
of Georgia (71), South Carolina (29), North Carolina (15), Kentucky (7), and Alabama (4).  
Local governments with approximately square jurisdictions also have fairly low border 
complexity.  In fact, for a perfect square, the border complexity metric takes a value of 1.13.  
Border complexity increases, however, in cases like Granville Township in McHenry County, 
North Dakota, which is almost a perfect six-mile square, but with a small “hole” (i.e., the City of 
Granville) in the northwest portion of the township (Figure B.4).  Border complexity also 
increases for local governments that border waterways or waterbodies, such as Goodhue County 
in southeastern Minnesota, where the county borders are mostly rectilinear excepting the 
irregular northeastern border along the Mississippi River (Figure B.5).  Extreme high values of 
border complexity (i.e., over ten) are observed for local governments with long, thin stretches of 
jurisdiction along roads, waterways, or other relatively thin features.  For example, the City of 
Alvin in Brazoria County, Texas has a border complexity of 19.8 because the city borders follow 
several waterways and drainage features (Figure B.6), such as the Austin Bayou. 
Local governments in some states tend to have less complex borders than other states 
(Figure B.7, Figure B.8).  States with the lowest average local government border complexity 
include North Dakota (Figure B.9), South Dakota, Michigan, New York, and the New England 
states of Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island (Figure B.7, Figure B.8).  
States with highest average local government border complexity are the southern states of 
Alabama (Figure B.10), North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Tennessee, along with 
Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Arizona (Figure B.7, Figure B.8).  In many states, local 
government borders are more complex in metropolitan regions around larger cities.  For instance, 
in Alabama, local government borders are particularly complex around Birmingham, Tuscaloosa, 
Montgomery, and Huntsville (Figure B.10). 
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Figure B.3.  Jurisdiction of the City of Eatonton in Putnam County, Georgia 
(land area = 20.4 square miles; perimeter = 16.1 miles; border complexity = 1). 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.  World imagery basemap courtesy of ESRI.] 
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Figure B.4.  Jurisdiction of Granville Township in McHenry County, North Dakota 
(land area = 35.1 square miles; perimeter = 26.6 miles; border complexity = 1.25). 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.  World imagery basemap courtesy of ESRI.] 
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Figure B.5.  Jurisdiction of Goodhue County, Minnesota 
(land area = 751.6 square miles; perimeter = 145.1 miles; border complexity = 1.46). 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.  World imagery basemap courtesy of ESRI.] 
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Figure B.6.  Jurisdiction of the City of Alvin in Brazoria County, Texas 
(land area = 24.5 square miles; perimeter = 355.5 miles; border complexity = 19.8). 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.  World imagery basemap courtesy of ESRI.] 
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Figure B.7.  Box-and-whisker plot of border complexity by state, with states ordered by longitude of centroid.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) 
values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes).  Y-axis truncated to maximum value of ten. 
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Figure B.8.  Box-and-whisker plot of border complexity by state, with states ordered by latitude of centroid.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) 
values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes).  Y-axis truncated to maximum value of ten. 
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Figure B.9.  Local government boundaries in North Dakota. 
Also shows land use [2011 National Land Cover Dataset]. 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.] 
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Figure B.10.  Local government boundaries in Alabama. 
Also shows land use [2011 National Land Cover Dataset]. 
[Jurisdiction boundary source is United States Census Bureau 2014 TIGER/Line shapefiles.]
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B.3 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR EXPLORATORY ANALYSES 
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Table B.2.  Number of new stormwater fees by state and decade. 
STATE 1970- 1979 
1980- 
1989 
1990- 
1999 
2000- 
2009 
2010- 
2017 
total 
# w/ year # w/o year # overall % w/ year 
AL 
   
1 1 2 2 4 50.0 
AR 
   
1 
 
1 
 
1 100.0 
AZ 
  
1 3 2 6 
 
6 100.0 
CA 1 2 25 11 2 41 15 56 73.2 
CO 1 6 5 19 3 34 3 37 91.9 
DC 
     
0 1 1 0 
DE 
   
1 1 2 
 
2 100.0 
FL 
 
15 81 56 10 162 21 183 88.5 
GA 
  
3 27 13 43 16 59 72.9 
IA 
  
3 24 16 43 63 106 40.6 
ID 
   
2 1 3 1 4 75.0 
IL 
 
1 1 8 12 22 5 27 81.5 
IN 
  
4 25 10 39 41 80 48.8 
KS 
  
6 14 4 24 13 37 64.9 
KY 
 
1 2 7 1 11 
 
11 100.0 
MA 
  
1 3 5 9 
 
9 100.0 
MD 
  
1 3 12 16 1 17 94.1 
ME 
   
1 2 3 2 5 60.0 
MI 1 1 1 2 2 7 2 9 77.8 
MN 
 
15 42 76 8 141 56 197 71.6 
MO 
  
2 2 
 
4 
 
4 100.0 
MT 
 
2 
 
2 2 6 1 7 85.7 
NC 
  
6 22 10 38 37 75 50.7 
ND 
 
1 1 
  
2 2 4 50.0 
NM 
   
1
 
1 
 
1 100.0 
NV 
   
1 1 2 1 3 66.7 
NY 
    
1 1 
 
1 100.0 
OH 
 
6 14 57 14 91 15 106 85.8 
OK 
 
1 3 5 3 12 10 22 54.5 
OR 2 1 15 11 5 34 18 52 65.4 
PA 
    
10 10 2 12 83.3 
SC 
 
1 4 19 5 29 9 38 76.3 
SD 
 
1 1 1 
 
3 1 4 75.0 
TN 
  
1 14 8 23 4 27 85.2 
TX 
  
14 44 24 82 27 109 75.2 
UT 
 
1 4 13 7 25 11 36 69.4 
VA 
  
7 3 15 25 5 30 83.3 
VT 
   
2 2 4 
 
4 100.0 
WA 1 19 49 29 3 101 16 117 86.3 
WI 
  
14 80 14 108 17 125 86.4 
WV 
   
4 4 8 1 9 88.9 
SUM 6 74 311 594 233 1218 419 1637 74.4 
COUNT 5 16 28 37 35 41 32 41 
 SUM cumulative 6 80 391 985 1218  
   COUNT cumulative 5 16 29 38 40  
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Table B.3.  Area (square miles) under the jurisdiction of various types of local governments by state. 
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MT     50         247   147,040 147,040 297 99.8   
WY     115         210   97,813 97,813 325 99.7   
ID               669   83,569 83,569 669 99.2   
NM   178 117         809   121,590 121,590 1,104 99.1   
NV               1,144   110,415 110,572 1,144 99.0 0.1 
OR     7         1,029   98,379 98,379 1,035 98.9   
CO     518         1,410   103,906 104,094 1,928 98.1 0.2 
WV   11 108         334   24,230 24,230 453 98.1   
UT     510         1,644   84,898 84,898 2,154 97.5   
WA     47         1,842   71,298 71,298 1,889 97.4   
MD   1 176         281   12,314 12,406 458 96.3 0.7 
IA               2,162   56,273 56,273 2,162 96.2   
AZ     1,404         3,057   113,991 113,991 4,461 96.1   
MS   24 373         1,730   48,441 48,441 2,127 95.6   
TX   50 566         11,308   268,596 268,596 11,924 95.6   
AR     296         2,174   53,179 53,179 2,470 95.4   
KY               1,257 683 39,725 40,408 1,941 95.2 1.7 
CA     312         8,622   163,463 163,695 8,935 94.5 0.1 
OK     1,085         2,934   69,899 69,899 4,019 94.2   
SC     794         1,095   32,020 32,020 1,889 94.1   
DE   1 71         79   2,489 2,489 150 94.0   
VA     529         2,218   40,557 42,775 2,748 93.6 5.2 
NC   100 1,793         2,194   53,819 53,819 4,088 92.4   
GA     230         3,022 1,268 58,133 59,425 4,520 92.4 2.2 
LA   266 394         1,301 2,082 49,943 52,375 4,043 92.3 4.6 
FL   101 473         5,521   65,757 65,757 6,095 90.7   
TN     756         2,624 773 41,372 42,144 4,153 90.1 1.8 
AL     1,473         3,796   52,420 52,420 5,269 89.9   
NE   135   18,358       589   77,347 77,347 19,083 75.3   
MO   149 50 14,292       2,815   69,641 69,707 17,306 75.2 0.1 
SD   0 80 34,873       449   77,116 77,116 35,403 54.1   
ME     17,705       1,532 922   35,380 35,380 20,159 43.0   
MI   340   55,329 4,168     2,061   96,713 96,713 61,898 36.0   
ND       48,412       537   70,698 70,698 48,949 30.8   
MN       66,359       4,656   86,935 86,935 71,016 18.3   
MA     7,771         1,237   4,025 10,554 9,008 14.7 61.9 
WI   1,312 54,114         1,753   65,496 65,496 57,178 12.7   
KS       70,268       1,444 935 81,344 82,278 72,647 11.7 1.1 
NJ 729 8 89 6,554       480   8,723 8,723 7,860 9.9   
RI     1,271         146   0 1,545 1,417 8.3 100.0 
CT 26   4,617         467   0 5,544 5,110 7.8 100.0 
NH     8,199         476   9,349 9,349 8,676 7.2   
NY   1,058 49,438         1,117   54,087 54,555 51,613 5.4 0.9 
IL   2,273 41 50,316       2,300   57,914 57,914 54,931 5.1   
OH   865   39,581       3,056   44,826 44,826 43,501 3.0   
VT   50 9,296         81   9,616 9,616 9,426 2.0   
PA 1,431   5 43,147   68   482 143 45,912 46,054 45,276 1.7 0.3 
DC               68   0 68 68 0 100.0 
IN     817 36,081       1,405 368 36,017 36,420 38,671 -6.2 1.1 
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B.4 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR REGRESSION ANALYSES 
B.4.1 Which 
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Figure B.11.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation between local governments that have and have not enacted 
stormwater fees.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals 
around median values (yellow boxes).  Y-axes truncated for perimeter, border complexity, population, population density, % developed (2011-1992), median 
age, and housing unit median value to visually emphasize separation between distributions. 
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Table B.4.  Pearson correlation coefficients for continuous variables selected for regression analysis on binary stormwater fee enactment variable. 
Variables in grey text were eliminated due to high collinearity with other variables. 
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# CSO discharges 1                                         
perimeter 0.03 1                                       
border complexity 0.04 0.19 1                                     
population 0.31 0.31 0.05 1                                   
population density 0.16 -0.14 0.16 0.14 1                                 
% urbanized (2010) 0.10 -0.06 0.34 0.11 0.63 1                               
% urbanized (2000) 0.10 -0.07 0.29 0.11 0.64 0.95 1                             
% developed (2011) 0.10 -0.22 0.29 0.08 0.75 0.70 0.69 1                           
% agriculture (2011) -0.05 -0.02 -0.23 -0.07 -0.37 -0.44 -0.44 -0.49 1                         
% developed (1992) 0.09 -0.25 0.21 0.06 0.72 0.63 0.65 0.88 -0.50 1                       
% agriculture (1992) -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.08 -0.35 -0.39 -0.41 -0.41 0.93 -0.47 1                     
Δ % developed (2011-1992) 0.02 -0.18 0.35 0.03 0.30 0.46 0.41 0.59 -0.33 0.32 -0.14 1                   
land use diversity -0.03 0.06 -0.30 -0.07 -0.18 -0.32 -0.29 -0.35 0.53 -0.32 0.44 -0.35 1                 
median age -0.04 -0.06 -0.22 -0.09 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21 -0.26 0.05 -0.20 -0.01 -0.22 0.20 1               
% white -0.06 -0.13 -0.22 -0.13 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.27 0.27 -0.28 0.25 -0.14 0.26 0.34 1             
housing units % owner-occupied -0.10 -0.08 -0.30 -0.12 -0.42 -0.40 -0.39 -0.47 0.33 -0.44 0.31 -0.26 0.34 0.44 0.46 1           
housing units % built after 1999 -0.03 0.17 0.19 0.04 -0.10 0.03 -0.04 -0.14 0.01 -0.24 0.06 0.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.04 0.09 1         
housing units % built before 1950 0.05 -0.22 -0.24 -0.07 0.01 -0.17 -0.14 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.18 -0.11 0.24 0.15 0.26 0.05 -0.49 1       
housing units newness index -0.05 0.23 0.26 0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.08 -0.06 -0.15 -0.16 -0.11 0.12 -0.22 -0.18 -0.21 0.00 0.77 -0.93 1     
housing units % valued > $100,000 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.25 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.37 -0.32 0.39 1   
housing units median value 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.22 0.33 0.33 0.11 -0.15 0.11 -0.17 0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.19 -0.20 0.22 0.64 1 
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Figure B.12.  Matrix scatterplot of the most highly correlated continuous variables selected for regression analysis on binary stormwater fee enactment variable.  
Locally weighted smoothing curves shown in green. 
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Table B.5.  Cross-tabulation of MS4 phase against government type on the binary stormwater fee enactment variable. 
MS
4 p
ha
se
 borough village town township 
ch
ar
te
r t
ow
ns
hi
p 
m
un
ici
pa
lit
y 
pl
an
ta
tio
n city city-county county 
pa
ris
h 
SUM 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
w/
o f
ee
 
w/ fee 
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w/ fee 
# # % # # % # # % # # % # # # # # % # # % # # % # # # % 
0 652 3 0.5 2987 135 4.3 6888 39 0.6 11746 254 2.1 78   34 6932 336 4.6 6   0 2438 16 0.7 49 31810 783 2.4 
1       6 8 57.1 39 12 23.5             361 218 37.7   7 100.0 37 33 47.1 1 444 278 38.5 
2 562 2 0.4 552 71 11.4 828 83 9.1 652 14 2.1 39 3   1343 822 38.0 2 1 33.3 371 62 14.3 12 4364 1055 19.5 
waiver             10   0                                       
SUM 1214 5 0.4 3545 214 5.7 7765 134 1.7 12398 268 2.1 117 3 34  8636 1376 13.7 8 8 50.0 2846 111 3.8 62  36628 2116 5.5 
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Figure B.13.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation between local governments that have and have not enacted 
stormwater fees by MS4 regulation phase.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 
95% confidence intervals around median values (white boxes).  Y-axes truncated for perimeter, population, population density, change in percent developed land 
use, and median age to visually emphasize separation between distributions. 
231 
 
Figure B.14.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation between local governments that have and have not enacted 
stormwater fees by local government type.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 
95% confidence intervals around median values (white boxes).  Y-axes truncated for perimeter, population, population density, change in percent developed land 
use, median age, and median housing unit value to visually emphasize separation between distributions. 
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Figure B.15.  Boxplot of percent developed land use by state and stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and 
mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes). 
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Figure B.16.  Boxplot of percent white population by MS4 regulation phase (3 = Phase 2 waiver) and stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are proportional to 
sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes). 
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Figure B.17.  Boxplot of percent white population by state and stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and 
mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes). 
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Figure B.18.  Boxplot of population by state and stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular 
crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes).  Y-axes truncated to visually emphasize separation between 
distributions. 
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Figure B.19.  Boxplot of percent agricultural land use by state and stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and 
mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes). 
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Figure B.20.  Boxplot of median housing unit value by MS4 phase and stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) 
and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes). 
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Figure B.21.  Boxplot of median housing unit value by local government type and stormwater fee enactment.  Charter township, municipality, plantation, city-
county, and parish government types not shown for visual clarity. 
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B.4.2 When 
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Figure B.22.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation among decades of stormwater fee enactment.  Box widths are 
proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (white boxes).  
Y-axes truncated for land area, population, and population density to visually emphasize separation between distributions. 
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Table B.6.  Pearson correlation coefficients for continuous variables selected for regression analysis on timing of stormwater fee enactment. 
Variables in grey text were eliminated due to high collinearity with other variables. 
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# CSO discharges 1                                   
land area 0.343 1                                 
population 0.549 0.457 1                               
population density 0.256 -0.174 0.069 1                             
% urbanized (2010) 0.222 -0.348 -0.077 0.563 1                           
% developed (2011) 0.197 -0.305 -0.043 0.755 0.747 1                         
% forest (2011) 0.029 0.181 0.033 -0.378 -0.336 -0.558 1                       
% deciduous (2011) 0.128 -0.027 -0.046 -0.289 -0.179 -0.420 0.773 1                     
% agriculture (2011) -0.232 0.030 -0.063 -0.419 -0.572 -0.496 -0.085 0.051 1                   
Δ % agriculture (2011-1992) 0.136 0.135 0.111 0.176 0.023 0.073 0.080 -0.105 -0.309 1                 
racial diversity -0.366 -0.122 -0.278 -0.174 -0.171 -0.136 0.020 0.146 0.259 -0.162 1               
% white or black -0.104 -0.093 -0.255 -0.284 -0.165 -0.257 0.153 0.246 0.185 -0.132 0.615 1             
% not white and not black 0.078 0.099 0.269 0.396 0.157 0.280 -0.257 -0.315 -0.189 0.165 -0.367 -0.761 1           
housing units % owner-occupied -0.252 -0.016 -0.157 -0.300 -0.205 -0.319 0.101 0.197 0.233 -0.166 0.406 0.311 -0.284 1         
housing units % built before 1950 0.169 -0.092 -0.041 0.119 0.000 0.131 0.028 0.108 -0.006 0.097 0.164 0.179 -0.221 -0.221 1       
housing units vintage diversity 0.144 -0.065 -0.076 -0.001 -0.103 -0.091 -0.002 0.025 0.140 -0.086 0.042 0.060 -0.060 0.121 0.332 1     
housing units median value 0.000 0.002 0.038 0.190 0.099 0.069 0.009 -0.071 -0.168 0.143 0.016 -0.213 0.139 0.153 -0.124 -0.061 1   
housing units % valued > $300k 
- % valued < 150k -0.015 0.057 0.081 0.137 0.071 0.001 0.052 -0.060 -0.144 0.106 0.020 -0.222 0.125 0.240 -0.316 -0.096 0.804 1 
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Figure B.23.  Matrix scatterplot of the most highly correlated continuous variables selected for regression analysis on timing of stormwater fee enactment.  
Locally weighted smoothing curves shown in green. 
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Figure B.24.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation among decades of stormwater fee enactment by MS4 
regulation phase.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals 
around median values (white boxes).  Y-axes truncated for land area, population, and population density to visually emphasize separation between distributions. 
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Figure B.25.  Boxplot of percent agricultural land use by MS4 regulation phase, state, and decade of fee enactment. 
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Table B.7.  Number of stormwater fees enacted each decade by MS4 regulation phase. 
MS4 phase 1970 - 1979 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2009 2010 and after total 
0 
 
5 67 119 83 274 
1 2 21 109 70 25 227 
2 4 48 168 411 185 816 
total 6 74 344 600 293 1317 
 
B.4.3 In what order within states
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Figure B.26.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation among state-specific enactment sequence groups.  Box 
widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values 
(white boxes).  Y-axes truncated for land area and population to visually emphasize separation between distributions. 
247 
Table B.8.  Pearson correlation coefficients for continuous variables selected for regression analysis on state-specific sequence of stormwater fee enactment. 
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land area 1          
population 0.457 1         
% urbanized (2010) -0.348 -0.077 1        
% forest (2011) 0.181 0.033 -0.336 1       
% agriculture (2011) 0.030 -0.063 -0.572 -0.085 1      
Δ % forest (2011-1992) -0.023 0.006 -0.090 -0.341 0.332 1     
median age 0.001 -0.110 -0.055 0.090 -0.168 -0.010 1    
racial diversity -0.122 -0.278 -0.171 0.020 0.259 0.225 0.332 1   
housing units tenancy diversity -0.043 -0.161 -0.179 0.099 0.229 0.088 0.317 0.380 1  
housing units % built before 1950 -0.092 -0.041 0.000 0.028 -0.006 0.059 0.030 0.164 -0.231 1 
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Figure B.27.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation among state-specific enactment sequence groups by MS4 
regulation phase.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) values marked.  Y-axes truncated for land area and population to visually 
emphasize separation between distributions. 
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Figure B.28.  Boxplot of continuous variables whose distributions exhibited the greatest separation among state-specific enactment sequence groups by local 
government type.  Box widths are proportional to sample size.  Outlier (grey Xs) values marked.  Y-axes truncated for land area and population to visually 
emphasize separation between distributions. 
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B.5 OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
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Figure B.29.  Boxplot of percent unincorporated area in counties by state and stormwater fee enactment. 
Outlier (grey Xs) and mean (circular crosshairs) values marked, with 95% confidence intervals around median values (yellow boxes). 
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APPENDIX C 
FORM 
C.1 INTERVIEW SCRIPT 
Although I adjusted the interview questions somewhat to better tailor each interview to particular 
people and organizations, the following interview script outlines the main points I aimed to cover 
in each interview. 
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A bit about you 
 
• What is your current role in your municipality? 
• How long have you been serving in your current position here? 
• What are your main responsibilities in this position? 
• What – if any – positions have you held here previously? 
 
• To what extent are you directly involved with decisions regarding stormwater and/or sewer management? 
 
Your stormwater finances / fee 
 
• Does your municipality currently assess a stormwater fee, or has your municipality ever assessed a stormwater fee?  If 
so, to what extent were or are you involved with the design, deliberation, implementation, evaluation, or management 
of your municipality’s stormwater fee?  What led your jurisdiction to first consider a stormwater fee?  To the best of 
your knowledge and memory, from where did the idea initially arise?  If not, how does your municipality finance 
stormwater costs?  Has your municipality ever considered such a fee, either independently or as part of a multi-
municipal fee system? 
 
• To the best of your knowledge, in the broader metropolitan region, has there been any multi-municipal collaboration or 
cooperation on stormwater fees specifically (e.g., on a county, watershed, or other basis), or stormwater and/or sewer 
management generally?  If so, has your municipality been involved in any of those endeavors?  In what capacity?  How 
would you describe those efforts?  Did your municipality voluntarily participate in these efforts?  What forces, interests, 
or objectives drove those discussions?  If not, why not? 
 
• In the metropolitan region, have there been any other instances of inter-municipal collaboration or cooperation on other 
fronts (e.g., transportation, economic development)?  If so, in what institutional forums did these efforts take place 
(e.g., councils of government, conservancy districts, watershed organizations, first suburbs consortia)?  Did any of 
these other collaborative efforts influence your municipality’s decision to participate or not participate in a multi-
municipal stormwater fee system?  If so, how? 
 
• To what extent would you say the following factors influenced your municipality’s decisions regarding stormwater 
financing / fees:  political (intra-municipal and inter-municipal); physiographic (i.e., your municipality’s position in your 
watershed); regulatory (e.g., MS4 permit requirements)?  Any other kinds of factors that influenced your municipality’s 
decision regarding stormwater financing / fees? 
  
• If your municipality has a stormwater fee or participates in a multi-municipal stormwater fee system, how was the 
stormwater fee first received in your community?  Has the reception changed over time?  Has any opposition to the fee 
ever manifested?  If so, how would you describe the nature, source, and effects of that opposition? 
 
• Did your municipality – either directly or through another entity – conduct any sort of public outreach or public relations 
campaign prior to, concurrent with, or after enactment of the fee?  If so, how would you describe the elements of this 
campaign (e.g., its leaders, its goals, its components, its effects)? 
 
• In your opinion, has the stormwater fee been successful in your municipality?  Do you foresee the fee continuing into 
the future?  If so, why?  If not, how could it be improved?   
 
Conclusion 
 
• That’s all the questions I have for you.  Is there anything else you’d like to add?  Do you have any questions for me? 
 
• Again, thank you very much for your generosity with your time and your willingness to participate in this interview. 
 
• If you want a report on my research, I’ll be in touch when as my dissertation progresses. 
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C.2 INTERVIEW TARGETS 
The following tables provide further information on the people I interviewed for the stormwater 
fee form case studies (Table C.1) as well as the characteristics of each general-purpose 
subcounty government in the MSDGC/HCSWD service area (Table C.2), the NEORSD service 
area (Table C.3), and the ALCOSAN service area (Table C.4). 
I conducted all interviews in person, except for the people representing the City of 
Cheviot and the Cincinnati Stormwater Management Utility, with whom I only had brief 
conversations over the telephone (Table C.1).  Due to a lack of response or scheduling conflicts, 
I was unable to interview representatives of a few organizations I originally targeted, particularly 
MSDGC and the City of Cleveland.  All but two of the interviews were with people who were 
directly employed by the organizations I targeted.  In the NEORSD case, two of the interviews 
were with individuals directly employed by private engineering firms that were contracted with 
the targeted local governments (Table C.1).  While I initially aimed to interview people directly 
employed by the targeted organizations, these interviews with consulting engineers provided 
unique perspectives, particularly because these firms had multiple local government clients 
across the region and were thus familiar with a variety of local perspectives on the NEORSD 
stormwater fee. 
I recorded all the in-person interviews in the MSDGC and ALCOSAN case studies, but 
only two of five in-person interviews in the NEORSD case study (Table C.1).  The unwillingness 
or reluctance to have interviews recorded in the NEORSD case study was primarily due to 
experiences people had with documented communications being discoverable and even 
subpoenaed during the litigation over the NEORSD stormwater fee. 
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Table C.1.  People I interviewed. 
case 
organization person(s) interview 
name type title date 
in
-p
er
so
n?
 
re
co
rd
ed
? 
MS
DG
C 
Evendale village Service Department Director 10 May 2016 Y Y 
Hamilton County Storm Water District special district Program Director 11 May 2016 Y Y 
Sharonville city Community Development Director 09 May 2016 Y Y 
Wyoming city Assistant Public Works Director 12 May 2016 Y Y 
Cheviot city Safety/Service Director 12 May 2016 N N 
Cincinnati Stormwater Management Utility city Senior Engineer 13 May 2016 N N 
NE
OR
SD
 
Oakwood village Village Engineer* 15 Mar 2018 Y N 
Valley View village Civil Engineer** 
Principal** 
Civil Engineer** 
15 Mar 2018 
Y N 
Independence city City Engineer 16 Mar 2018 Y Y 
Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District special district Watershed Team Leader 16 Mar 2018 Y Y 
Strongsville city Law Director 16 Mar 2018 Y N 
AL
CO
SA
N 
Dormont Stormwater Authority authority (borough) Administrative Manager 15 Feb 2018 Y Y 
Etna borough Borough Manager 16 Feb 2018 Y Y 
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority authority (city) Sustainability Manager 
Green Infrastructure Program and Policy Manager 
26 Feb 2018 Y Y 
Shaler township Township Manager 14 Feb 2018 Y Y 
Whitehall borough Borough Manager 04 Apr 2018 Y Y 
* Chagrin Valley Engineering   ** Donald G. Bohning & Associates 
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Table C.2.  Select characteristics of general-purpose, subcounty governments in the MSDGC/HCSWD service area.  
name type stormwater fee area (mi2) population population / mi2 median income 
Cincinnati City HCSWD 77.9 298,165 3,826 $34,002 
Colerain Township HCSWD 42.8 58,640 1,369 $56,753 
Green Township HCSWD 27.8 58,484 2,102 $68,714 
Anderson Township HCSWD 30.4 43,553 1,434 $88,347 
Fairfield City none 20.9 42,643 2,042 $55,803 
Springfield Township HCSWD 16.4 36,364 2,219 $51,981 
Delhi Township HCSWD 10.1 29,546 2,935 $67,605 
Norwood City none 3.1 19,405 6,166 $36,075 
Sycamore Township HCSWD 6.8 19,219 2,847 $64,311 
Forest Park City independent 6.5 18,723 2,891 $48,865 
Miami Township HCSWD 22.7 15,812 697 $70,241 
Symmes Township HCSWD 8.3 14,726 1,770 $93,242 
Harrison Township 
 
17.5 13,934 0 
 Sharonville City HCSWD 9.2 13,581 1,470 $49,920
Loveland City independent 4.9 12,405 2,516 $66,384 
Blue Ash City HCSWD 7.6 12,149 1,603 $65,991 
Springdale City none 5.0 11,212 2,258 $49,757 
Harrison City independent 4.9 10,479 2,130 $61,587 
Montgomery City HCSWD 5.3 10,440 1,974 $101,675 
Reading City none 2.9 10,354 3,580 $40,480 
North College Hill City none 1.8 9,362 5,127 $39,328 
Madeira City HCSWD 3.4 8,936 2,646 $86,612 
Wyoming City none 2.9 8,427 2,929 $108,346 
Cheviot City none 1.2 8,325 7,128 $37,841 
Milford City independent 3.6 6,892 1,914 $131,667 
Mount Healthy City HCSWD 1.4 6,061 4,311 $31,786 
Indian Hill City Village HCSWD 18.6 5,808 313 $209,250 
Deer Park City HCSWD 0.9 5,703 6,525 $50,015 
Whitewater Township HCSWD 25.3 5,496 217 $42,173 
Silverton Village HCSWD 1.1 4,779 4,298 $41,106 
Columbia Township HCSWD 2.5 4,529 1,786 $58,197 
St. Bernard Village none 1.5 4,361 2,821 $43,477 
Amberley Village HCSWD 3.5 3,598 1,028 $112,115 
Greenhills Village HCSWD 1.2 3,596 2,886 $55,000 
Golf Manor Village HCSWD 0.6 3,595 6,252 $36,941 
Lockland Village HCSWD 1.2 3,432 2,788 $32,695 
Mariemont Village HCSWD 0.9 3,386 3,919 $92,837 
Lincoln Heights Village HCSWD 0.8 3,368 4,491 $23,413 
Cleves Village none 1.6 3,354 2,123 $58,021 
Woodlawn Village none 2.6 3,300 1,284 $49,643 
Evendale Village HCSWD 4.7 2,773 585 $105,625 
Crosby Township HCSWD 19.8 2,754 139 $67,500 
Newtown Village HCSWD 2.2 2,672 1,230 $72,105 
Terrace Park Village HCSWD 1.2 2,254 1,920 $116,250 
Elmwood Place Village HCSWD 0.3 2,173 6,769 $20,540 
Glendale Village HCSWD 1.7 2,157 1,270 $96,840 
Fairfax Village HCSWD 0.8 1,703 2,232 $55,066 
Addyston Village HCSWD 0.9 970 1,141 $29,485 
North Bend Village HCSWD 1.1 886 828 $77,083 
Arlington Heights Village HCSWD 0.3 743 2,772 $41,354 
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Table C.3.  Select characteristics of general-purpose, subcounty governments in the NEORSD service area. 
name type county 
12
 g
an
g 
OH
SC
 area 
(mi2) population population / mi
2 median income 
Cleveland City Cuyahoga  + 82.5 396,815 4,812 $26,583 Parma City Cuyahoga  + 20.0 81,601 4,071 $51,383 Lakewood City Cuyahoga   6.7 52,131 7,787 $47,145 Euclid City Cuyahoga   11.5 48,920 4,253 $35,949 Cleveland Heights City Cuyahoga – – 8.1 46,121 5,674 $53,901 
Strongsville City Cuyahoga – – – 24.6 44,750 1,822 $80,323 
North Royalton City Cuyahoga –  21.3 30,444 1,431 $66,189 Garfield Heights City Cuyahoga   7.3 28,849 3,960 $40,376 Shaker Heights City Cuyahoga  + 6.3 28,448 4,498 $79,519 Solon City Cuyahoga   20.5 23,348 1,141 $96,976 Maple Heights City Cuyahoga   5.2 23,138 4,479 $37,911 South Euclid City Cuyahoga  + 4.7 22,295 4,791 $59,734 Hudson City Summit   25.8 22,262 864 $126,618 Parma Heights City Cuyahoga  + 4.2 20,718 4,957 $44,564 Broadview Heights City Cuyahoga   13.0 19,400 1,488 $77,480 Brook Park City Cuyahoga  + 7.5 19,212 2,556 $48,813 Mayfield Heights City Cuyahoga   4.2 19,155 4,582 $45,875 Berea City Cuyahoga   5.8 19,093 3,287 $57,896 Twinsburg City Summit   13.8 18,795 1,365 $73,314 East Cleveland City Cuyahoga   3.1 17,843 5,764 $19,953 Fairview Park City Cuyahoga   4.7 16,826 3,595 $54,431 Middleburg Heights City Cuyahoga  + 8.1 15,946 1,978 $58,810 Lyndhurst City Cuyahoga – – – 4.4 14,001 3,153 $65,921 
Brecksville City Cuyahoga – – – 19.6 13,656 697 $98,345 
Warrensville Heights City Cuyahoga  + 4.1 13,542 3,277 $35,733 University Heights City Cuyahoga   1.8 13,539 7,436 $65,143 Olmsted Township Cuyahoga  + 9.7 13,235 1,367 $72,743 Bedford City Cuyahoga   5.4 13,074 2,424 $41,285 Beachwood City Cuyahoga – – – 5.3 11,953 2,262 $88,287 
Seven Hills City Cuyahoga  + 4.9 11,804 2,406 $73,948 Macedonia City Summit   9.7 11,188 1,157 $86,061 Brooklyn City Cuyahoga  + 4.3 11,169 2,609 $45,102 Sagamore Hills Township Summit   11.2 10,964 977 $75,238 Bedford Heights City Cuyahoga – – 4.5 10,751 2,363 $37,692 
Richmond Heights City Cuyahoga   4.4 10,546 2,370 $51,212 Bath Township Summit – – 22.4 9,702 433 $101,079 
Willoughby Hills City Lake   10.8 9,485 875 $61,276 Olmsted Falls City Cuyahoga – – 4.1 9,024 2,187 $62,058 
Highland Heights City Cuyahoga   5.2 8,345 1,619 $101,875 Columbia Township Lorain   25.7 7,167 279 $67,824 Independence City Cuyahoga – – – 9.6 7,133 741 $84,900 
Richfield Township Summit   25.5 6,169 242 $94,500 Pepper Pike City Cuyahoga   7.1 5,979 837 $164,471 Northfield Center Township Summit   5.4 5,842 1,092 $86,346 Northfield Village Summit   1.1 3,677 3,403 $57,344 Oakwood Village Cuyahoga – – 3.4 3,667 1,069 $51,667 
Mayfield Village Cuyahoga  + 4.0 3,460 873 $72,156 Orange Village Cuyahoga  + 3.8 3,323 869 $102,109 Moreland Hills Village Cuyahoga  + 7.2 3,320 460 $139,539 Twinsburg Township Summit   6.6 2,877 439 $81,136 Walton Hills Village Cuyahoga   6.8 2,281 336 $69,167 Gates Mills Village Cuyahoga   9.1 2,270 249 $132,167 Newburgh Heights Village Cuyahoga  + 0.6 2,167 3,717 $33,750 Valley View Village Cuyahoga  + 5.6 2,034 366 $86,071 
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name type county 
12
 g
an
g 
OH
SC
 area 
(mi2) population population / mi
2 median income 
Brooklyn Heights Village Cuyahoga  + 1.8 1,543 874 $64,722 Boston Heights Village Summit   6.9 1,300 189 $103,603 Bratenahl Village Cuyahoga   1.6 1,197 746 $82,500 Highland Hills Village Cuyahoga  + 2.0 1,130 575 $23,984 North Randall Village Cuyahoga   0.8 1,027 1,339 $35,288 Glenwillow Village Cuyahoga – – 2.8 923 332 $87,375 
Woodmere Village Cuyahoga   0.3 884 2,646 $44,333 Cuyahoga Heights Village Cuyahoga  + 3.2 638 199 $49,286 Linndale Village Cuyahoga   0.1 179 2,209 $32,857 
 
 
Table C.4.  Select characteristics of general-purpose, subcounty governments in the ALCOSAN service area. 
name type area (mi2) population population / mi2 median income 
Pittsburgh City 58.3 305,305 5,233 $42,450 
Penn Hills Township 19.4 42,073 2,173 $49,844 
Mount Lebanon Township 6.1 32,865 5,411 $86,422 
Bethel Park Municipality 11.6 32,222 2,766 $72,083 
Ross Township 14.5 31,004 2,139 $65,726 
North Huntingdon Township 27.3 30,735 1,127 $69,471 
McCandless Township 16.6 28,872 1,736 $80,265 
Shaler Township 11.2 28,599 2,558 $68,054 
Monroeville Municipality 19.7 28,250 1,433 $58,538 
Plum Borough 29.0 27,474 948 $71,204 
Peters Township 19.7 21,928 1,115 $109,713 
West Mifflin Borough 14.5 20,153 1,391 $50,273 
Baldwin Borough 5.9 19,794 3,369 $55,573 
Penn Township 30.7 19,752 643 $72,922 
Upper St. Clair Township 9.8 19,521 1,990 $110,417 
Scott Township 3.9 16,914 4,331 $63,620 
Wilkinsburg Borough 2.3 15,797 7,018 $33,905 
South Fayette Township 20.4 15,283 751 $79,527 
North Fayette Township 25.2 14,385 571 $71,394 
Franklin Park Borough 13.6 14,228 1,050 $121,661 
Whitehall Borough 3.3 13,873 4,177 $59,853 
Robinson Township 15.3 13,676 892 $82,706 
Munhall Borough 2.4 11,305 4,741 $48,978 
North Versailles Township 8.2 10,178 1,244 $42,478 
Brentwood Borough 1.4 9,550 6,605 $51,197 
Swissvale Borough 1.2 8,893 7,157 $40,391 
O'Hara Township 7.4 8,529 1,155 $87,917 
Dormont Borough 0.8 8,491 11,175 $58,875 
Castle Shannon Borough 1.6 8,288 5,196 $50,783 
Bellevue Borough 1.1 8,285 7,374 $41,073 
Pleasant Hills Borough 2.8 8,271 2,984 $68,453 
Kennedy Township 5.5 8,007 1,447 $66,353 
Carnegie Borough 1.6 7,944 4,913 $45,109 
Collier Township 13.6 7,755 570 $68,542 
Indiana Township 17.6 7,287 414 $89,663 
West View Borough 1.0 6,704 6,633 $57,078 
Forest Hills Borough 1.6 6,475 4,142 $63,563 
Wilkins Township 2.7 6,311 2,300 $53,345 
Stowe Township 2.3 6,289 2,737 $35,552 
McKees Rocks Borough 1.1 6,046 5,398 $29,431 
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name type area (mi2) population population / mi2 median income 
Ohio Township 6.9 5,937 865 $105,919 
Crafton Borough 1.1 5,899 5,164 $51,236 
Fox Chapel Borough 7.9 5,392 684 $148,553 
Turtle Creek Borough 1.0 5,292 5,463 $33,345 
Bridgeville Borough 1.1 5,117 4,671 $45,849 
North Braddock Borough 1.6 4,810 3,099 $28,565 
Green Tree Borough 2.1 4,749 2,289 $72,604 
Avalon Borough 0.7 4,666 6,753 $39,552 
Millvale Borough 0.7 3,714 5,488 $35,496 
Sharpsburg Borough 0.6 3,421 5,425 $32,431 
Etna Borough 0.8 3,415 4,296 $44,615 
Mount Oliver Borough 0.3 3,362 9,907 $33,750 
Reserve Township 2.1 3,307 1,602 $59,256 
Ingram Borough 0.4 3,294 7,590 $48,490 
Pitcairn Borough 0.5 3,259 6,456 $30,902 
Homestead Borough 0.6 3,142 4,882 $24,703 
Edgewood Borough 0.6 3,080 5,244 $73,250 
Trafford Borough 0.2 3,049 12,623 $49,345 
Churchill Borough 2.2 2,990 1,367 $88,605 
Aspinwall Borough 0.4 2,773 7,207 $66,108 
Verona Borough 0.6 2,590 4,343 $37,857 
Emsworth Borough 0.7 2,443 3,529 $55,399 
Rankin Borough 0.5 2,274 4,519 $25,117 
East McKeesport Borough 0.4 2,111 5,096 $41,081 
Robinson Township 21.2 1,977 93 $47,893 
Baldwin Township 0.5 1,972 3,899 $60,595 
Wilmerding Borough 0.4 1,911 4,460 $25,536 
East Pittsburgh Borough 0.4 1,844 4,760 $25,697 
Braddock Borough 0.6 1,841 2,852 $24,551 
Ben Avon Borough 0.5 1,774 3,871 $91,250 
West Homestead Borough 1.0 1,720 1,699 $49,219 
Braddock Hills Borough 1.0 1,674 1,752 $31,000 
Blawnox Borough 0.4 1,670 3,787 $39,929 
McDonald Borough 0.2 1,624 8,139 $43,571 
Oakdale Borough 0.5 1,508 3,216 $58,618 
Heidelberg Borough 0.3 1,314 4,641 $43,333 
Whitaker Borough 0.3 1,165 3,542 $39,167 
Neville Township 2.3 1,145 488 $44,375 
Chalfant Borough 0.2 798 5,018 $44,659 
Wall Borough 0.4 711 1,626 $45,000 
Kilbuck Township 2.6 632 243 $73,125 
McDonald Borough 0.3 503 1,563 $49,271 
Rosslyn Farms Borough 0.6 465 831 $128,750 
Thornburg Borough 0.4 449 1,032 $136,000 
Ben Avon Heights Borough 0.2 349 2,011 $148,750 
Trafford Borough 1.2 81 67 
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C.3 INTERVIEW CODING FRAMEWORKS 
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Figure C.1.  Coding framework for the institutional collective action framework. 
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Figure C.2.  Coding framework for concepts shared among the institutional collective action, ecology of games, and local public economy frameworks. 
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C.4 ADDITIONAL INTERVIEW CODING RESULTS 
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Figure C.3.  Dendrogram of coded concepts for the form case studies.  Concepts clustered by Pearson correlation coefficient based on number of times each 
concept was coded to each piece of evidence.  Grey highlighting indicates concepts specific to the institutional collective action framework.  Numbers indicate 
the number of times each concept was coded across all interviews (left column) and number of interviews in which each concept was coded (right column). 
17 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
36 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
31 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
9 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
19 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
29 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
4 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
3 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
13 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
12 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
51 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
100 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
22 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
30 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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